WaPo: Volokh Conspiracy’ Blog: Man vs. drone, vs. the law

WaPo: Volokh Conspiracy’ Blog: Man vs. drone, vs. the law by Eugene Volokh:

Perhaps the law should be different, and photographing someone in a public place from a close enough distance should generally be illegal. (Certainly many movie stars beset by papparazzi would be happy to change the law this way.) But my sense is that such photography from a nearby place on the ground is generally legal.

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techdirt: DC Mayor Reverses Course On Body Cam Footage, Opens Up Recordings To Citizens And Researchers

techdirt: DC Mayor Reverses Course On Body Cam Footage, Opens Up Recordings To Citizens And Researchers by Tim Cushing:

Back in April of this year, Washington DC mayor Muriel Bowser sided with the city’s law enforcement against transparency and accountability. The mayor promised to outfit officers with body cams in the wake of several, high-profile police-involved shootings. But two weeks after this promise in her State of the District speech, Bowser tucked a provision into a budget bill that would exempt the footage from public records requests.

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CA6: “In this respect, we must be mindful of the particular exigencies presented to the officers, who must make decisions to safeguard their own and the public’s safety under the fog of rapidly developing situations and without the luxury of complete information.”

Individually, none of the factors of reasonable suspicion was enough, but collectively they were. “In this respect, we must be mindful of the particular exigencies presented to the officers, who must make decisions to safeguard their own and the public’s safety under the fog of rapidly developing situations and without the luxury of complete information.” Recent shooting; mask over companion’s face; high crime area. United States v. Chambers, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14653 (6th Cir. August 18, 2015).

The search warrants here were limited in scope to records from 2005 to the present and for particular crimes, and that was sufficient to prevent a rummaging [“health care fraud, business and personal income tax evasion, and employment tax return liability”] after an analysis of bank records. United States v. Belfrey, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109826 (D.Minn. June 25, 2015),* adopted 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107663 (D.Minn. August 17, 2015).*

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N.D.Cal.: Arguing for trespass rather than the reasonable expectation of privacy standard doesn’t enhance the likelihood of showing standing

Arguing for trespass rather than the reasonable expectation of privacy standard doesn’t enhance the likelihood of showing standing. “Proceeding under the trespass theory, rather than the reasonable expectation of privacy theory, defendants have not demonstrated that they have a possessory interest in the driveway or parking lot to establish standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Ellis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108231 (N.D.Cal. August 17, 2015).

The application for cell site location information was based on probable cause. Commonwealth v. Augustine, 2015 Mass. LEXIS 614 (August 18, 2015).

Jaywalking justified defendant’s stop and production of his ID. Defendant consented to a search, and his bus ticket didn’t match his ID, so the stop could be prolonged. State v. Nwachukwa, 2015-Ohio-3282, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 3191 (3d Dist. August 17, 2015).*

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techdirt: Court Says Government Has To Reveal If It Kept The Data From The DEA’s Mass Surveillance Program

techdirt: Court Says Government Has To Reveal If It Kept The Data From The DEA’s Mass Surveillance Program by Mike Masnick:

Back in April, USA Today had a detailed report on a massive DEA phone records surveillance program that pre-dated 9/11 (and the NSA’s similar phone records mass collection). The DOJ put an end to the DEA’s program after the Snowden revelations when it realized that the government’s own defense of why the NSA program was legal would conflict with the DEA program. Specifically, it kept trotting out “terorrism” and “national security” but that didn’t apply to the DEA’s program, which was actually used much more widely than the NSA’s (according to the report, the DEA searched the database as many times in a day as the NSA did in a year). However, a day after this report, Human Rights Watch, represented by the EFF, sued the DEA over the program — citing both the First and Fourth Amendment as being violated.
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NJ: A vacated warrant not yet removed from computer system could not be relied on in good faith (3-3)

Affirming the Appellate Division by an equally divided vote: the arresting officer’s good faith belief that a valid warrant for defendant’s arrest was outstanding cannot render an arrest made in the absence of a valid warrant or probable cause constitutionally compliant. The warrant had been judicially vacated but hadn’t been removed from the computer system. State v. Shannon (A-111-13) (N.J. August 19, 2015) (per curiam).
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MO: State investigative subpoena for bank and insurance records didn’t violate Fourth Amendment or statute

Defendant was convicted of murdering her husband. The state collected bank and insurance records by investigative subpoena, and her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by lack of notice to her, seizure of the records, or failure to have an examination under oath when the records were produced. State v. Plunkett, 2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 827 (August 18, 2015):
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D.Colo.: Motion for return of property denied until post-conviction process over

Defendants moved for return of their property after conviction and the appeal was affirmed. The government gets to keep it pending conclusion of any collateral review which might be filed. United States v. Banks, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107994 (D.Colo. August 17, 2015).

Defendant gave a statement which showed he lived elsewhere and disclaimed any connection with the place searched. He lacked standing. Given a “second bite at the apple” to produce evidence to show standing, he didn’t. Besides, he’d lose on the merits anyway. United States v. Taylor, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109197 (N.D.Ind. August 19, 2015).*

A neighbor of a liquor store complained of drug sales occurring outside of it after hours. Police set up surveillance across the street to watch, and they saw apparent drug deals. On the totality of circumstances, defendant’s conduct was at least reasonable suspicion to engage in a stop and frisk. State v. Starks, 2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 817 (August 18, 2015).*

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IA: No REP when in custody on a civil commitment order

Defendant was picked up on an involuntary commitment order for drug addiction, and she was brought to a hospital and locked in a room. She was directed to dress out into a hospital gown to go to the psychiatric floor, and she was directed to empty her pockets. Marijuana was found. The state court had previously held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an ER, and the authority it found showed no reasonable expectation of privacy in a civil commitment either. State v. Secory-Monson, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 768 (August 19, 2015):
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IA: Def counsel not charged with anticipating changes in law; no IAC for not arguing an issue adopted two years after appeal

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing an issue that was not decided for the defense under the state constitution until two years after his appeal was decided. Counsel is not charged with anticipating changes in the law under IAC. Enriquez v. State, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 740 (August 19, 2015).

The motion to suppress was not timely filed, so it was properly treated as waived. Even so, there was no prejudice because any motion to suppress would have lost on the merits. State v. Kuhlemeier, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 760 (August 19, 2015).*

The video of defendant’s driving did not give reasonable suspicion for her stop. The fact that she pulled to the right as vehicles coming at her on a two lane road is normal, and she went around a curve at “about 45” in a 55 mph zone. State v. Loge, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 763 (August 19, 2015).*

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N.D.Fla.: Showing up at a prearranged drop point, a motel room, was RS

Showing up at a prearranged drop point, a motel room, was reasonable suspicion that the defendant was there with the drugs. United States v. Mendoza, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109526 (N.D.Fla. August 18, 2015).*

A worker’s gesture was not consent to enter; it was, essentially, he didn’t care. But, even so, there was no showing by the government that the worker had apparent authority to consent. Suspicious asbestos on the property was not an exigent circumstance requiring immediate action. United States v. Kolokouris, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109105 (W.D.N.Y. August 14, 2015).*

Officers had information that defendant was a pimp, and that was reasonable cause for a stop. Dropping off a known prostitute would be reasonable suspicion anyway. When officers stopped defendant, the first question asked was about drugs and guns, and defendant admitted that he had a gun. That was reason enough to get him out of the car. United States v. Fortenberry, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109583 (D.Nev. July 10, 2015).*

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N.D.Cal.: Riley doesn’t require SW for parole search of cell phone

Riley doesn’t apply to a parole search of a cell phone because of the defendant waiving his Fourth Amendment rights by accepting parole. United States v. Johnson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106925 (N.D.Cal. August 13, 2015).

Even though the patdown of the occupants of the vehicle did not reveal a weapon, the subsequent actions of the driver suggested that there might be a weapon in the car, and that justified a frisk of the car. Commonwealth v. Douglas, 2015 Mass. LEXIS 613 (August 14, 2015).*

An inventory was justified. “The testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that Defendant did not have a driver’s license and there was no one else in the car that was licensed to drive.” United States v. Robinson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108986 (N.D.Ga. August 18, 2015).*

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CA9: SCOTUS has never adopted trespass as a sole ground for a Fourth Amendment violation

Entry into the public areas of a motel where low income persons lived to look for code violations did not violate the Fourth Amendment. There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in those places, and the court declines to adopt a trespass theory for that as an alternative. Patel v. City of Montclair, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14468 (9th Cir. August 18, 2015):
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CA7: Witness ID’s enough for arrest thus barring § 1983 case

Four witnesses ID’d defendant for a crime. The fact that the charges were later dropped didn’t form a basis for a § 1983 case. There was probable cause and no reasonable jury would conclude otherwise and that’s qualified immunity. Hart v. Mannina, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14422 (7th Cir. August 17, 2015)

The trial court held that defendant was not seized, but he was, for two hours. The reasonableness of the detention, however, is apparent from the record, and the longer the stop went, the more reasonable suspicion was building. Defendant was stopped on a cul-de-sac and semi-blocked in, and the officers were questioning them about possible thefts in the area. Inquiries about the trailer attached to the truck were not excessive and were within the basis for the stop. State v. Howell, 2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 73 (August 17, 2015).*

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D.Colo.: Threat to have CPS take child made consent involuntary

The officers told defendant that if she didn’t consent she’d be arrested, and CPS was on standby to take custody of her child, aside from the fact there were seven officers there. The consent was coerced. United States v. Thorson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107696 (D.Colo. June 12, 2015), reconsideration denied 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106027 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 2015):
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techdirt: Hey NSA: Even If AT&T Was Collecting The Info For You, The Fourth Amendment Still Applies

techdirt: Hey NSA: Even If AT&T Was Collecting The Info For You, The Fourth Amendment Still Applies by Mike Masnick:

We’ve already written a few articles about the confirmation that AT&T is going above and beyond what’s required by the law to be a “valued partner” of the NSA in helping with its surveillance campaign. While it’s long been known that AT&T was giving fairly direct access to its backbone (thank you Mark Klein!), the latest released documents provide much more detail — including that AT&T often does the initial “sifting” before forwarding content it finds to the NSA. To some NSA apologists, this is proof that the NSA isn’t so bad, because it doesn’t have full unencumbered access to everything, but rather is relying on AT&T to do the searching and then handing over what it finds. Of course, as the documents showed, it’s only in some cases that AT&T searches first, in others it appears that the NSA does, in fact, have full access.

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MA: A license plate reader is not treated as an anonymous informant with little or no credibility

A license plate reader is not treated as an anonymous informant with little or no credibility. It is based on a database that is sufficiently reliable to based a stop on. Commonwealth v. Ramos, 2015 Mass. App. LEXIS 116 (August 14, 2015).

Officers came to a house because of a complaint that defendant was coming to cause trouble. They found him parked there and an SKS was visible on the front seat. The plain view of the gun was valid. United States v. Reina, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106687 (M.D.Fla. August 13, 2015).*

A not readily legible temporary permit provided reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, as it raised a reasonable and articulable suspicion beyond mere intuition or speculation that the temporary permit might be expired or invalid. State v. Kinch, 2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 72 (August 14, 2015).*

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Brennan Center For Justice: The Dystopian Danger of Police Body Cameras

Brennan Center For Justice: The Dystopian Danger of Police Body Cameras by Rachel Levinson-Waldman:

Police-worn body cameras are the newest darling of criminal justice reform. They are touted as a way to collect evidence for criminal investigations, oversee and expose abusive police practices, and exonerate officers from fabricated charges. While the nation continues to debate how effective these body cameras are for police departments, less attention has been paid to the appearance of body cameras in other public sectors, most recently in our schools.

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AZ: Dog sniff in hotel hallway and knock-and-talk thereafter not unreasonable

About midnight, officers did a dog sniff in the hallway of defendant’s hotel, and the dog alerted on defendant’s door. There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel hallway, and hotel management permitted the dog to come in. The knock-and-talk on defendant’s door at that late hour was not unreasonable because defendant was almost certainly awake, and the officers knew it. When the door was opened, the strong smell of fresh marijuana came out, and that justified getting defendant and his companion out of the room. The state statute on nighttime searches wasn’t violated by this encounter. State v. Foncette, 2015 Ariz. App. LEXIS 143 (August 11, 2015):
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S.D.N.Y.: Whether an apt building stairwell is a “public place” is unsettled law in NYS, so def’s stop not unreasonable under Heien

Whether an open container in an apartment building stairwell was done in a “public place” is not clear and is unsettled under New York law, so the officer’s detention of defendant on this ground was not objectively unreasonable under Heien and it would be sustained. United States v. Diaz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107344 (S.D.N.Y. August 14, 2015):
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