IN: Even if prolonged knocking can be unreasonable in a knock-and-talk, here it was justified by a chemical smell at the house

Even if prolonged knocking during a knock-and-talk, recognized as potentially unreasonable in United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1997), was unreasonable, here it was reasonable because it was based on the officers encountering a chemical on the property. Warren v. State, 2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 141 (March 30, 2017):
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NY4: Testimony at trial can’t be used on appeal of a suppression issue

Even if defendant had standing, the search was justified by consent. “In contending that the resident did not give consent, defendant improperly relies on testimony of the resident of the home at the first trial, which ended in a hung jury. ‘[T]estimony subsequently elicited at trial may not be considered in connection with a challenge to a pretrial suppression determination’”. People v. Kabir, 2017 NY Slip Op 02571, 2017 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2522 (4th Dept. March 31, 2017).

“Defendant is correct that ‘a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person.’ Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 86, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). However, the Court also recognizes that ‘the standard for probable cause is not terribly demanding.’ United States v. Collins, 427 F.3d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2005).” Here, there was several more that suspicious inferences that could be drawn that pointed to probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in a marijuana off-load operation at a Santa Barbara beach. United States v. Huizar, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46989 (C.D. Cal. March 27, 2017).*

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WaPo: Want Medicaid coverage? A drug test should come first, Wisconsin governor says

WaPo: Want Medicaid coverage? A drug test should come first, Wisconsin governor says by Paige Winfield Cunningham:

Now that House Republicans have squandered their shot at reordering Medicaid, governors who want conservative changes in the health program for low-income Americans must get special permission from the Trump administration.
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Two on qualified immunity

It was not sufficiently clear that the officers’ actions here in aiding a repossession violated the Fourth Amendment, so they get qualified immunity. “However, there is sufficient daylight between the Officers’ conduct here and the conduct in Cochran and Hensley that those precedents may not ‘apply with obvious clarity to [this] specific conduct.’ Hope, 536 U.S. at 739 (quoting Lanier, 520 U.S. at 271).” The case was back after a GVR in light of Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). Middaugh v. City of Three Rivers, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5640 (6th Cir. March 29, 2017).* (See Treatise § 64.09).

Defendant police officers prevailed in a § 1983 case over a raid on a keg party in 2012. On a motion for new trial, it’s denied. Qualified immunity being a big impediment because it wasn’t clearly established that the officers’ conduct back in 2012 was unreasonable. Holloran v. Duncan, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47717 (W.D. Tenn. March 30, 2017).*

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W.D.Mo.: Email SW to Google was particular, and target has no 4A right to notice of the SW

“Courts have repeatedly upheld courts’ ability to issue warrants outside their respective district under the S[tored] C[communications] A[ct]. The computer system was in California with Google. The email warrant was for nearly everything for 13 months, and it wasn’t overbroad. The constitution doesn’t require notice of a search warrant. United States v. Henshaw, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45429 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44132 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2017) (see Treatise § 58.25 n.3):
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CA5: Handing over one’s phone in response to “do you mind if I look through your phone?” is consent

Defendant’s stop 30 miles from the border in a corridor known for smuggling was based on reasonable suspicion. When defendant was asked “do you mind if I look through your phone?”, he handed it over, and that was consent. United States v. Escamilla, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5485 (5th Cir. March 29, 2017).

Defendant consented to the officer’s searching his phone calls and text messages for a specific person to locate her, and the limits on that consent were not exceeded. United States v. Todd, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48181 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2017),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46837 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2017).*

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CA11: RS justified home search by PO when door opened and MJ could be smelled, plus more, not that it mattered

POs came to defendant’s place for a home visit. When the door was opened, the officer could smell marijuana. He asked for defendant and the man answering the door said defendant didn’t live there. He asked for defendant’s girlfriend who came to the door; she was asked he she said he lived there but was out. There was reasonable suspicion for a home search. [Since justification for a car search is based on the smell of marijuana, certainly a house during a probation or parole search.] United States v. Collins, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5279 (11th Cir. March 27, 2017).

2255 petitioner’s search and seizure issues were decided on direct appeal to the Third Circuit can can’t be relitigated. Pavulak v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48478 (D. Del. March 31, 2017).*

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D.Mass.: Evidence that officer condoned CI planting evidence survives MSJ

Plaintiff had enough evidence of CI misconduct in planting evidence and police turning a blind eye toward it to survive summary judgment. Santiago v. Lafferty, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49177 (D. Mass. March 31, 2017):
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NYTimes: What the Repeal of Online Privacy Protections Means for You

NYTimes: What the Repeal of Online Privacy Protections Means for You by Brian X. Chen:
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WaPo: A panty liner triggers a TSA pat-down just one step removed from a pap smear

WaPo: A panty liner triggers a TSA pat-down just one step removed from a pap smear by Petula Dvorak:
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IL: Def’s statement after illegal arrest when confronted with bogus GSR test was not attenuated

Defendant’s statement six hours after his illegal arrest when confronted with a bogus GSR test was not attenuated. People v. Hernandez, 2017 IL App (1st) 150575, 2017 Ill. App. LEXIS 206 (March 31, 2017), mod. on den. of rehearing, 2017 IL App (1st) 150575, 2017 Ill. App. LEXIS 366 (June 9, 2017):
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NYTimes Sunday Review: Trump Is President. Now Encrypt Your Email.

NYTimes Sunday Review: Trump Is President. Now Encrypt Your Email. by Max Read:
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MD: PC as to the passenger isn’t automatic PC as to the vehicle

Probable cause that the passenger is in possession does not automatically translate to probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband in the trunk justifying its search. The police could articulate nothing as to the vehicle itself, other than the passenger having been in it. Johnson v. State, 2017 Md. App. LEXIS 328 (March 29, 2017):
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LATimes: Police arrests are plummeting across California, fueling alarm and questions

LATimes: Police arrests are plummeting across California, fueling alarm and questions by James Queally, Kate Mather and Cindy Chang:
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CEI: Six Reasons FCC Rules Aren’t Needed to Protect Privacy

CEI: Six Reasons FCC Rules Aren’t Needed to Protect Privacy by Ryan Radia:
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CA11: Nolo plea establishes PC for arrest; excessive force can be shown by the injuries

Plaintiff’s nolo plea established probable cause for his arrest. Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, however, is established by clearly established law and the district court erred in finding it was de minimus. It appears that plaintiff was handcuffed and compliant but was slapped and punched in the chest, requiring documented medical attention. Stephens v. Degiovanni, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5548 (11th Cir. March 30, 2017):
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D.Minn.: 911 call about two men entering house with guns couldn’t be corroborated at all at scene; entry for protective sweep unreasonable

“The information provided to the police was that a caller called 911 and said ‘there’s two men that came inside the house with guns.’ (Transcript at 9.) The police were also given the address of the subject house. (Id.) Based on the testimony of Officer Anderson, that is the only information they received from dispatch.” Officers arrived, heard and saw nothing, and entered doing a protective sweep, finding defendant asleep with a shotgun near him. The entry was without an objective showing of exigency. United States v. Seymour, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46568 (D. Minn. March 28, 2017).

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Two on Miranda custody

Asking defendant whether he drove to the place where he was detained was not within the “public safety” exception of Miranda. His car, however, being left in an emergency zone when he was arrested permitted inventory for the gun under Opperman. United States v. Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45229 (W.D. Mo. March 28, 2017).

The officers who stopped defendant and then handcuffed him during the stop were able to show that it was reasonable and within the traffic stop; therefore, not “custody” for Miranda purposes. Also, defendant was told he was not under arrest, just being detained. Furthermore, under the totality of circumstances, the court finds no arrest yet. His statements then were not subject to Miranda, and they led to his actual arrest. United States v. Medina, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013 (D. Me. March 27, 2017).

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N.D.Ill.: QI granted city for seizure of liquor license under IL law after a bar erupted into a large fight

Plaintiff ran a bar in the Chicago suburbs, and police got 911 calls about a large fight inside. When they arrived and sorted it out, the Mayor, under the authority of the Illinois liquor control law, ordered the liquor license seized for the evening. Liquor licenses are pervasively regulated, and this unilateral seizure was authorized by Illinois law. “The Court declines to venture any further into this thicket. The obvious ambiguities here cry out for the application of qualified immunity, which ‘protects police officers who reasonably interpret an unclear statute.’ … The Court’s ‘inquiry is aimed at determining whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have understood his actions to be against the law at the time he acted,’ … and a reasonable officer in Lacey’s position could have easily concluded, given the obvious threats to the Village’s welfare posed by Lilah’s on the morning of March 15, 2015, that they were empowered to seize the License under the Act.” Lilah’s, Inc. v. Lacey, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48801 (N.D. Ill. March 31, 2017).*

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CA4: Two successive computer checks took a while, but they were reasonable; def finally admitted to a gun during “small talk” with officer at window

Defendant’s stop was a bit long, but not unreasonably long, and it wasn’t delayed by the officers. Running the driver and defendant passenger’s name through NCIC produced an alert on them because of past events, and the court never says this alert was reasonable suspicion, because it wouldn’t be. However, that led to running names through a local system which gathered all the similar names of people associated with them. That took a little longer. While the officer in the car was waiting, he was filling out a traffic citation. The other officer was standing at the passenger window just making “small talk” and asked about drugs and guns. After having asked four times during the stop, defendant admitted a weapon. The computer search and the small talk were not unreasonable, considering the fact the occupants were known to the police from past encounters. Standing next to the car to watch them was reasonable for officer safety. United States v. Hill, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5537 (4th Cir. March 30, 2017):
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