CA5: 2 am knock-and-talk that led to alleged consent and excessive force claim gets no QI

2 a.m. knock and talk may have been unreasonable, and summary judgment for officers is reversed. Plaintiff closed her door and they insisted upon entry. The officers were investigating whether plaintiff’s son committed trespass that night. Plaintiff also stated a claim for excessive force for their actions when she questioned why they were there. Westfall v. Luna, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25967 (5th Cir. Sep. 13, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Knock and talk, Nighttime search, Qualified immunity | Comments Off on CA5: 2 am knock-and-talk that led to alleged consent and excessive force claim gets no QI

CA9: No articulable facts could be given for exigent based entry into apt; “lack of information is the opposite of articulable facts.”

There was no objectively reasonable basis for an emergency entry into defendant’s apartment because the police said that somebody might need immediate assistance. Defendant grabbed his waistband when running, but no gun was ever seen. “[L]ack of information is the opposite of articulable facts.” By the time police got to defendant’s apartment, he’d already been arrested. No reason for the entry could be given. United States v. Garcia, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25978 (9th Cir. Sep. 13, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Emergency / exigency | Comments Off on CA9: No articulable facts could be given for exigent based entry into apt; “lack of information is the opposite of articulable facts.”

IL: Unambiguous traffic statute wasn’t subject to Heien good faith mistake argument

The traffic statute defendant was alleged to have violated was unambiguous, and the court finds defendant didn’t violate it. Therefore, there can be no reasonable good faith reliance on the statute to salvage the stop. People v. Walker, 2018 IL App (4th) 170877, 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 659 (Sep. 13, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Good faith exception | Comments Off on IL: Unambiguous traffic statute wasn’t subject to Heien good faith mistake argument

M.D.La.: Typo in the address of the place to be searched not fatal where officers surveilled it before

There was an error in the address on the search warrant, but it’s clear to the court that there was no likelihood that the wrong apartment would be searched because the officers had surveilled it. There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop near a drug sale because defendant called the CI to say he was coming as the CI predicted. Also, defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a gated parking lot where the police entered. United States v. Grant, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156238 (M.D. La. Sep. 13, 2018).

Defendant was alleged to be part of a drug trafficking organization for a decade. He’s alleged to have done a drug deal in May 2017, and that led in part to a wiretap. After the wiretap produced results, a search warrant for the phone was not stale. Even so, it was valid under the good faith exception. United States v. Davis, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156379 (S.D. N.Y. Sep. 13, 2018).*

Posted in Particularity, Staleness | Comments Off on M.D.La.: Typo in the address of the place to be searched not fatal where officers surveilled it before

OR: Failure to appeal order denying return of property precludes later relief

Defendant’s denial of his motion for return of property was a final appealable order, and his failure to appeal foreclosed later recovery. State v. Fenton, 294 Ore. App. 48, 2018 Ore. App. LEXIS 1091 (Sep. 13, 2018).

Defense counsel made the best suppression argument he could based on what he had at the time. Defendant can’t show that the outcome would be different if it had been approached differently. State v. Ortiz, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 387 (Sep. 12, 2018).*

The record supports the finding of consent. People v. Xochimitl, 2018 NY Slip Op 06053, 2018 N.Y. LEXIS 2585 (Sep. 13, 2018) (memorandum).*

Posted in Forfeiture, Ineffective assistance, Rule 41(g) / Return of property | Comments Off on OR: Failure to appeal order denying return of property precludes later relief

LA4: When state fails to get a SW for def’s medical records, it doesn’t get a do over to fix it

In State v. Skinner, 10 So.3d 1212 (La. 2009), the state supreme court held that there was a state constitutional warrant requirement for defendant’s medical records. Failing to do it right can’t be cured by a later warrant after it’s brought out. State v. Andrews, 2018 La. App. LEXIS 1736 (La. App. 4 Cir. Sep. 12, 2018).

The affidavit for search warrant of defendant’s place had its last information a month earlier, but it described an ongoing drug operation before the one at hand. Therefore, the court finds the trial court didn’t err in refusing to suppress for staleness. State v. Morales, 2018-Ohio-3687, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 3992 (10th Dist. Sep. 13, 2018).

Posted in Privileges, Staleness, State constitution | Comments Off on LA4: When state fails to get a SW for def’s medical records, it doesn’t get a do over to fix it

N.D.Ill.: Def’s alleged torture during arrest in Mexico with DEA there and allegedly watching didn’t justify dismissal under CA7 precedent

Defendant claimed that he was arrested in Mexico by their military with the DEA on the scene, and that he was allegedly tortured by the Mexican military. His outrageous conduct for dismissal claim is foreclosed by Seventh Circuit case law. United States v. Leon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154787 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 11, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest | Comments Off on N.D.Ill.: Def’s alleged torture during arrest in Mexico with DEA there and allegedly watching didn’t justify dismissal under CA7 precedent

OH9: Probable hand-to-hand drug deal from car was RS for stop

Potential hand-to-hand drug deal in a car was reasonable suspicion for a stop. It’s what these officers were always looking for. [It may have ultimately had an innocent explanation, but it looked like it to them.] State v. Dunlap, 2018-Ohio-3658, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 3954 (9th Dist. Sep. 12, 2018).

“Moreover, false statements by an informant, whether they are purposeful or made in error, are insufficient to warrant a Franks hearing when there has been no showing that the statements were included intentionally or recklessly by the affiant.” The mistake as to defendant’s height (5’5″ v. 5’10”) and nationality (Jamaican v. Guyanese) wasn’t material to the finding of probable cause.
United States v. Cabrera, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154808 (W.D. N.Y. Aug. 8, 2018),* adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154365 (W.D. N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018).*

Posted in Franks doctrine, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on OH9: Probable hand-to-hand drug deal from car was RS for stop

N.D.Ohio: FISA warrant that caught defs’ phone calls was valid

Defendants’ calls were caught up in a FISA warrant and they were indicted for providing material support to terrorists. The collection under the FISA warrant was valid because the government showed “the purpose” of the surveillance was bona fide national security. United States v. Mohammad, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154877 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 12, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in FISA | Comments Off on N.D.Ohio: FISA warrant that caught defs’ phone calls was valid

TN: Homeless urban camper trespassing in taking over another homeless camp tent had no standing

Defendant found an abandoned tent in a homeless campsite. The owner of the property was complaining to the police about homeless living there. “The record reflects that the Defendant and the others happened upon the tent and began using it without determining who owned the tent and without the owner’s consent. Furthermore, the property on which the tent was located had visible no trespassing signs, and the defense conceded at the suppression hearing that the tent was located on private property upon which no trespassing signs were posted. The Defendant admitted during his police interview that he and the others began using the tent when they saw nobody inside and that he did not know what occurred inside the tent before he began camping there. Likewise, the Defendant stated that it was common for people to enter and to leave tents frequently.” State v. Cool, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 691 (Sep. 12, 2018).

Posted in Standing | Comments Off on TN: Homeless urban camper trespassing in taking over another homeless camp tent had no standing

PA: Private university public safety conducted dorm searches for drugs after drug induced fight; it was a private search

Defendant was a student at Villanova University. There was a violent confrontation in a dorm between students who had admitted ingesting likely too much LSD. The University’s Public Safety Department and University officials conducted dorm searches. They had no arrest powers, and they carried no firearms or handcuffs. They turned over what they found to the local police, and defendant was prosecuted. The search was a private search. The local police weren’t in on the searches although the product came to them. Commonwealth v. Yim, 2018 PA Super 253, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1007 (Sep. 12, 2018).

Defendant can’t move to suppress his voice on a phone call without filing an affidavit with the motion that it’s his voice. He can’t rely on the government’s assertion that it’s him. United States v. Loera, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155544 (E.D. N.Y. Sep. 12, 2018).

Posted in Burden of pleading, Private search | Comments Off on PA: Private university public safety conducted dorm searches for drugs after drug induced fight; it was a private search

Draft article: Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, forthcoming in the Texas Law Review, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248286

Abstract:
Continue reading →

Posted in Privileges | Comments Off on Draft article: Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

W.D.Tenn.: Reasonable to block and stop a car that an officer thought had the subject of an arrest warrant in it

It was reasonable for the officer to block a car because he reasonably suspected that the person he wanted on an arrest warrant was in it and the honking of the car horn might have been a warning to others of the police presence. And, when the car door opened, the smell of marijuana was evident. United States v. Jackson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155416 (W.D. Tenn. Sep. 12, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Arrest or entry on arrest, Reasonable suspicion, Seizure | Comments Off on W.D.Tenn.: Reasonable to block and stop a car that an officer thought had the subject of an arrest warrant in it

N.D.Ga.: No REP in a wiretapped contraband cell phone in a jail

Defendant was on a contraband cell phone in jail that was wiretapped. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in that phone. United States v. Nava, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155590 (N.D. Ga. Sep. 12, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Cell phones, Prison and jail searches, Reasonable expectation of privacy | Comments Off on N.D.Ga.: No REP in a wiretapped contraband cell phone in a jail

D.S.D.: Reasonable to stop car driving off rural property as police arrive to execute a SW

Officers arrived with a search warrant for a house on rural property, and a vehicle was leaving. It was reasonable to stop the vehicle to determine whether it or an occupant belonged at the house and was covered by the search warrant. “Bradshaw and Foster were involved in criminal activity and were trying to drive off. Officer Antman and assisting officers had every right to stop and detain the two and search them and their vehicle.” United States v. Bradshaw, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154303 (D.S.D. Sep. 6, 2018).

Defendant argues the curtilage was violated because the officers parked in the driveway in such a way to make it hard for the owners to see them coming, and thus allow them to inspect the curtilage more. The court finds the police action reasonable because of where all the cars in the driveway were parked. United States v. Grantham, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154253 (N.D. Okla. Sep. 11, 2018).*

Posted in Curtilage, Reasonableness, Warrant execution | Comments Off on D.S.D.: Reasonable to stop car driving off rural property as police arrive to execute a SW

CA4: Pre-Carpenter gathering of CSLI subject to GFE

Pre-Carpenter gathering of CSLI subject to good faith exception. United States v. Christian, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25580 (4th Cir. Sep. 10, 2018).

Defendant didn’t object to the R&R recommending denial of his search claim, and the R&R is adopted. United States v. Cabrera, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154365 (W.D. N.Y. Sep. 11, 2018).*

Posted in Burden of pleading, Cell site location information, Good faith exception | Comments Off on CA4: Pre-Carpenter gathering of CSLI subject to GFE

D.Ariz.: Threat to use a Taser vitiates consent

Defendant’s alleged consent at the I-19 checkpoint in Arizona was involuntary. She was on a bus that was stopped, she was seized, she could not leave the secondary checkpoint, the CBP agent followed her, “when Ms. Rodriguez hesitated or became non-compliant, Agent Salcido proceeded and Ms. Rodriguez was threatened with use of a taser.” United States v. Rodriguez, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153797 (D. Ariz. Sep. 10, 2018).

“Rule 41(g) is a means of recovering seized property, not forfeited property. United States v. Sims, 376 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2004). Instead, the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 983(e), is the exclusive mechanism to set aside declarations of forfeiture under a civil forfeiture statute.” United States v. Dotstry, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154625 (D. Minn. Sep. 11, 2018).

Posted in Consent, Forfeiture, Rule 41(g) / Return of property | Comments Off on D.Ariz.: Threat to use a Taser vitiates consent

GA: Search of a backpack six days after seizure required a SW

Defendant was granted a new murder trial on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds, one of which was failure to file a motion to suppress. On remand to the trial court, he pursued the motion to suppress claiming that a search of his backpack six days after his arrest was not a valid inventory. The motion to suppress should have been granted, and inevitable discovery does not support the trial court’s order that an inventory could have been conducted because the warrant requirement applied after that long. Kennebrew v. State, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 601 (Sep. 10, 2018).

Defense counsel’s can’t be ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress that lacks merit. United States v. Barber, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153768 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2018),* adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152811 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2018).*

Posted in Inevitable discovery, Inventory, Warrant requirement | Comments Off on GA: Search of a backpack six days after seizure required a SW

OR: On a domestic call, “The officers heard a man say ‘shut the fuck up,’ a woman crying and whimpering, a loud thump, and then silence.” This was exigency

Police get a domestic call, and when they get there “The officers heard a man say ‘shut the fuck up,’ a woman crying and whimpering, a loud thump, and then silence.” This was enough for exigency for an entry. State v. Clay, 293 Ore. App. 797, 2018 Ore. App. LEXIS 1067 (Sep. 8, 2018).

The IRS was investigating the defendant and gathered records from an employee. The IRS summons was validly issued for a valid purpose, and there’s no evidence at all that there was an end-run around the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Inevitable discovery applies. United States v. Koerber, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153231 (D. Utah Sep. 8, 2018).*

Posted in Emergency / exigency, Inevitable discovery | Comments Off on OR: On a domestic call, “The officers heard a man say ‘shut the fuck up,’ a woman crying and whimpering, a loud thump, and then silence.” This was exigency

The New Yorker: Can the Manufacturer of Tasers Provide the Answer to Police Abuse?

The New Yorker: Can the Manufacturer of Tasers Provide the Answer to Police Abuse? by Dana Goodyear:

Axon’s body cameras are reshaping how video evidence is collected—and who controls it.

Posted in Body cameras | Comments Off on The New Yorker: Can the Manufacturer of Tasers Provide the Answer to Police Abuse?