W.D.Ky.: Mere refusal to cooperate is not RS, but headlong flight pretty much is

Mere refusal to cooperate is not reasonable suspicion, but headlong flight adds a lot to otherwise legally innocuous yet suggestive facts. United States v. Vance, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87086 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2017):

Most importantly in the analysis, though, is the fact that Vance, upon seeing a patrol vehicle and hearing Officer Lawrence address him, took off running on foot immediately. “Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). If an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991). But, unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual’s right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. In the event that a suspect flees upon noticing police, the stop is supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 126. Following Wardlow, the Sixth Circuit “held that ‘the speed of the suspect’s movements’ to get away ‘may be relevant to the totality of the circumstances’ for reasonable suspicion, [United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2006), and the Sixth Circuit has] considered the abruptness and other evasive characteristics of a suspect’s departure upon noticing the police to determine whether his reaction contributes to reasonable suspicion.” Johnson, 620 F.3d at 694; see United States v. Davis, 331 Fed. App’x 356, 358, 360 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding reasonable suspicion when a defendant who emerged from a known drug house “had a deer-in-the-headlights kind of look and proceeded to pick up the pace” to cross the street upon seeing two officers on patrol); United States v. Fisher, 229 F.3d 1154, 2000 WL 1234327, at *2-3 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable suspicion where the defendant turned away from police, feigned entry into an apartment, and upon confrontation, fled from police on foot).