“Orr argues, nevertheless, that it was clearly established that the Deputies could not search him and seize his property pursuant to the order, citing State v. Burgess, 826 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. App. 2019). We disagree. For starters, Burgess is an opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals, Georgia’s intermediate appellate court, so under our binding precedent, it cannot clearly establish the law of Georgia. See Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1307 (‘[C]learly established law consists of holdings of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the relevant state.’); see also Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Under controlling law, the plaintiffs must carry their burden by looking to the law as interpreted at the time by the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida Supreme Court.”). [¶] Moreover, even if we consider it, Burgess is distinguishable. …” Orr v. Rogers, No. 21-10397 (11th Cir. Sept. 8, 2021).*

“No precedent places it beyond debate that Officer Purdy violated Monterroso’s constitutional rights by arresting Monterroso in these alleged circumstances. We give no weight to Neidermeyer v. Caldwell, 718 F. App’x 485 (9th Cir. 2017), a non-precedential disposition, which in any event merely identifies some facts that supported probable cause but does not hold that the lack of such factors vitiates probable cause, see id. at 486–87.” Monterroso v. City of San Diego, 20-55980 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2021).*