In the past five years, more Utahns have been killed by police than by gang members. Or drug dealers. Or from child abuse. And so far this year, deadly force by police has claimed more lives — 13, including a Saturday shooting in South Jordan — than has violence between spouses and dating partners.
Posted inExcessive force|Comments Off on Salt Lake Tribune: Killings by Utah police outpacing gang, drug, child-abuse homicides
The police had detailed probable cause from a CI there would be heroin in a hidden compartment in defendant’s car. The automobile exception permits the car to be moved to the police station for a search for the hidden compartment. People v. Contreras, 2014 IL App (1st) 131889, 2014 Ill. App. LEXIS 802 (November 19, 2014).
Earlier in the night at 3:17 am officers received a report of a burglary and a beating caused by a man named “Drift.” They didn’t find him but they learned he was from an area about five miles away. The only car they saw pulled up for a stop and the officers pulled in behind it and parked with no lights on, just to talk to the occupants. Defendant and the passenger couldn’t provide information. No lights, not blocked in, no guns drawn, no coercion. The stop remained consensual until defendant was ordered out of the vehicle with some reasonable suspicion, and then the officers learned defendant was armed and he was a felon. United States v. Pettis, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22086 (6th Cir. November 21, 2014).*
Posted inAutomobile exception, Consent|Comments Off on IL: Search under the automobile exception can occur after the car is moved to police station
Police obtained a search warrant for defendant’s car in the murder of his ex-wife. They surveilled the car for two hours until defendant appeared and put his backpack in the car. Then they approached and seized the car. Waiting until defendant put his backpack in the car to search it too was not unreasonable. That did not make the warrant overbroad, either. People v. Brown, 2014 COA 155, 2014 Colo. App. LEXIS 1913 (November 20, 2014):
[*P39] Here, there is no dispute that the backpack was “within” the vehicle at the time it was seized; therefore, seizing it was not outside the scope of the warrant. The items found in the backpack and used at trial were within the description of the items to be searched and seized. Defendant cites no authority, nor are we aware of any, for the proposition that the police acted illegally by waiting to execute the warrant until he placed his personal property in the vehicle. See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1993) (eight-day delay in execution of search warrant not unreasonable). Moreover, even if we assume the police intended to exceed the scope of the warrant by delaying its execution, “otherwise lawful conduct by law enforcement officers is not made illegal or unconstitutional merely because the officers’ subjective intent is illegitimate.” People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 146 (Colo. 1997) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813).
Posted inOverbreadth, Warrant execution|Comments Off on CO: Waiting for defendant to put his backpack in car to execute search warrant for car wasn’t unreasonable
In a case that started in 1997 and was the subject of a successful habeas petition, defendant is not entitled to relief for a McLaughlin error where he was held more than 48 hours without a probable cause determination and he confessed. The issue was not directly addressed in the trial court because voluntariness was the only issue. The police did have probable cause for the arrest, and, on plain error review, he is not entitled to relief because of the muddled facts and some delay attributable to defendant wanting to speak to his mother, the court can’t say the error was plain. State v. Norris, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1039 (November 18, 2014).
There was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop at 3 am when the defendant stopped at a green light. When he finally drove off, he was weaving within the lane. Once stopped, the officer noticed the windshield was broken, glass and blood was on the dashboard, and the driver was shirtless and bleeding. State v. Puckett, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1050 (November 20, 2014).*
Posted inArrest or entry on arrest, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on TN: No relief under plain error for McLaughlin error of no PC determination in 48 hours because of muddled facts
An officer involved in the case conducted an illegal warrantless, albeit limited, search of defendant’s cell phone, realized it was wrong, and then stopped and didn’t tell the case agent or anyone else what he’d done. Later, he “came clean” to the AUSA who told the defense. It was explored at a hearing, and the court suggests “no harm, no foul” [see Treatise § 2.01 No. 1, at n. 14] is reason not to apply the exclusionary rule and declines to suppress. United States v. Pecina, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163121 (N.D. Ind. November 21, 2014): Continue reading →
The American Civil Liberties Union of California has produced a guide for communities on how to evaluate surveillance proposals and how to put in place security and civil liberties safeguards before these new tools are used. The ACLU’s approach to vetting new technologies is so pragmatic that cities, counties and law enforcement agencies throughout California would be foolish not to embrace it.
The 30 page report is here in .pdf. It’s actually on the ACLU of Southern California’s website. There is no link in the LAT editorial.
Posted inSurveillance technology|Comments Off on LA Times: Editorial: ACLU offers a smart safeguard for using surveillance technology [link to pdf added]
Generally, the absent owner of a car loaned to somebody else doesn’t have standing to challenge the stop and then search of the car. United States v. Gonzalez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162121 (E.D. Mich. November 19, 2014).
Because of wiretap information, the question of consent is moot, and the officers had probable cause for the automobile exception to search a tractor trailer for drugs and money. A hearing isn’t even required because the only disputed facts are consent. United States v. Aguilar, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162547 (D. Mass. November 20, 2014).*
Defendant was stopped for running a red light, which he admitted, and an open container was found. His arrest on the open container violation was objectively reasonable even if it was arguable that an open container was only a citable offense under the city code. When defendant was out of the car, a gun was seen in the door storage area. It was properly seized. United States v. Patterson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162921 (N.D. Ohio November 20, 2014).*
Posted inAutomobile exception, Plain view, feel, smell, Standing|Comments Off on E.D.Mich.: Generally, absent owner of a car loaned to somebody else doesn’t have standing to challenge the stop and then search of the car
Defendant consented to show a video of the victim on his cell phone, and it was immediately obvious that the cell phone had evidence the police needed because the time of the recording contradicted several things the defendant said. They seized the phone without a warrant and then applied for a search warrant to search it. This did not run afoul of Riley. State v. Greenwood, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1060 (November 21, 2014): Continue reading →
The description of a car involved in a shooting doesn’t need to, and usually can’t, include a description of the occupants. Here, a radio report was put out about a white sedan being involved in a shooting at a particular intersection. An officer 3-4 blocks away was thus able to stop the first white sedan heading away from that intersection within seconds of the broadcast. That was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Welch, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162579 (D. Alaska October 31, 2014): Continue reading →
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on D.Alaska: Stop of “white sedan” 3-4 blocks from shooting within seconds of report was RS; occupants’ description not required
A probation search of an iPod without a warrant was improper under state law. The statute doesn’t help the court, but the department’s rules do, and they limit searches to a potential offense being investigated and this was not. Thus, such a broad search power of electronic devices violates the state constitution. State v. Jardinez, 2014 Wash. App. LEXIS 2692 (November 18, 2014). [I personally think the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment, considering the policy considerations of Riley.]
Defendant violated a parole condition of no driving by getting in a car and driving away from the parole office. This parole violation did not grant carte blanche to conduct a parole search of the car. United States v. Jackson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162700 (M.D. Pa. November 20, 2014).
The police made two warrantless entries into one defendant’s hotel room: one for a protective sweep and one to watch him remove his belongings. A search warrant was obtained on other information, and there was no evidence of a search in the prior entries. Therefore, the search warrant is based on an independent source. United States v. Kenniston, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162590 (D. Nev. November 20, 2014).*
There was probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrant for defendant, and the search of his car was with probable cause because of a dog alert. State v. Smith, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2747 (La.App. 2 Cir. November 19, 2014).*
A car was pulled over and two men fled from it. A third in the back seat was asleep or passed out, and he was awakened by officers banging on the windows. When he awoke, he refused to show his hands, and he was removed. The car was searched incident to arrest, and cocaine was found. This was not sustainable as a search incident because it’s weak there would be evidence there, and there was at best reasonable suspicion and no probable cause for the automobile exception because of the flight of the two others. Reversed. [This is a cautionary tale for prosecutors because it omits two critical issues that should have won, apparently because they wereit was not argued by the state: (1) Where is this defendant’s standing to contest a search of the car? (2) Why wasn’t a Long protective weapons search argued by the state because of the furtive movement down in front of the seat? The briefs are apparently not online. Update and correction: I am informed by a reader that Louisiana grants automatic standing by Art. 1, § 5 of the state constitution, so ignore the first reference.] State v. Monroe, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2743 (La.App. 2 Cir. November 19, 2014).
Plaintiff was at an airport awaiting an unassisted minor on a US Airway flight. When the child didn’t arrive, she found out that the child missed her connection and was likely on the next flight. She felt that the airline’s customer service was less than adequate in dealing with the situation and her, and she started to make a scene. An officer came up to her and told her to quiet down or leave the airport, and she refused, and he ultimately handcuffed and arrested her. There are fact disputes for trial on the First and Fourth Amendment claim for lack of arguable probable cause for arrest. Brown v. Hoffman, 2014 NY Slip Op 08099, 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8035 (3d Dept. November 20, 2014).* For a recitation of the facts see WaPo: Airport First and Fourth Amendment claim may go forward by Eugene Volokh.
A judge Friday unsealed a trove of court documents that could shed light on a secret cellphone tracking program used by police nationwide.
The judge in Charlotte, N.C., acted after a petition from the Charlotte Observer to make the documents public.
Included are 529 requests from local Charlotte-Mecklenburg police asking judges to approve the use of a technology known as StingRay, which allows cellphone surveillance.
Together, the requests give the most complete account yet of the U.S. law enforcement tactic, about which little is known.
Posted inCell phones|Comments Off on The Hill: [NC] Judge unseals info on secret cellphone spying
The use of public data on stop and search is an alternative tactic as communities who say they are unfairly targeted seek to rewrite their relationship with the police.
Posted inStop and frisk|Comments Off on NYTimes: Activists Wield Search Data to Challenge and Change Police Policy
Civil libertarians are disappointed by the Kentucky senator’s vote against debate on NSA reform legislation.
In June 2013, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) introduced the Fourth Amendment Restoration Act, a bill declaring that “the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution shall not be construed to allow any U.S. government agency to search the phone records of Americans without a warrant based on probable cause.” The legislation was aimed specifically at stopping the National Security Agency (NSA) and other federal agencies from interpreting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the USA PATRIOT Act in ways that allows them to clandestinely collect and winnow through Americans’ telephone and other electronic records. I entirely support the bill, but the sad truth is that it has garnered not a single cosponsor and it has gone nowhere.
Posted inFISA|Comments Off on Reason.com: USA FREEDOM and Rand Paul
“No Trespassing” signs used to be not determinative of curtilage. It’s apparent they are becoming so. Here, the defendant had a cable across the driveway, a “No Trespassing” sign, and a surveillance camera. The police were not in hot pursuit and had no exigency for an entry just to question him about a theft offense even though they knew he was soon leaving for Florida. The observations made were used for a search warrant, and the product of the search warrant is suppressed. Mundy v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 566 (November 19, 2014). This discussion about curtilage is worth reading: Continue reading →
Posted inCurtilage, Emergency / exigency, State constitution|Comments Off on IN: “No Trespassing” sign and cable across driveway defined curtilage under state constitution; entry required warrant
During a traffic stop, reasonable suspicion was clearly developing, and defendant had something in his hand while denying it. Multiple requests to open his hand were refused, and, fearing a weapon, the officer ultimately had to take defendant down to get the hand open. The question of excessive force for the search thus making it unreasonable wasn’t raised in the trial court, so it’s waived. Even if raised, state case law says that this search would be reasonable. State v. Henry, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1151 (November 18, 2014).
Even if the search was illegal, the state clearly proved inevitable discovery linking a car key on defendant to a car they already knew he owned. [Sounds also like harmless error; so what about the key with all this other evidence of ownership?] State v. Larkin, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1172 (November 18, 2014).*
Defendant had his DNA taken by consent to attempt to match it to DNA found in a 2012 crime, but it didn’t match. It did, however, in CODIS match a 2008 sexual assault case. His motion to suppress was granted because the consent didn’t include more pervasive matching, and the state appealed and the court reversed. It is now well settled that DNA databases are no different than fingerprint databases were. “Federal and Florida courts, as well as those of other states, have not interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require a more detailed disclosure and consent requirement of the kind demanded by the trial court. To the contrary, DNA samples, profiles, and databases have been assessed in substantially the same way as other biometric identifiers, particularly fingerprints. The trial court’s order is a substantial and unsupported departure from controlling precedent.” State v. Gibson, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 18949 (Fla. 3d DCA November 19, 2014).
Defendant was unusually nervous during a traffic stop. “Although the act of asking additional unrelated questions and waiting for backup unquestionably took more time than if Officer Valdes had not taken those steps, the Court finds that these additional actions did not ‘measurably extend the duration of the stop’ because the total amount of time was not unreasonable under the circumstances.” United States v. Swann, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162284 (M.D. Ga. November 20, 2014).*
Posted inConsent, DNA, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on FL3: Consent for DNA sample need not include warning it would be tested against CODIS, too
The search incident of a bag in the defendant’s hand after he arrived in Hawai’i from Oakland was with probable cause, and it did not have to be immediately contemporaneous with the arrest to be valid. Here, exigency justified dealing with the defendant before the search. United States v. Seals, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162417 (D. Haw. November 20, 2014): Continue reading →
Posted inSearch incident|Comments Off on D.Haw.: Search incident does not have to be exactly contemporaneous with arrest
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.