WaPo: Amazon wants a key to your house. I did it. I regretted it.

WaPo: Amazon wants a key to your house. I did it. I regretted it. by Geoffrey Fisher:

Amazon Key might help you avoid package theft, but the smart lock and camera aren’t good enough to warrant giving Amazon control of your door.

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CA2: Traffic stop ignored traffic inquiries and went into carrying drugs within 5 minutes; unreasonable under Rodriguez but valid at time, so GFE applies

“This appeal arises out of a traffic stop of Defendant-Appellant Brayan Gomez and his resulting judgment of conviction for heroin-trafficking …. During the five-minute traffic stop prompted by multiple traffic violations, the officers prolonged Gomez’s seizure by asking him narcotics-related questions. Gomez then consented to the search of a bag in the car’s trunk, which contained heroin. The district court denied Gomez’s motion to suppress. We hold that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers extended the stop for reasons unrelated to Gomez’s traffic violations. Nevertheless, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies because, at the time of the stop, the officers reasonably relied on our binding precedent, which we conclude is abrogated by Rodriguez v. United States ….” United States v. Gomez, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24502 (2d Cir. Dec. 5, 2017)

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CA4: Officer who obtained court order for minor ptf to be detained and to get an erection so police could photograph it gets no QI; this isn’t remotely reasonable

Plaintiff was a 17 year old that allegedly sent a picture of his erection to his 15 year old girlfriend. Defendant obtained a court order for plaintiff to be transported to a juvenile detention center to masturbate to get an erection so the police could photograph it as evidence so they could charge him with child pornography. Any reasonable police officer had to know that such a court order is unreasonable on its face, and it states a § 1983 claim. This case completely fails the defense of qualified immunity. Sims v. Labowitz, 877 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. Dec. 5, 2017), opinion reissued, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 6311 (4th Cir. Mar. 14, 2018).
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E.D.Mich.: Police officer’s presence at repossession doesn’t make it state action

A police officer’s presence at the scene of a vehicle repossession doesn’t turn an otherwise private action into a Fourth Amendment seizure. King v. Blackhawk Recovery & Investigations, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198373 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2017).

“As the People concede, defendant is entitled to suppression because the hearing evidence did not establish a sufficient basis for a search of a closed container incident to defendant’s arrest, under the principles set forth in People v Jimenez (22 N.Y.3d 717, 985 N.Y.S.2d 456, 8 N.E.3d 831 [2014], which was decided after defendant’s conviction.” People v. Mora-Diaz, 2017 NY Slip Op 08485, 2017 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8535 (1st Dept. Dec. 5, 2017).*

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UT: There was PC for the warrant, and whether there is a state exclusionary rule doesn’t have to be decided

The trial court erred in concluding there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, but the good faith exception applied. Instead, there was a substantial basis for issuance of the search warrant, and the exclusionary rule question thus doesn’t have to be decided. There were specific nonconclusory facts, and the trial court did not read the affidavit in a “common sense” fashion giving deference to the issuance of the warrant, instead reading it conclusorily. State v. Rowan, 2017 UT 88, 2017 Utah LEXIS 205 (Dec. 1, 2017).
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techdirt: Intelligence Director Says Gov’t Can Demand Encryption Backdoors Without Having To Run It By The FISA Court

techdirt: Intelligence Director Says Gov’t Can Demand Encryption Backdoors Without Having To Run It By The FISA Court by Tim Cushing:
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NBC News: FDA Approves Pill That Tracks Whether You Took Your Meds

NBC News: FDA Approves Pill That Tracks Whether You Took Your Meds by Maggie Fox:

The Food and Drug Administration approved a new pill [on November 14] that can track whether people have taken their medications – and report back to the patient or the doctor. The idea is to help people remember to take their pills, but some critics are already calling it a ‘biological Big Brother’ and are suspicious because the drug it’s combined with treats mental illness.

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MassPrivateI: Police in two states use hospitals to take motorists blood without a warrant

MassPrivateI: Police in two states use hospitals to take motorists blood without a warrant:
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Lexis’s U.S. Dist. database will hit 200,000 in 2017 today

… for the first time. They’re clearly trying to include more stuff from the U.S. District Courts. Some of it is meaningless, I know and I see, but there is more substance being posted. This is about 4 times the number from about 10 years ago.

About once a week I get citations that are more than 3-4 years old. If the District Court that decided it didn’t think much of it at the time, I’m hard pressed to take the time to read it now.

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OH12: 911 call about overdose brought narcs and EMS; entry justified and plain view sustained

Defendant was making methamphetamine in his garage, and he overdosed on heroin. His mother found him and called 911. A narcotics officer arrived shortly before EMS, and he saw defendant on the floor with a used syringe near him. EMS administered Narcan to defendant and revived him. “During this check, Deputy Spears testified he also observed in plain view several syringes and ‘a glass jar that was boiling over’ sitting on a workbench less than five feet from where Hensgen had been found. Based on his training and experience, Deputy Spears also testified he believed the mason jar contained an active ‘one-pot’ methamphetamine lab.” The initial entry was justified by the exigency of the overdose call, and the evidence was all in plain view. Other officers were called to render the meth operation safe. State v. Hensgen, 2017-Ohio-8793, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 5230 (12th Dist. Dec. 4, 2017).

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OH3: PC for anticipatory SW exists here merely because drug traffickers commonly use their home to store drugs

The trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress because the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause for an anticipatory search warrant existed. Evidence of drug trafficking, without more, furnished probable cause to search the residence of a man who was known to reside with defendant because drug traffickers often keep evidence of their illicit activities in their residences. The evidence indicated an ongoing relationship between the CI and defendant’s housemate, such that he both sold drugs to the CI and was comfortable enough in the presence of the CI to have the CI accompany him to various locations around town while he boasted about the quantity of drugs he had for sale. As to defendant’s argument the warrant was stale, their relationship extended for months, and there was information from the CI about defendant being in possession that day. State v. Reece, 2017-Ohio-8789, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 5227 (3d Dist. Dec. 4, 2017).

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WaPo: This week in the Fourth Amendment: Cops, drugs and the Castle Doctrine

WaPo: This week in the Fourth Amendment: Cops, drugs and the Castle Doctrine by Radley Balko:
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D.Me.: SW for jail cell produced evidence; USAO ordered to return some stuff, but sheriff not because USAO can’t be ordered to get it from them

There was a search warrant for personal papers in a jail, and some came into the possession of the USAO but two pages did not. They were needed for litigation. The USAO is ordered to return the copies it has, but the court won’t tell the USAO to tell the jail to turn over what it has because that’s outside of Rule 41(g). United States v. Stile, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197716 (D. Me. Dec. 1, 2017).

Defendant claims in his post-conviction petition that the searching officers left a listening device behind in his house after a search to continue to surveill him. The state denies it, and defense counsel admits that there is no factual basis for the assertion. Denied on this ground for lack of a factual basis. [No mention of what that allegedly produced against him.] State v. Harris, 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 625 (Nov. 30, 2017).*

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DE: Typo of month of controlled buy in affidavit for SW could be ignored; totality shows what it really is

The affidavit says that the controlled buy was in the “second half of February 2017” when the search warrant was issued February 1. It’s clear to the court from reading the affidavit as a whole that this is a typo that can be ignored. State v. Tingle, 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 623 (Dec. 1, 2017).

Defendant was pulled over for a seatbelt violation, and the officer smelled marijuana coming from the passenger compartment. A drug dog was called. The first officer never told the canine officer about the smell. While that can be used to assess credibility, it’s not determinative, and the officer was otherwise credible on the stand. Calling the dog was justified. State v. Faulkner, 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 611 (Nov. 30, 2017).*

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CA11: Supervised release warrantless computer search condition isn’t limited to sex offenses

Defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse, but not a sex offense, in state court, and that resulted in revocation of supervised release. The new sentence was 24 months confinement and 36 months supervised release. A warrantless computer search condition was imposed, and defendant objects and appeals. The warrantless reasonable suspicion computer search condition isn’t limited to sex offenders. It was within the district court’s discretion at sentencing. United States v. Dean, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24345 (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2017).

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CA6: Moving to withdraw plea after three months because “there were technical issues with his arrest warrant” is denied; not a ground for relief

Defendant moved to withdraw his plea three months later because “there were technical issues with his arrest warrant.” “Further, Miller never asserted his innocence, which also weighs against granting the motion. He argued only that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because there were technical issues with his arrest warrant. And, most importantly, the circumstances underlying Miller’s plea do not suggest that his plea was involuntary.” United States v. Miller, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24359 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2017). [What “technical issues” with an arrest warrant are enough to overcome the arrest and then a guilty plea? I can’t think of any. “An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).]

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WaPo: House Intelligence Committee passes spy-bill renewal, but on party lines

WaPo: House Intelligence Committee passes spy-bill renewal, but on party lines by Karoun Demirjian:

The House Intelligence Committee passed a bill Friday to restrain the government’s access to data collected under a powerful authority to collect foreign intelligence on U.S. soil, weighing in on what has become a wide-ranging debate, just days before Congress must act to keep the surveillance program from expiring.

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OH2: Two on nonconsensual encounters: one in an ER, one on def’s own property

The officer’s encounter with defendant in the ER initially asking if he had “any drugs or weapons” was not consensual. “The trial court concluded that Officer West’s encounter was not a consensual encounter. The trial court emphasized that West approached Weisgarber in an individual treatment room in the emergency department solely due to a report of Weisgarber’s drug overdose, and the officer initiated the contact by asking whether Weisgarber had ‘any drugs or weapons.’ The trial court implicitly found that the location of the encounter and the language used by the officer when he approached conveyed to Weisgarber that a response was required.” State v. Weisgarber, 2017-Ohio-8764, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 5202 (2d Dist. Dec. 1, 2017).*

Officer told defendant on his own property to stop his dirt bike so the officer could search it to check for the VIN then he let him go. “Based upon these facts, we cannot conclude that a reasonable person in Wertz’s position would have believed that he was free to go; Wertz, on his own property, was ordered to stop moving a dirt bike, an activity which exhibited at the time no evidence of illegality, and to come to Lingo. Wertz was asked several questions, and the VIN number of the bike was searched for and recorded. Lingo stated that after the interview, he ‘let [Wertz] go because I had no further cause to keep him.’ Since Lingo’s encounter with Wertz was not consensual, Wertz’s assigned error is sustained. State v. Wertz, 2017-Ohio-8766, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 5203 (2d Dist. Dec. 1, 2017).*

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CA7: Nolo plea after losing suppression hearing is collateral estoppel

A state multiday suppression hearing was denied, and that led to defendant’s nolo plea to the charges. Then he sued in federal court. When collateral estoppel was invoked, he argued that the plea vitiated collateral estoppel. It didn’t. Derrick v. Hines, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 24261 (7th Cir. Nov. 30, 2017):
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W.D.Mo.: Knock-and-announce didn’t apply to an open door; plain view reasonable, but wife’s consent was vitiated by threat of jail if she didn’t sign form

Officers came to defendant’s house both on a call about the welfare of children living there and with a pre-existing warrant for defendant’s arrest. They encountered one of the children outside taking trash to the street and determined that defendant was home. The officer stepped in the open door and called out for defendant. No weapons were drawn. This circuit has previously held that an open door vitiates knock-and-announce. “The Court finds that the officers’ entry into the residence to effectuate the arrest of defendant Sherrod on a warrant was reasonable. The officers were not required to knock and announce their presence before entering the open door of the residence.” Defendant’s wife’s consent to search after they were inside is involuntary because she was told to sign the consent form or go to jail. She was also under the influence of something. “However, Officer Trost told Ms. Sherrod that if she did not sign the consent form, she would be going to jail because of the ‘stuff’ at the house and her city warrant. (Fact No. 10) On cross-examination, Officer Trost was asked: ‘You gave her an option, sign it or go to jail, correct?’ and Officer Trost answered, ‘Yes.’ (Fact No. 10)” The gun in plain view, however, are not suppressed. United States v. Sherrod, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198114 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 30, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198115 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 1, 2017).

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