W.D.Mo.: Email SW to Google was particular, and target has no 4A right to notice of the SW

“Courts have repeatedly upheld courts’ ability to issue warrants outside their respective district under the S[tored] C[communications] A[ct]. The computer system was in California with Google. The email warrant was for nearly everything for 13 months, and it wasn’t overbroad. The constitution doesn’t require notice of a search warrant. United States v. Henshaw, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45429 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44132 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 27, 2017) (see Treatise § 58.25 n.3):

In this case, the warrant application identified with specificity the target account to be searched in Attachment A(1), that is information associated with “clarkumarkus@gmail.com.” Attachment B(1) specifically described the information sought from Google (i.e., contents of all e-mails, all records or other information regarding the identification of the account, and all records or other information stored by an individual using the account to include address books, contacts and photographs), and connected the evidence to be seized by the government with specific criminal statues (i.e., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2252(a)(2) and 2252A(a)(2)). Such information was limited to the time period from August 1, 2012 to August 26, 2013. I, therefore, find that the warrant was not lacking in particularity and recommend Defendant’s motion to suppress be denied.


Lastly, Defendant challenges the fact that he was not personally given notice of the search of his e-mail account. This argument is without merit. The Fourth Amendment does not require that the owner of an e-mail account be notified when a warrant is served upon the internet provider. In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221-22, 1224 (D. Or. 2009) (“In this third party context, the Fourth Amendment notice requirement is satisfied when a valid warrant is obtained and served on the holder of the property to be seized, the [Internet service provider].”). See also Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 83-84. Defendant’s motion should be denied accordingly.

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