This case is on post-conviction, and defendant attached a police report to his petition. Based on the police report, the mere act of radioing for a drug dog did not appreciably extend the stop which took three minutes. People v. Watkins, 2019 IL App (4th) 180605, 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 833 (Oct. 16, 2019).
Defendant claimed his stop was pretextual. “Utilizing corroborating testimony and police reports, Eversole provided a credible and consistent narrative detailing how he had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop of Hensley. As there is no issue concerning credibility here, Hensley’s subjective intent is immaterial, and the Court recommends that the District Court find the stop permissible.” Once the car was stopped, it was not unreasonably prolonged. United States v. Hensley, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179472 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2019),* adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176873 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 11, 2019).*
Posted inPretext, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on IL: Merely radioing for a drug dog did not materially extend a stop that was only 3 minutes long
The codefendant’s appeal on the same grounds, from the same suppression hearing was affirmed in July. That’s law of the case as to this defendant. United States v. Thompson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30910 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019).
“Carter also argues that the search was improperly executed for several reasons. First, he says that officers violated the ‘knock-and-announce’ rule. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109. But that rule applies only when officers enter by force; here, they were invited in. Id. Second, he says the officers violated the Fourth Amendment because they did not show the search warrant until asked. But here nothing required the officers to present the warrant any sooner than they did. … Third, Carter says that his federal prosecution effectively precluded him from challenging the search on state-law grounds. But he has not identified any aspect of the search that violated state (or federal) law.” [And state grounds would be moot under Virginia v. Moore.] The government also didn’t need a search warrant for his IP information. United States v. Carter, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30734 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019).*
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on CA6: Codef’s appeal from same suppression hearing already affirmed, so that’s law of the case [even though he didn’t get to brief it, so how fair is that?]
“When an officer encounters a vehicle the whole of which is painted a different color from the color listed in the vehicle-registration records and the officer believes, based on his experience, that the vehicle or its displayed license plates may be stolen, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and is authorized to perform an investigative traffic stop.” (Syllabus by the court) State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, 2019 Ohio LEXIS 2152 (Oct. 16, 2019).
“Otoupal ‘had no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address assigned by the Internet Service Provider or any of the other information acquired from’ Charter Communications. … Therefore, HSI ‘needed no warrant to obtain the information,’ and the search warrant later issued based on that information was valid. Id. Accordingly, Calvert’s failure to investigate and raise this meritless issue in a motion to suppress the warrant to search Otoupal’s residence was reasonable.” Otoupal v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178529 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 20, 2019),* adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177838 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2019).*
Posted inReasonable suspicion, Third Party Doctrine|Comments Off on OH: On LPN check, car not matching color on registration is enough for a stop to see if it’s stolen
The parties got into an argument, and plaintiff went back into his house. The defendant came in after him. “Without deciding whether Bailey’s arrest was supported by probable cause—or, as it goes in the qualified-immunity context, ‘arguable probable cause’—we reverse. Even assuming that Swindell had probable cause, he crossed what has been called a ‘firm’ and ‘bright’ constitutional line, and thereby violated the Fourth Amendment, when he stepped over the doorstep of Bailey’s parents’ home to make a warrantless arrest.” Bailey v. Swindell, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30787 (11th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019).
A police officer off duty got into an argument over a personal matter and his firearm was discharged. It was not state action for § 1983. Morris v. City of Detroit, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30749 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019).*
The fact one officer swore to an affidavit prepared by another on the other’s knowledge is not a constitutional violation. Moreover, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Parrish, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178155 (N.D. W.Va. Oct. 15, 2019).
Officers had probable cause to initiate the contact with defendant, and he consented to a search of his hotel room based on the fact that the credit card used to rent the room was counterfeit. Defense counsel can’t be ineffective for not raising nonmeritorious grounds. Ntow v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178126 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2019).*
Defendant was arrested for another reason, and police did a search incident of his breath for DUI. That’s not a proper purpose. City of Vancouver v. Kaufman, 2019 Wash. App. LEXIS 2616 (Oct. 15, 2019).
The search warrant appears based on probable cause, and defendant bears the burden of showing that it’s not, which she didn’t do. “For these reasons, Yang has failed to cast even minimal doubt on the warrant, and her Motion to Suppress is therefore denied.” United States v. Yang, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178209 (D.Colo. Oct. 8, 2019).*
A reasonable person in defendant’s position would believe he was seized, but there was reasonable suspicion for the encounter between defendant and the police. United States v. Mollohan, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178206 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 15, 2019).*
Philadelphia Inquirer: As Philadelphia aims to curb racial disparities, why are police stops of black drivers skyrocketing? by Samantha Melamed (“Although Philadelphia police and civil rights lawyers have been monitoring pedestrian stops and frisks since 2011 — when they entered into a consent decree after a federal lawsuit over stark racial disparities — they have not studied vehicle stops as closely. (Among other reasons, they are more complicated to track than pedestrian stops, and usually some cause is listed for the initial stop — tinted windows, for instance.) This year, though, police data show a dramatic increase in vehicle stops. Through August, police had stopped more than 10,000 additional drivers each month compared with the first eight months of 2018.”)
Posted inRacial profiling|Comments Off on Philadelphia Inquirer: As Philadelphia aims to curb racial disparities, why are police stops of black drivers skyrocketing?
NYTimes: Opinion: You’re in a Police Lineup, Right Now (“Face-recognition technology is the new norm. You may think, ‘I’ve got nothing to hide,’ but we all should be concerned.”).
Posted inSurveillance technology|Comments Off on NYTimes: Opinion: You’re in a Police Lineup, Right Now
Plaintiff’s Airbnb tenant suffered a theft, and he had the authority to consent to an entry by police to investigate it. Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30651 (7th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019).*
The officer didn’t prolong the stop in violation of Rodriguez. He ran defendant’s information and a warrant came back. United States v. Offord, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30656 (7th Cir. Oct. 15, 2019).*
Posted inConsent, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on CA7: Airbnb tenant who was theft victim can consent to police entry to rental unit
Defendant’s offense was in 2005 and he was originally tried in 2011 and reversed that conviction. On retrial, he filed a motion to suppress a pen register used to locate him in Colorado. CSLI without a warrant was permitted in 2005, but here it dealt with realtime and future CSLI which was not at issue in Carpenter. The court approaches the issue as attenuation, and finds it. When defendant was located, he pulled a gun on the officers and then a search warrant was obtained that led to the evidence used here. The CSLI only helped find him. State v. Thomas, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 846 (Oct. 15, 2019).*
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the search warrants for defendant’s electronic devices because there was probable cause for the warrants and he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address. “It can hardly be considered unreasonable for Otoupal’s lawyer to not pursue a course of action that would have failed. But even assuming counsel should have filed a motion to suppress, Otoupal’s objection fails because he cannot show prejudice.” Otoupal v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177838 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2019).*
Posted inAttenuation, Ineffective assistance|Comments Off on NC: CSLI violation was attenuated because it only helped locate him and then there was a SW in another state
“Defendant David Arnold was arrested for and charged with possession of a firearm by a felon after the Detroit police found a stolen handgun in the glovebox of the car he was driving. The police stopped the car because the temporary license tag was not legible. The government attempts to justify the warrantless search of the glovebox under the inventory search exception, but the timing of the events does not support that argument, and the police officers’ testimony on that score is not credible. Nonetheless, because the car would have been impounded and inventoried regardless of the illegal search, the inevitable discovery rule precludes application of the exclusionary rule to the fruits of the search. Therefore, the Court will deny Arnold’s motion to suppress the firearm. Also, because Arnold’s incriminating statements were obtained lawfully, the Court will deny the motion to suppress those as well.” United States v. Arnold, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177868 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 2019).*
Posted inInevitable discovery, Inventory|Comments Off on E.D.Mich.: Court doesn’t believe officer on inventory as a justification, but impoundment of the vehicle would have happened anyway
Defendant’s stop was unreasonably prolonged and violated Rodriguez. The product of that search was used to get a search warrant for the house. The search of the house is suppressed, too. United States v. Maffei, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177755 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2019).*
Defendant’s motion to suppress should be denied on the merits because he fled from police, and he wasn’t seized until he laid down and submitted. Then he filed a motion to withdraw the motion and pled. Granted. United States v. Smith, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177720 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2019).*
Posted inExclusionary rule, Seizure|Comments Off on N.D.Cal.: Search of car violated Rodriguez and product of that search led to suppression of SW for house
Defendant was accused of sexual assault, and a “white dish towel-like cloth” was likely a source of DNA evidence. A search warrant was obtained. Executing the warrant, officers saw a blue and white dish-towel-like cloth. The trial court suppressed it. Reversed, “A law-enforcement officer may seize an item pursuant to a search warrant if the item is described in the search warrant, if there is a strong relationship between the seized item and the things described in the search warrant, or if the seized item clearly and definitely relates to the suspected criminal conduct that gave rise to the issuance of the search warrant.” Under plain view, its evidentiary value was immediately apparent, and it was important to the state’s case. It was properly seized. State v. Sexter, 2019 Minn. App. LEXIS 334 (Oct. 14, 2019).
Posted inScope of search|Comments Off on MN: A white cloth sought in a SW for evidence of sexual assault permitted seizure of a blue and white one
The Nation: Google Is Coming for Your Face (“Personal data is routinely harvested from the most vulnerable populations, without transparency, regulation, or principles—and this should concern us all.”)
Prior incidents led to the search warrant here, but that doesn’t make them admissible in this trial. Motion in limine granted. United States v. Knapp, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177213 (D. Mont. Oct. 11, 2019).
The plaintiff didn’t overcome the defendant officer’s motion for summary judgment that there was probable cause for his arrest that led to a probable cause based indictment and which started from a search warrant. All he relied on was his allegations, and he had no evidence. Wilson v. Clem, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 178 (Oct. 11, 2019).*
Posted inAdmissibility of evidence|Comments Off on D.Mont.: Incidents leading to SW doesn’t necessarily make them relevant for trial; motion in limine granted
Defendant was Mirandized, and she lawyered up. She was presented with a consent form for her cell phone with the understanding that if she didn’t consent they’d get a search warrant. She didn’t ask for a lawyer, and she consented. This was not a violation of Miranda. State v. Sallard, 2019 Ariz. App. LEXIS 925 (Oct. 11, 2019).
Posted inAdmissibility of evidence, Consent|Comments Off on AZ: Presenting a consent form after def lawyers-up doesn’t violate Miranda
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
