MD: PC as to the passenger isn’t automatic PC as to the vehicle

Probable cause that the passenger is in possession does not automatically translate to probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband in the trunk justifying its search. The police could articulate nothing as to the vehicle itself, other than the passenger having been in it. Johnson v. State, 2017 Md. App. LEXIS 328 (March 29, 2017):

Applying the principles expressed in Acevedo, Ross, and Wilson, the permissible scope of the search in this case was defined by the object of the search: to find contraband that Haqq may have left or concealed within the vehicle. The police did not articulate a reasonable suspicion to believe that contraband was hidden in the trunk, or somewhere generally in the car, or beyond the passenger compartment, and therefore, the police lacked probable cause to support a warrantless search of Johnson’s trunk.

The State urges that Wyoming v. Houghton, supra, 526 U.S. 295, supports its argument that there is no longer a distinction between a driver and a passenger in determining the scope of the search of a vehicle under the Carroll doctrine. In Houghton, a police officer stopped a vehicle for exceeding the speed limit and driving with a broken brake light. 526 U.S. at 297. While questioning the driver, the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket. Id. at 298. After the driver admitted to using the syringe to take drugs, backup officers ordered the two passengers—one of whom was Sandra Houghton—out of the car so that they could search the passenger compartment for contraband. Id. In the backseat of the vehicle, the officer found Houghton’s purse, proceeded to search it, and found drug paraphernalia and a syringe containing methamphetamine. Id. Houghton was subsequently charged with felony possession of methamphetamine and was convicted of that crime after the court denied her motion to suppress. Id.

In Houghton, it was uncontested that the police officers had probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs in the car and, therefore, could search the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to the Carroll doctrine. Id. at 300. The issue the Court addressed was whether a container (Houghton’s purse) belonging to a passenger and left in the passenger compartment of a vehicle was lawfully within the scope of a Carroll search. Id. at 297. The Court declined to create an exemption to the Carroll Doctrine for a passenger’s property, and, instead, held that police officers with probable cause to search a vehicle under the Carroll Doctrine may also search a passenger’s purse capable of concealing the object of that search found in a vehicle. Id. at 307. “[N]either Ross itself nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a distinction among packages for containers based on ownership.” Id. at 302.

The State reasons that because the Houghton Court refused to create a passenger-property exemption to the Carroll Doctrine, all passenger-driver distinctions are irrelevant under the Carroll Doctrine. Accordingly, the State maintains that the drugs found in Haqq’s waistband and the PCP odor on his breath were all the police needed to form the requisite probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the entire car, including the trunk, for drugs and paraphernalia.

The State’s reading of Houghton is a paralogism, for it ignores the point that once the object of the search establishes the proper scope, all areas and property within the scope may be searched. ‘”If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of that search.”‘ Id. at 301 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825). The Houghton Court reasoned that an exemption for property belonging to a passenger, “would dramatically reduce the ability to find and seize contraband and evidence of crime” because “one would expect passenger-confederates to claim everything as their own.” Id. at 305-06. Nothing in Houghton suggests, however, that it is irrelevant whether the probable cause to search a vehicle or part of a vehicle is developed through interactions with the driver versus a passenger. We do not interpret the holding in Houghton as eliminating the distinction between passengers and drivers in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Conclusion

The factual circumstances surrounding the stop of Johnson’s vehicle fell short of establishing probable cause that she was transporting contraband in the trunk of her car. Because the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile “is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found,” Ross, 456 U.S. at 799, before the police may conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of a vehicle, the police must either have probable cause to believe drugs are in the car generally, or, as in this case, where the police find drugs on a passenger, they must articulate a particularized basis to search the trunk, such as the reasons for their belief that the passenger had access to the trunk. Here, the officers lacked probable cause to believe that drugs were in the trunk based solely on the drugs found on the breath and in the waistband of the front-seat passenger. Consequently, the suppression court concluded erroneously that the officers were permitted to search the trunk of the car under the Carroll Doctrine.