CA3: Legality of arrest on an ICE warrant for overstaying visa irrelevant to removal

“Matos first argues that local law enforcement violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizures by arresting him pursuant to the purported ICE warrant. Matos protests that he never waived this right when he entered the country using the Visa Waiver Program. Even assuming that Matos, as an alien, has the right to be free from unreasonable seizures, the lawfulness of his arrest is legally irrelevant. Matos does not seek to exclude any fruit of the allegedly unconstitutional arrest; rather, he wants to remain in the United States despite his admission that he violated the terms of his entry. In short, he would still be subject to removal even if his arrest was unconstitutional. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b)(2) (waiving, as a condition of entry under the Visa Waiver Program, the right to contest “any action for removal of the alien” except on the basis of asylum).” His identity and removability aren’t suppressible. Romero-Matos v. AG United States, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35848 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2018).

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Reason: Kansas Supreme Court Says Cops Can Search Your Home Without a Warrant If They Claim It Smells Like Pot

Reason: Kansas Supreme Court Says Cops Can Search Your Home Without a Warrant If They Claim It Smells Like Pot by Jacob Sullum:

Cops supposedly smelled 25 grams of pot inside a plastic container inside a safe inside a closet 30 feet from a guy’s doorstep.

Posted here Dec. 9th.

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CA9: Seizure of a vehicle for 30 days for no DL without alternatives was unreasonable

Plaintiffs get summary judgment on their damages claim against the County and officers for impounding vehicles if the driver never had a valid DL rather than letting others take the vehicle. It was an unreasonable seizure. The state has a valid interest in keeping unlicensed drivers off the road, but the community caretaking function doesn’t go that far. Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36147 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2018). Summary by the court:
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OH11: When def’s ID showed he wasn’t subject to an order of protection, questions about drugs unreasonably extended stop

Defendant was stopped and the officer asked for his ID to determine whether defendant was subject to an order of protection. He wasn’t. Then the officer started asking about drugs, and he didn’t like the form of defendant’s answer. That went too far, and it unreasonably extended the stop without reasonable suspicion. State v. Mullen, 2018-Ohio-5188, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 5492 (11th Dist. Dec. 21, 2018):
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N.D.Ga.: SW for CP permitted search of entire dwelling; it wasn’t apparent to officers def had a roommate

Defendant’s email and IP address connected him to receipt of child pornography. The search warrant for his entire home for child pornography was valid even though defendant had a roommate. There’s no constitutional requirement for police to go to great efforts to determine whether the home is a multifamily dwelling. Nothing from the appearance of the building suggested otherwise. United States v. Reed, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211987 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2018),* adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211475 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2018).*

There was reasonable suspicion on the totality for the officer’s patdown of all the people in the car for officer safety under Terry. Shay v. State, 2018 Ark. 393, 2018 Ark. LEXIS 329 (Dec. 20, 2018),* rev’g Shay v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 101, 542 S.W.3d 885 (2018).

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IA: No conflict in motion to suppress where def counsel was law partner of issuing magistrate

Defense counsel was the law partner of the issuing magistrate. On post-conviction, defendant did not show that defense counsel was operating under a conflict of interest because defense counsel filed and vigorously litigated a motion to suppress. Kensett v. State, 2018 Iowa App. LEXIS 1120 (Dec. 19, 2018):
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S.D.Ohio: Reasonable to put def in police car where he had no DL or registration to car while they checked it out

It was reasonable for officers to put defendant in their vehicle when he had no DL or registration for the vehicle he was driving while they checked it out. “The officers ran Bonner’s name through their databases and learned that he was engaging in a crime, albeit a different one, in that he was in violation of a no-trespass order issued against him.” His arrest was lawful. United States v. Bonner, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214316 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2018).

Walking into another’s backyard at 3:30 am was enough to stop defendant at least for inquiry. His explanation that he was there to pick up a friend for work did not dispel suspicion. United States v. Goebel, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213300 (D. N.M. Dec. 19, 2018).*

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New law review article: Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter

This brief essay is great insight into arguing the next steps of Carpenter, reasonableness, property rights, and whether the reasonable expectation of privacy test will be changed. We recommend you read all you can about Carpenter because the right reasonableness cases will make more law, and we’d rather be the litigators than the spectators:

Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 Yale L.J. Forum (forthcoming 2019):

Abstract and lead paragraph:

Carpenter v. United States has been recognized as a landmark case in Fourth Amendment law. Commentators have highlighted—and generally lauded—the opinion’s limiting of the third-party doctrine. But just as important as the decision’s effect on the scope of the Fourth Amendment— when the Fourth Amendment applies—is its impact on the amendment’s content. The Supreme Court did far more than find that government acquisition of cell-site location data is subject to the Fourth Amendment. It also held that any process short of a warrant—and thus any level of suspicion short of probable cause—would be inadequate, and on that basis held a law of Congress unconstitutional. This brief essay argues that Carpenter’s application of a strict warrant requirement was a mistake, and that the Court should have instead engaged more directly with the question of whether Congress’s surveillance policymaking was reasonable.

Last two paragraphs:
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CA4: Once def knew he was target of a child porn investigation, exigency for seizure of cell phones was apparent

In interviewing the defendant about possible possession of child pornography, his answers created exigent circumstances for seizure of his cell phone because he was well aware of what he was accused of and could then destroy evidence. The two day delay in getting a search warrant was reasonable. United States v. Burton, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35555 (4th Cir. Dec. 19, 2018):
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MO: Requiring trial objection after denial of motion to suppress allows trial court to reconsider; issue still preserved here

Defense counsel in Missouri is obligated to object again when evidence that was subject to a motion to suppress that was overruled is offered into evidence. This gives the trial court the opportunity to revisit the ruling under the evidence adduced thus far in trial. There was no continuing objection, but here, as in other cases, the parties treated the issue as preserved for appellate review. State v. Hughes, 2018 Mo. LEXIS 562 (Dec. 19, 2018):
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San Bernardino County Sun: San Bernardino County settles for $390000 with families of girls arrested to ‘teach them a lesson’

San Bernardino County Sun: San Bernardino County settles for $390000 with families of girls arrested to ‘teach them a lesson’. The case: CA9: School resource officer’s arrest of alleged bullying middle school girls ‘to prove a point’ and ‘make [them] mature a lot faster’ was unreasonable under T.L.O.

And the lesson was taught to whom?

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ID: Def counsel’s refusal to say officers attempted to mislead the issuing magistrate was fatal to Franks claim

Defendant entered the Pocatello federal courthouse with a backpack. The x-ray scanner revealed a meth pipe, and the local police were called. After police searched the backpack and found meth, they went to defendant’s pickup truck, placed the backpack in the truck and then had a dog alert on the truck. A search warrant was then obtained. The affidavit for the search warrant only said that “personal effects” were put in the pickup truck, not explaining that the backpack was already known to be a container of drugs. Franks was not violated, and the search wasn’t invalid. Defense counsel, put on the spot at the suppression hearing, wouldn’t come out and say that the officers were attempting to mislead the issuing magistrate, and that was fatal to the claim. State v. Mullins, 2018 Ida. LEXIS 221 (Dec. 19, 2018):
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D.Minn.: This wasn’t a case of guilt by association for being near a drug dealer; officers reasonably believed drug deal occurred

This was not a case of mere propinquity to a drug dealer causing defendant’s frisk. Based on the officer’s training and experience, the officers could fairly conclude that there was a drug deal going on and not just a casual conversation. United States v. Tucker, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213594 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2018).*

Defendant’s running a stop sign was justification for his stop. The smell of burnt marijuana was coming from defendant’s person and car, and that justified a search. United States v. Kelley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213306 (W.D. La. Dec. 3, 2018),* adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213096 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2018).*

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IA: Def answered door in underwear with apparent semen stains; police there with SW for sex abuse with minors

Defendant was under investigation for sexual abuse of minors. “[T]he police went to Heggebo’s house to execute a search warrant. Heggebo answered the door wearing only shorts. The police seized Heggebo’s shorts because the shorts had apparent semen stains on them.” No search claim made. State v. Heggebo, 2018 Iowa App. LEXIS 1133 (Dec. 19, 2018).*

Defendant was alleged to have used his Twitter account to advertise goods stolen from the government for sale. The government established probable cause for the search of the account. The government also obtained his CSLI six months before Carpenter and in violation of Carpenter. This circuit has already held the good faith exception applies. United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018). United States v. Martin, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212314 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2018).*

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IL: Fatal accident alone not PC for blood draw; no exigency argued either

Just because defendant was involved in a fatal accident where his passenger died, there wasn’t probable cause for a blood draw. The state did not argue exigent circumstances below or on appeal, but that would also require probable cause. People v. Pratt, 2018 IL App (5th) 170427, 2018 Ill. App. LEXIS 973 (Dec. 19, 2018).

The officer here approached defendant’s vehicle parked at a gas station because the radio was too loud. When he got to the car to tell them to turn it down, he could smell marijuana coming from the car. The search was valid. State v. Blanchard, 2018 Iowa App. LEXIS 1135 (Dec. 19, 2018).*

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CA1: QI in excessive force shooting case; brief cases of reasonableness weren’t helpful

The grant of qualified immunity to the officer shooting defendant during execution of a warrant was not contrary to clearly established law. Comparing cases that show the use of deadly force was reasonable; however, isn’t helpful where excessive force is the issue. Escalera-Salgado v. United States, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35564 (1st Cir. Dec. 19, 2018):
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NJ: GPS monitoring of sex offender still on supervision is reasonable under “special needs”; one not on supervision is not

Two sex offenders sued over their GPS monitoring. The state defended under the special needs doctrine. GPS monitoring of SO still on supervision is reasonable, but it is unreasonable as to the one off supervision. H.R. v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 175 (Dec. 20, 2018):
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IA: Stolen tractor tires were visible from the curtilage and entry permitted

Defendant was suspected of possession of stolen property. Police came to his rural property to talk to him where he was self-employed working on tractors in back. He had a circular driveway. From the driveway they could see the outbuildings where he worked and some large tractor tires. “Here, testimony from the officers, as well as Devries and his girlfriend, indicates the stolen property was visible from areas not within the curtilage of the house–either the driveway or the door of the house–and the officers immediately recognized the lathe and the tires as matching the descriptions of the property reported stolen.” State v. Devries, 2018 Iowa App. LEXIS 1162 (Dec. 19, 2018).

There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop for being involved in an armed robbery, and that also justifiably involved officer safety and a frisk. United States v. Slater, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211851 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2018),* adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210984 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 14, 2018).*

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CA6: Dist.Ct.’s findings don’t support inevitable discovery, so court applies independent source instead

The district court’s analysis doesn’t support application of the inevitable discovery exception because the court didn’t make sufficient findings on the second part of the test. Instead, the record fully supports the independent source doctrine instead. United States v. Chapman-Sexton, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35397 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2018).

“The court found the marijuana admissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement and the inevitable-discovery doctrine. We agree with the court’s reliance on inevitable discovery.” State v. Landis, 2018 Iowa App. LEXIS 1157 (Dec. 19, 2018)

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CA6: GFE applies to evidence of nexus, too

While this court has struggled with what is sufficient nexus, the evidence of nexus here is more than minimal and clearly satisfies the good faith exception, too. United States v. Ardd, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 35389 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2018):
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