E.D.Va.: SW for Manafort’s house is upheld

(1) “In sum, the warrant here (i) identified the items to be seized in relation to specific Subject Offenses, (ii) included an illustrative list of records to limit the discretion of executing agents, and (iii) provided a sufficient description of the categories of items to be seized given the nature and circumstances of the crimes at issue. Accordingly, the warrant was adequately particularized and suppression on this ground is inappropriate.” (2) The officers detailed specific information that electronic devices would be found in defendant’s home. “These facts, taken together, lend ample support to the common-sense conclusion reached by the magistrate judge here, namely that probable cause existed to believe (i) that defendant’s electronic devices would contain evidence relevant to the Subject Offenses and (ii) that the devices in question would be located at defendant’s residence.” (3) “In sum, the warrant here also satisfied the breadth requirement of the Fourth Amendment by adequately limiting the scope of the warrant by the probable cause on which the warrant was based. Accordingly, suppression on this ground is unwarranted.” (4) Even if the search warrant was issued without probable cause, the good faith exception would save it. (5) The search warrant was not executed unreasonably. United States v. Manafort, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116033 (E.D. Va. July 12, 2018).*

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CA9: Def didn’t have standing in her parents’ house that she used just to store stuff

Defendant kept stuff at her parents’ house, which was searched with a warrant for her stuff. She lacked standing because it was merely a storage place shared with others. The search warrant was narrowed by the district court with partial suppression because of time limitations, and this was proper. United States v. Chang, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19347 (9th Cir. July 12, 2018). (Similar to Manafort‘s case.)

Defendant’s house was searched in a sex trafficking operation. He was accused of keeping Thai women working. It was reasonable to conclude that there was no other base of operations that the government could see, so his house was a likely source of where the proceeds and the drugs to keep the women high were kept. The warrant was not stale because the information supporting it was from 2009-2017. United States v. Morris, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116210 (D. Minn. July 12, 2018).*

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D.Minn.: Def’s lawyering up prior to giving statement didn’t prevent her from being asked for consent

Defendant was Mirandized and lawyered up. The officer then asked for consent in writing and got it. Her lawyering up didn’t prevent her from being asked to consent, and it was voluntary on the totality. United States v. Unpradit, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116208 (D. Minn. July 12, 2018):
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Miami Herald: The chief wanted perfect stats, so cops were told to pin crimes on black people, probe found

Miami Herald: The chief wanted perfect stats, so cops were told to pin crimes on black people, probe found by Charles Rabin, Jay Weaver & David Ovalle:
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NYTimes: Advocates From Left and Right Ask Supreme Court to Revisit Immunity Defense

NYTimes: Advocates From Left and Right Ask Supreme Court to Revisit Immunity Defense by Alan Feuer:
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Gizmodo: Microsoft Asks Congress to Regulate Face Recognition

Gizmodo: Microsoft Asks Congress to Regulate Face Recognition by Sidney Fussell:
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ACLU Blog: Stop-and-Frisk Settlement in Milwaukee Lawsuit Is a Wakeup Call for Police Nationwide

ACLU Blog: Stop-and-Frisk Settlement in Milwaukee Lawsuit Is a Wakeup Call for Police Nationwide by Nusrat Choudhury:

In a banner day for police reform, the city of Milwaukee has entered into a settlement agreement to end practices amounting to a decade-long stop-and-frisk program that resulted in hundreds of thousands of baseless stops as well as racial and ethnic profiling of Black and Latino people citywide. The agreement provides a roadmap for how the Milwaukee Police Department and Fire and Police Commission must reform to protect the constitutional rights of the people they serve.

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Human Rights Watch Blog: US: Government Has Planted Spy Phones With Suspects

Human Rights Watch Blog: US: Government Has Planted Spy Phones With Suspects:
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OH7: There was plenty of PC for def’s DNA in a murder case to connect him to the body found in his house

Affidavits for search warrant can be based on hearsay, and here the totality of information was probable cause to gather defendant’s DNA in a murder case. There was a known connection between the defendant and the victim, and male DNA was found on her, and she was found in his house. State v. Johnson, 2018-Ohio-2780, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 2982 (7th Dist. June 21, 2018).*

Defendant had a Franks hearing in the district court and lost. The information he claimed was material wasn’t, and there was plenty for probable cause aside from the allegedly false statements which would be found not false anyway. United States v. Harris, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19254 (2d Cir. July 11, 2018).*

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WY: PC existed for vehicle search before dog was called in; legality of stop abandoned

Defendant’s three sentence motion to suppress said it would follow up with authority. The motion and hearing without that authority narrowed the scope of the claim and abandoned the justification for the stop and any state constitutional claim. What developed during the stop was probable cause on the totality, and the claim the dog sniff was unreasonable is moot. Pier v. State, 2018 WY 79, 2018 Wyo. LEXIS 83 (July 13, 2018).

The DEA asked the MSP to make a stop of defendant, which was for a traffic offense. Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the subsequent search (1) because a drug dog alert that happened while the initial stop was being conducted was reasonable, and (2) because the DEA had probable cause for the search. United States v. Patton, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543 (E.D. Mich. July 10, 2018).*

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W.D.Mo.: Overnight guest didn’t have standing in attic

Defendant was an overnight guest in a house searched with a warrant. A protective sweep of the attic was done, and the only way into the attic was from the room defendant was staying in. The court first finds that defendant lacks standing in the attic as opposed to the living areas of the house under Olson. Second, even if he had standing, the protective sweep of the attic was reasonable. United States v. Thompson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117073 (W.D. Mo. July 13, 2018).

There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s traffic stop for lane violations and then not stopping at a stop line. He didn’t contest that he consented to a search after the stop. State v. Hudson, 2018-Ohio-2717, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 2926 (4th Dist. July 11, 2018).*

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CA3: Def’s trespass argument of using key to find door was interesting, but waived

Defendant raises an interesting argument, but it’s raised for the first time on appeal and thus waived: “Wheeler next argues that under the trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment articulated in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), the officers’ use of a key seized from Wheeler first to enter the apartment complex at 500 Mills Avenue and then to ascertain which apartment Wheeler had access to by testing the key in each apartment’s lock, constituted warrantless searches that were per se unreasonable, requiring the suppression of the evidence resulting therefrom. We conclude that Wheeler has waived the Jones-Jardines theory by failing to raise it at trial and that to the extent he presses a claim based on the reasonable expectation of privacy principles announced in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), his argument fails.” United States v. Wheeler, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 18998 (3d Cir. July 12, 2018).*

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W.D.Mo.: Cell phone seized during child porn raid was initially seized and searched, and then seven months later searched again; no exclusion

The defendant’s cell phone was seized during a child pornography raid. The phone was attempted to be searched reasonably promptly, and it was confirmed there was child pornography on it. The search was not completed, however, because of problems with the software and equipment to do it. It was followed up seven months later. The later search was still reasonable, despite the limitations in the warrant on a 14 day window, and would not be excluded. The phone had been secured throughout. United States v. Keeter, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116202 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2018):
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CA11: Newly discovered evidence that officer committed perjury years after obtaining def’s SW wasn’t sufficient for successor habeas

Newly discovered evidence that the police officer involved in obtaining the search warrant for petitioner had committed perjury in some other proceeding years later wasn’t sufficient to show actual innocence for successor habeas. In re Taylor, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19236 (11th Cir. July 13, 2018):
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NMCCA: Despite lack of PC for search authorization, GFE applies because everybody thought there was PC

Defendant service member had sex with another service member, allegedly taking pictures and videos of her. Then he allegedly tried to extort her over the pictures, which she reported. A search authorization was issued for defendant’s on base housing to look for the pictures as a part of the extortion scheme. The court concludes first that there was no probable cause for the search authorization [something many would disagree with], but then finds that the good faith exception makes it admissible. Everybody involved thought there was probable cause [except the appeals court], so the searching officer was acting with good faith. The rest of the Leon factors in M.R.E. 311(c)(3) favor no exclusion. United States v. Perkins, 2018 CCA LEXIS 336 (N.-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 12, 2018):
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NY3: Neutral and detached magistrate claim has to be preserved for appeal

Defendant’s claim that the issuing magistrate was not neutral and detached was not preserved for appellate review. And, in any event, it lacks merit because there was plenty of probable cause. People v. Schaefer, 2018 NY Slip Op 05235, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5163 (3d Dept. July 12, 2018).

“DeMeulenaere seeks a COA to appeal the district court’s rulings that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate the circumstances surrounding the search of his vehicle and for not filing a motion to suppress the drug evidence found in the vehicle. He contends that an investigation would have revealed facts to support a successful motion to suppress the drugs, which would have resulted in the dismissal of the charges or a significantly lower sentence.” He provides no facts to support what would have been found out if such an investigation had been done. The only evidence the court has is that the search of the car was with probable cause and justified under the automobile exception. COA denied. United States v. Demeulenaere, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 18994 (10th Cir. July 12, 2018).*

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TN: Seizure of a cell phone incident to arrest is provided for in Riley; search still requires warrant

Defendant’s cell phone was properly seized incident to his arrest, as contemplated by Riley. It was not searched until a search warrant was obtained. State v. Wade, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 523 (July 13, 2018).

The search warrant for defendant’s residence for evidence of sex trafficking was not stale. Some of the information developed was six years old, showing it was ongoing. He was alleged to be a “house boss” working from home, and that provided nexus to his house. United States v. Morris, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115299 (D. Minn. July 11, 2018).*

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E.D.N.C.: Passenger’s possession of counterfeit drugs didn’t justify search of def’s car

Defendant’s passenger having alleged counterfeit drugs on his person didn’t provide probable cause for a search of defendant’s car under the automobile exception. United States v. Daughtridge, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115326 (E.D. N.C. July 11, 2018).

You can’t relitigate a motion to suppress via 2255 habeas. Law of the case applies. Minney v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116355 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2018).*

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N.D.Ind.: Protective sweep here was based on officers’ experience and not on any specific facts and was still reasonable

The officers here had no specific information there was anybody else in defendant’s house when they did a protective sweep. Nevertheless, the sweep is reasonable. Officers are also entitled to draw on their experience in determining whether a protective sweep is necessary, and, in their experience, others could have been present. Defendant’s involvement in drugs and gangs was enough. United States v. Sanders, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115345 (N.D. Ind. July 11, 2018) (I’m not convinced; getting “no response” when knocking on door happens when the house is empty, after all. So, the officer was coming in no matter what then?):
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D.Md.: Officer gets QI for arresting person with same name but it turned out warrant was for far younger woman of different race

Plaintiff was legally blind but owned her car. She was a passenger in the back seat. After the vehicle was stopped, the officer found a warrant for a person with the same name as her. She protested she wasn’t the one. He took her in, causing her pain and to collapse during the arrest process. After a few hours, the fax confirmation of the warrant came in and it was for a 20 year younger white woman, and plaintiff is African-American. In a Bivens action, the officer gets qualified immunity. The fact the name was the same was enough. Williams v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115005 (D. Md. July 11, 2018).*

The alleged material omissions, if supplied, still leaves probable cause for the search warrant. United States v. Charles, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 18964 (8th Cir. July 12, 2018).*

Guilty plea waived appeal of denial of suppression motion. People v. Brown, 2018 NY Slip Op 05188, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5079 (2d Dept. July 12, 2018).*

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