E.D.Ky.: Paraphrasing def’s jail calls on hearsay without affiant actually listening to them isn’t a Franks violation

A full forensic search of defendant’s cell phone was authorized by the affidavit which was attached to the search warrant. There were admissions from the defendant on jail calls to others that were reported to the police. The paraphrasing the content of the calls didn’t rise to the level of a Franks violation for not listening to the calls themselves. United States v. Zulawski, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182712 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2019).*

Defendant’s claim the stop wasn’t valid isn’t supported by the record. The officer testified that there was a traffic offense, and the officer wasn’t required to arrest for one. The deployment of the dog didn’t prolong the stop. At the police station, defendant voluntarily disrobed, they thought to hide the fact he had drugs in his underwear. United States v. Minor, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183054 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 23, 2019).*

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress somebody else’s cell phones because defendant had no standing. Swatzell v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182479 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2019).*

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MO: Def’s blood draw while he was unconscious was proper under Mitchell

Defendant was unconscious after a single car accident and he smelled of alcohol. There was probable cause and the blood draw did not violate the Fourth Amendment under Mitchell v. Wisconsin. State v. Gray, 2019 Mo. App. LEXIS 1671 (Oct. 22, 2019).

Defendant’s Franks claim fails. There is probable cause on the face of the affidavit for the search warrant and the suggestion of omitted information does not undermine it. Moreover, defendant doesn’t overcome the presumption that the good faith exception applies. United States v. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182627 (E.D.Wis. Aug. 30, 2019).*

There was probable cause that defendant brandished a weapon outside of his house and that it would be found in defendant’s house. Moreover, the good faith exception applied. United States v. Roldan-Marin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182978 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 1, 2019),*

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S.D.Ga.: Def was a passenger in a car and his cell phone was seized and subjected to search with a warrant; the seizure was lawful

Defendant challenged only the seizure of his cell phone from a car he was a passenger in, and not its later search with a warrant. The search warrant makes all the difference, even assuming he had standing, which he likely didn’t. United States v. Ray, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182823 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2019):
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CA7: PC to arrest doesn’t usually go stale

Probable cause to arrest doesn’t go stale like probable cause to search does. “Haldorson’s primary contention is that the information from the controlled buy was too stale three weeks later to support probable cause for an arrest. The mere passage of time does not necessarily dissipate the probable cause for an arrest. It is well-established that “there is no requirement that an offender be arrested the moment probable cause is established.” United States v. Reis, 906 F.2d 284, 289 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966)).” “Our facts are nearly identical to those that the Tenth Circuit confronted in United States v. Hinson, 585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009).” “It is the rare case where ‘staleness’ will be relevant to the legality of a warrantless arrest. When there is a reasonable belief that someone has committed a crime, time by itself does not make the existence of that fact any less probable. Certainly, ‘[g]ood police practice often requires postponing an arrest, even after probable cause has been established, in order to place the suspect under surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence necessary to prove guilt to a jury.’ United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976 (Powell, J., concurring)).” United States v. Haldorson, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 31569 (7th Cir. Oct. 23, 2019).

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N.D.Fla.: Def’s coming to door and at threshold made him capable of being arrested without police entering home

When defendant came to the door and answered the officers’ knock, and moved into the threshold when they said they were “security forces,” he was subject to arrest right there without the officers violating the privacy of the home. They also had probably cause to arrest him. United States v. Roberts, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182696 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2019).

Defendant claims his lawyer in his 2255 was ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress for him, but he can’t show that it would be meritorious. Kitroser v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182578 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 22, 2019).*

Defendant’s computer was open for peer-to-peer exchange of child pornography. Therefore, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his own computer. United States v. Shipton, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182734 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2019),* adopted, 019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183010 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2019).*

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NYTimes: You Got a Brain Scan at the Hospital. Someday a Computer May Use It to Identify You.NYTimes: You Got a Brain Scan at the Hospital. Someday a Computer May Use It to Identify You.

NYTimes: You Got a Brain Scan at the Hospital. Someday a Computer May Use It to Identify You.
By Gina Kolata (“In a disturbing experiment, imaging and facial recognition technologies were used to match research subjects to their M.R.I. scans.”)

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Law.com: Commentary: The Privacy Revolution Has Arrived (in the US)

Law.com: Commentary: The Privacy Revolution Has Arrived (in the US) (“While the European Economic Area, including the European Union, has led the modern privacy revolution, specifically by enacting and enforcing the groundbreaking General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the protection of consumer privacy is also gaining momentum around the globe. In the United States, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) is leading the way.”)

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NYLJ: Analysis: Warrant-Proof Encryption and Lawful Decryption

NYLJ: Analysis: Warrant-Proof Encryption and Lawful Decryption (“In his Cyber Crime column, Peter A. Crusco addresses the legal landscape surrounding the question of what legal options are available for decrypting an electronic device that has been seized via a lawful search warrant subject to a criminal investigation. For example, may an accountant be compelled to disclose the password to a computer or cellphone? Courts are in apparent disagreement, and federal and state legislatures appear unwilling to act.”)

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CA7: Police officers who obtained def’s blood work from a hospital under an Indiana statute didn’t violate the 4A

Plaintiff sued under § 1983 because police got his blood work from the hospital albeit under Indiana statute. “We turn next to Stewart’s Fourth Amendment claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant police officers on the basis that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they obtained the blood test results under the Indiana statute. The defendants urge us to affirm on that basis or on the grounds of qualified immunity. Agreeing that the district court committed no error, we choose the latter course.” Stewart v. Parkview Hosp., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 31473 (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 2019).

The Sheriff’s failure to release plaintiff promptly did not show deliberate indifference. There are systems for entering information from the courts to get people released. Defendant’s “singular experience” resulting in his over detention doesn’t show pattern and practice. Levy v. Marion Cty. Sheriff, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 31041 (7th Cir. Oct. 18, 2019).*

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E.D.Wis.: “the issue is not whether the affiant omitted information the issuing judge may have found relevant; rather, the focus is on the affiant’s state of mind.”

“As indicated, however, the issue is not whether the affiant omitted information the issuing
judge may have found relevant; rather, the focus is on the affiant’s state of mind. United States
v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2000). In the context of omissions, the defendant ‘must
offer direct evidence of the affiant’s state of mind or inferential evidence that the affiant had
obvious reasons for omitting facts in order to prove deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard.’
United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 1990). Defendant fails to do so here.” United States v. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182202 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2019).

Defendant is charged with criminal civil rights violations for excessive force. He claims lack of fair notice that the Fourth Amendment was violated. The court disagrees and finds the law of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment well settled. United States v. Wheaten, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182129 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2019).*

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OK: Officer’s excuse for extending the stop was pretext and violated Rodriguez

The officer’s claim that defendant’s log book wasn’t up to date was a mere pretext and subterfuge to unreasonably continue the stop in violation of Rodriguez. State v. Morgan, 2019 OK CR 26, 2019 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 26 (Oct. 17, 2019).

Defendant made admissions in jail calls that any evidence would be on his old cell phone. Police then got a search warrant for the cell phone. The fact the content of the calls wasn’t repeated verbatim wasn’t a Franks violation. United States v. Zulawski, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182167 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2019).*

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W.D.Ky.: Stop of one suspect created exigency that occupants might destroy evidence; entry justified

The stop of one suspect created exigent circumstances for entry into the premises to freeze it until a warrant could be obtained. The police reasonably feared that occupants would learn of the stop and destroy evidence. On entry, there was a plain view. United States v. Evans, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181597 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2019).

Nexus was shown: “Here, the affidavit established that Villar stopped at his home before selling heroin to the confidential informant. Thus, the affidavit specifically links a sale of heroin to Villar’s home. Further, the affidavit points to other drug-related contraband found in Villar’s trash, thereby connecting Villar’s home to drug activity. Additionally, the affiant detective stated that he believed, in light of the contraband recovered from the trash pull as well as his training and experience, that contraband and evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the home.” United States v. Vargas, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 31355 (11th Cir. Oct. 22, 2019).*

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N.D.Ohio: Criminal acts on premises is not a waiver of a REP in it

Defendant did not own the premises searched, but he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it because of his connection to it. Also, criminal acts on the premises is not a waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Carter is different because there the premises were used solely for distribution of drugs – it was not a residence. United States v. Jordan, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181643 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2019).

The defendant juvenile’s pat search wasn’t justified by reasonable suspicion or safety concerns. Police were responding to a robbery call late at night, and they encountered a few juveniles. They didn’t express any safety concerns, the juvenile was smaller than the police officers, and there just was no reasonable suspicion for patting him down. In re Jeremiah S., 2019 Cal. App. LEXIS 1033 (1st Dist. Oct. 21, 2019).*

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N.D.Iowa: Std of review of PC for a warrant is not de novo

The standard of review of probable cause for a search warrant is not de novo—it’s whether there is a substantial basis for believing that evidence would be found. Here, “Although some of the information lacked detail, the volume and corroboration of the information constitutes substantial evidence in support of probable causes here. … The level of specificity demanded by defendant is not necessary. … Law enforcement officers obtained information from multiple sources who corroborated key aspects of defendant’s alleged criminal activity over the span of months. These sources described an ongoing scheme in which defendant would frequently use his silver Cadillac or silver van to transport drugs from Kansas City to Dubuque.” Finally, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Seys, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181288 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 21, 2019).*

Two search warrants issued in a death investigation, one in Georgia and one in Vermont, were both supported by probable cause. Leili v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 703 (Oct. 21, 2019).*

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W.D.Tenn.: Putting a wildlife camera on ptf’s open fields wasn’t a violation of the 4A

Officers putting a wildlife camera on plaintiff’s open fields wasn’t a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Hollingsworth v. Tenn. Wildlife Res. Agency, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181311 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2019):
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MA well explains the totality of circumstances test applied to police-citizen contacts

Massachusetts well explains the totality of circumstances test applied to what a civilian would find an inherently coercive police citizen contact but the courts hardly ever do. Commonwealth v. Matta, 2019 Mass. LEXIS 582 (Oct. 21, 2019):
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GA: Retrieval of data from airbag control module after car wreck was search requiring warrant

Warrantless retrieval of data from the airbag control module (ACM) from a vehicle after a car crash was a search that required a warrant. Mobley v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 694 (Oct. 21, 2019).
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W.D.La.: Dismissal of indictment is not remedy for DEA allegedly violating its policy manual, even if it did

Defendant’s general allegation that the DEA officers violated their own policy manual isn’t specific and doesn’t even rise to the level of dismissal of the indictment, which is what he alleges. “Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that violations of agency regulations are not grounds for applying the exclusionary rule when a defendant does not show that his constitutional rights were violated. United States v. Caceres, ….” United States v. Willis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181064 (W.D. La. Sept. 22, 2019), adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180164 (W.D. La. Oct. 17, 2019).

Defendant said nothing to object to a search of his car. He essentially said he was confused by it all. Found to be by consent. United States v. Skinner, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180491 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2019).*

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M.D.Pa.: Despite appearance building was multi-unit, SW was still particular because it alleged he was in control

The search warrant was sufficiently particular despite there being more than one entrance to the building and the fact there were multiple electric boxes outside. Based on what the officers knew, it was either one or all under his control. United States v. Laury, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180484 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2019):
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NYTimes: Opinion: Why We Must Ban Facial Recognition Software Now

NYTimes: Opinion: Why We Must Ban Facial Recognition Software Now by Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog (“The benefits do not come close to outweighing the risks.”)

Daily Beast: Border Agents Could Get Bodycams With Facial Recognition Technology by Blake Montgomery (“The agency is interesting in wearable systems that can match faces to databases.”)

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