The affiant’s failure to include that a state court suppressed the underlying search was material to probable cause in federal court. The state search was based on the probation search exception, but the target was off probation. “This omission created a misleading impression that the Galindo Probation Search was lawful when, in reality, it was previously invalidated by the State Court Ruling. The question then becomes whether this omission was intentional or reckless.” It was. United States v. Ramirez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63472 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2025).
This is an effort at a successor habeas based on an alleged falsified search warrant affidavit. That’s not a ground for a successor habeas. In re Willis, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7771 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).*
No CoA for a 2254 Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone. Bozeman v. Schiebner, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7778 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).*
Individually, the facts may not show probable cause, but on the totality they do. The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Baird, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63203 (D. Kan. Apr. 2, 2025).*
Posted inFranks doctrine, Issue preclusion, Probable cause|Comments Off on C.D.Cal.: Affidavit’s failure to mention state court suppressed the same search was material and reckless under Franks
A Texas rule permitting limited inspections of produce growing farms is not enjoined as a Fourth Amendment violation. In the circumstances presented, the farmers have the ability to make a Fourth Amendment challenge should the inspectors violate it. Farm and Ranch Freedom Alliance v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2224 (Tex. App. – Austin Apr. 3, 2025).
Defendant’s stop was for a traffic offense, but the officers also had reasonable suspicion that the passenger was a drug trafficker, and that justified extending the stop. United States v. Trent, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64558 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2025).*
The officer had reasonable suspicion that a car was involved in a shooting three days earlier, but not to the defendant getting in it. Grabbing his arm as he was trying to drive off was a seizure. However, inevitable discovery applies. United States v. Murphy-Robinson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64508 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2025).*
Defendant didn’t show standing to challenge the search of a cell phone found in his car that wasn’t his. United States v. Pulliam, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64356 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025).
A search warrant for a Jan. 6th defendant produced child pornography. Whether his pardon applies to the child pornography case is remanded to the district court for consideration. United States v. Costianes, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 8022 (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025).*
Officers executing a search warrant saw a sweatshirt with evidentiary value. Rather than just seize it, they got a second warrant for it, and it was valid. State v. Stewart, 2025-Ohio-1189 (8th Dist. Apr. 3, 2025).*
Plaintiff stated enough to overcome qualified immunity in this unjustified excessive force case. Santander v. Salazar, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7996 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025).*
Posted inCell phones, Qualified immunity, Standing|Comments Off on S.D.N.Y.: Just because a cell phone was found in def’s car doesn’t mean he has standing to challenge its search
The court previously rejected the government’s argument that the community caretaking function applied to the encounter with defendant at 1 am. The government’s motion for reconsideration is denied. Essentially, the community caretaking function is too easy to justify after the fact. United States v. Reeves, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64872 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2025):
Two 911 calls about erratic driving involving a black Volvo led to defendant’s stop, and that was sufficient for Navarette. While checking defendant’s license, the officer asked about his travel plans, and he said he came from California to help set up a pizza stand at the Iowa State Fair, except it wasn’t for about 10 days and the stop was in South Dakota. That was suspicious enough for a dog sniff. United States v. Gonzalez, 24-1324 (8th Cir. Apr. 4, 2025).
2255 petitioner’s guilty plea waived his Fourth Amendment claim. Smith v. United States, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7830 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).*
“Viewing the remaining disputed facts in Ledbetter’s favor, as well as the factual underpinnings of the jury’s special verdict, Helmers was faced with a compliant, non-resisting felon who posed minimal threat to officers or the public. Helmers chose to body-slam that individual with catastrophic force without warning. Under those circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that choice was unreasonable. Because a reasonable jury could find those circumstances to be true, the district court should not have resolved Helmers’s qualified immunity motion on that ground.” Ledbetter v. Helmers, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7819 (8th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025).*
In a motion for return of property, a state search warrant was issued for defendant’s phone and the warrant authorized a federal forensic examination of the phone. The need for the phone is over in federal court, but not state court, and there’s a separate remedy there. United States v. Lawhorn, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63909 (D. Conn. Apr. 3, 2025).
“This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an unconstitutional search and seizure of plaintiff Mike Pop’s Jeep arises out of a series of unfortunate actions during which Pop, despite having valid title to the vehicle, was forced to navigate a maze of government bureaucracy and police officers who all believed—incorrectly—that his Jeep was stolen. The sequence of events culminated when defendant Sheriff’s deputies, Gregory Gunther and Anthony Turner, were dispatched to Pop’s home where they persuaded Pop to consent to the surrender of the vehicle. Pop now alleges his consent was coerced, amounting to an unreasonable seizure of his vehicle. The district court denied the deputies’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity. Because the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity, we reverse.” Pop v. Brookfield Chrysler Dodge Jeep, Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7877 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).*
“Balancing the four factors set forth in State v. Bowley … (reliability and credibility of informant, description of vehicle, officer’s observations of traffic violations, and timelag between report of criminal activity and stop), we conclude that Lazure’s investigatory stop of Flodman was reasonable. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we determine Lazure had reliable information that provided a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Flodman had unlawfully left the scene of a property damage accident. Because the investigatory stop of Flodman’s pickup was supported by reasonable suspicion, the county court did not err in denying Flodman’s motion to suppress, and the district court did not err in affirming the county court’s decision.” State v. Flodman, 33 Neb. App. 504 (Apr. 1, 2025).*
Defendant was in the hotel room of another who was on parole and there was at least reasonable suspicion to believe was dealing drugs from the room. Search of the room was valid as to the defendant guest. United States v. Titterington, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63673 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2025).
Having waived his lack of probable cause claim, plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim fails. Wang v. City of Indianapolis, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7888 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025).*
Jan. 6th defendant whose following search found weapons he couldn’t have doesn’t show a likelihood of success for release that his pardon Jan. 6 pardon applies to firearms he possessed at home. United States v. Wilson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7884 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).*
Posted inProbable cause, Probation / Parole search|Comments Off on E.D.Ark.: Non-parolee was subject to search with parolee in hotel room with RS drugs were being sold
“Balanced against this diminished expectation of privacy is the government’s heightened interest in evaluating and monitoring the conduct of persons on supervised release. Id. The United States Office of Probation and Pretrial Services has a legitimate, important interest in ‘rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations.’ Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. And this interest comes with a sense of urgency. ‘[Probationers] have even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence.’ Id. at 120. Here, at the time of the search, Officer Phillips had corroborated information that supported (minimally) a reasonable suspicion that Neves had a gun and access to contraband drugs and that his phone(s) would bear witness to the same. With this information, Probation had an interest to locate these items to sanction recidivism and protect the public.” United States v. Neves, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63785 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 2025).
The officers didn’t have to actually see defendant doing things to have reasonable suspicion. United States v. Trent, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64096 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 3, 2025).*
While the outline of a firearm in defendant’s pocket wasn’t visible on the bodycam video, the court credits that the officers could still see it. United States v. Lee, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63788 (E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2025).*
Plaintiff worked for Metro-North Railroad, and he sued claiming he was subject to searches of his person and stuff without justification. He stated a plausible claim under the Fourth Amendment under O’Connor v. Ortega. Foli v. Metro-N. R.R., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63986 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025).*
Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective for not challenge his consent to search his phone. Now, however, “the only documentation before the Court reflects that the government conducted the search with Defendant’s consent. And there is no question that the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to government searches of cell phones.” United States v. Levin, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64117 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2025).*
“Wright challenges the stop of his vehicle. … He does not challenge the search warrant that authorized the search of the Honda. This case involves a combination of police officer and victim observations of a suspect vehicle that became more specific over the course of a few hours. Officer Haas had reasonable suspicion to stop Wright’s Honda. Thus, the stop was lawful, and all the evidence seized following the stop is admissible at trial.” United States v. Wright, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64029 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2025).*
Posted inAdministrative search|Comments Off on S.D.N.Y.: Metro-North RR worker stated claim for 4A violation in personal searches
In Michigan, because of legalization of recreational marijuana the smell of marijuana from a vehicle is no longer probable cause to search. People v. Armstrong, 2025 Mich. LEXIS 583 (April 2, 2025). From the court’s syllabus:
A search for ammunition permits a search in small spaces. State v. Thomas, 2025 ME 34 (Apr. 1, 2025).
“The trial court erred when it mistakenly applied the Texas Rules of Evidence during the motion to suppress hearing by sustaining the State’s hearsay objection. [¶] Nevertheless, we are unable to determine whether the trial court’s error harmed Brown because he failed to properly preserve Matlock’s testimony regarding the substance of his conversation with the State prior to drafting the April 10, 2023 search warrant for appellate review.” Brown v. State, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2192 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Apr. 2, 2025).*
Toyota leases vehicles and one was seized and ultimately sold off. As a nonpossessory owner, it didn’t have a Fourth Amendment claim. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. v. Borough of Wyo., PA, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62540 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025).*
Posted inScope of search, Seizure, Waiver|Comments Off on ME: Search for ammunition permits a search in small spaces
The arrest of defendant’s drug runners was exigency for entry into his hotel room. United States v. Biggs, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7696 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025).
The trial court erred in holding that defendant’s father who owned the house didn’t have apparent authority to consent to a search of the premises producing evidence taken in a burglary. (It didn’t help defendant’s cause that he actually denied living there.) State v. Bromwell, 2025 Mo. App. LEXIS 218 (Apr. 1, 2025).*
“The Court of Appeals has stated that under the emergency exception, the police may make a warrantless entry into a protected area if (1) they have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property, (2) the search is not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence, and (3) there is some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched (see People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-178, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246). Although the United States Supreme Court has determined that the second prong, regarding the subjective intent of the police, is not relevant under the Fourth Amendment (see Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US at 404-405), we need not decide whether the second prong of Mitchell is still viable under the New York Constitution because we conclude that the People did not satisfy the first prong of Mitchell (see People v Doll, 21 NY3d 665, 671, 998 N.E.2d 384, 975 N.Y.S.2d 721 n; People v Scott, 133 AD3d 794, 796-797, 21 N.Y.S.3d 121).” People v. Carey, 2025 NY Slip Op 01944 (2d Dept. Apr. 2, 2025).*
Courthouse News Service: ACLU urges 2nd Circuit to rethink no-warrant cellphone searches at US border by Erik Uebelacker (“A Fourth Amendment carveout that gives U.S. Border Patrol agents the right to conduct warrantless searches shouldn’t apply to cellphones and laptops, the American Civil Liberties Union argued to a Second Circuit panel on Monday. The ‘border search exception’ allows federal officers to search people and items entering the United States, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. ‘It’s like searching someone’s home,’ ACLU lawyer Esha Bhandari told the court. ‘It’s like searching the entire contents of someone’s mind.'”)
Posted inBorder search, Cell phones|Comments Off on CNS: ACLU urges 2nd Circuit to rethink no-warrant cellphone searches at US border
Defendant’s status as the manager of a lounge gave reasonable suspicion to detain him under Pennsylvania law for what was going on inside. United States v. Burgess, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7359 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2025).
Plaintiff’s civil Franks claim fails on qualified immunity after discovery. The statements were at worst reckless and not intentional nor material. de Leon v. Munoz, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7424 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025).*
“Thus, while ‘an “inchoate hunch” does not equate to reasonable suspicion, the Fourth Amendment only requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory stop.’ United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 251 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotations omitted). [¶] The record before our Court demonstrates that Officers McCormick and Hayden had a reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Gaten at the Red Roof Inn.” United States v. Gaten, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59726 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13, 2025),* adopted, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58760 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2025).*
The warrants database showed a warrant for defendant, but it actually had been recalled. The officer checked dispatch who told him of the warrant, although defendant denied there was one, but he had a motive to lie to avoid arrest. The officer wasn’t obligated to obtain the actual warrant before arresting. The officer did nothing wrong, and the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply. State v. Remy, 2025-Ohio-1137, 2025 Ohio App. LEXIS 1085 (4th Dist. Mar. 27, 2025).
On a no merit brief: “After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Allen’s motion to suppress, as the search warrant was based on probable cause, and it was not overbroad or lacking in particularity. … In any event, nothing in the record indicated the officers did not execute the warrant in good faith.” United States v. Allen, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 7185 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 2025).*
Defendant’s search incident was valid because there was probable cause to arrest him for carrying a weapon without a license in violation of Delaware law. United States v. Wing, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59213 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2025).*
The fact a person “might have a firearm but not a CCL” isn’t reasonable suspicion. Otherwise, all of them are subject to a stop and frisk. People v. Dorsey, 2025 IL App (1st) 240933, 2025 Ill. App. LEXIS 624 (Mar. 31, 2025):
The right to advice of counsel under the Fifth Amendment has to be read together with the Fourth Amendment and a request for consent. Other states do not, but New Jersey does. Defendant was asked for consent inside his own house. State v. Amang, 2025 N.J. Super. LEXIS 24 (Mar. 31, 2025):
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
