IN: Crossing the curtilage to get to defendant’s front door at 11:30 pm violated the Indiana Const.

Crossing the curtilage to get to defendant’s front door at 11:30 pm violated the Indiana Constitution under its Litchfield case. State v. Hendricks, 2025 Ind. App. LEXIS 71 (Mar. 12, 2025).

Defendant parked in a “no parking” zone at the Pittsburgh airport and walked inside. An officer looked in the car and saw an open container and marijuana shake. Defendant was found inside and appeared under the influence. A warrant was obtained for his car and a firearm was found and he was federally indicted. The warrant was with probable cause and there was no materially false statement. United States v. Griffey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42908 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2025).*

The automobile exception applied to defendant’s vehicle’s search, and he also fled and abandoned it. United States v. Jimenez-Caraballo, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45833 (D.V.I. Mar. 13, 2025).*

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E.D.Mo.: Single image that officer opined was CP is PC

“Under Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit law, Detective Erwin’s professional opinion [based on her experience] that the file contained child pornography was sufficient to establish probable case for the issuance of the search warrant. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700; Mutschelknaus, 592 F.3d at 828-29. The Court therefore rejects this portion of Defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of probable cause.” “Detective Erwin thus was under no obligation to investigate further, as she possessed a sufficient basis to present the search warrant application to a judge.” A couple of years old possible child pornography picture wasn’t stale: “The Eighth Circuit has recognized ‘“the compulsive nature of the crime of possession of child pornography and the well-established hoarding habits of child pornography collectors.”’ Espinoza, 9 F.4th at 636 …” United States v. Becker, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45912 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2025).*

“Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to establish that a Fourth Amendment challenge would have been meritorious.” It wouldn’t succeed. Perry v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42730 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 10, 2025).*

The CI had been used before, and he reported seeing drugs in defendant’s house within the last 72 hours. All things considered, this was not stale. United States v. Dutton, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5954 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025).*

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M.D.Fla.: Not IAC to not call private searcher at suppression hearing where it wouldn’t have changed the outcome

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not calling a “hotel maid” who found defendant’s gun at the suppression hearing that led to his ACCA sentence. He doesn’t show that she would have changed the outcome. The private search issue was litigated on the direct appeal. Allen v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42194 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2025).

“[W]e find that the court properly denied defendant’s motion to controvert the search warrant because the no-knock provision was authorized based on sufficient information supporting the conclusion that defendant might be present with immediate access to firearms when the search warrant was executed.” People v. McCray, 2025 NY Slip Op 01324 (1st Dept. Mar. 11, 2025).*

The claimant’s claim was properly struck for refusal to answer interrogatories about where the money seized came from. United States v. $1,106,775.00 in United States Currency, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5598 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025).*

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CA9: Jury verdict that officer violated clearly established rights and precluded qualified immunity

One defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity on the merits because the jury found that he violated plaintiff’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force by using deadly force when he posed no immediate threat. Est. of Aguirre v. Cty. of Riverside, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5591 (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025).

“‘The dispositive question is “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”’ Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). ‘Such specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context[.]’ Id.” The use of deadly force here was covered by qualified immunity. Rubin v. De La Cruz, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5643 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025).*

Window tint justified the stop. Then the smell of marijuana from the car justified more. United States v. Dumeus, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43302 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2025).*

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WA: There was an objective basis for this stop even if with pretext

There was an objective basis for defendant’s stop, even if the officer had subjective motives. State v. Olson, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 423 (Mar. 11, 2025).*

Defendant was in prison for about 20 years and there were phone calls between him and his wife. A search warrant for a drug operation was executed at her home. The [thorny] question of his standing to challenge the search of her home when he’s in prison for so long is mooted by finding probable cause, which there clearly was. United States v. Lott, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5701 (11th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025).*

NYC boots and tows vehicles with more than $350 in unpaid parking tickets. Mercedes-Benz Financial has a lien on some of these vehicles. “The ‘towing and impoundment of vehicles’ based on valid parking-and traffic-ticket judgments and authorized under New York City Administrative Code § 19-212 and New York Vehicular & Traffic Law § 237(5) is ‘reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” [Citing a bunch of cases.] Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC v. City of New York, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43551 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2025).*

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CA5: Stay of § 1983 shooting case was properly denied pending state criminal case

Plaintiff was charged in state court and sued under § 1983 in federal court over his shooting by the police. The federal court refused a stay and plaintiff ended up taking the Fifth. The denial of the stay of the civil case was not an abuse of discretion. Langiano v. City of Fort Worth, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5638 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025):

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NPR: A little-known law is in the spotlight: What to know about the Privacy Act of 1974

NPR: A little-known law is in the spotlight: What to know about the Privacy Act of 1974 by Kathryn Fink, Ailsa Chang & Jeanette Woods (“The Privacy Act of 1974 protects personal information collected across federal agencies. Privacy groups and attorneys are invoking it to block access to personal records by DOGE.”)

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CA8: Dog sniff at apt door was reasonable under existing precedent

A drug dog sniff at defendant’s apartment door was reasonable under well-established circuit precedent. There’s no evidence the dog’s nose went under the door. United States v. Peck, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5710 (8th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025).

Plaintiff’s condition of having a stroke during arrest wasn’t obvious, so the officers get some qualified immunity. D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5735 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025).* Metropolitan News-Enterprise: Ninth Circuit Revives Suit Against CHP Officer Over Misdiagnosing Stroke as Intoxication

Summary judgment was erroneous in an excessive force case where the credibility of witnesses was everything. Rose v. Farney, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5738 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2025).*

Defendant’s probation Fourth Amendment waiver was mentioned at his sentencing, and it’s binding. Muniz v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 129 (Mar. 12, 2025).*

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OR: Petr’s post-conviction 4A denied for lack of specifics and context

Defendant’s post-conviction Fourth Amendment claim was properly denied for not telling the court what evidence was improperly admitted, where it appears in the record, and how it affected the outcome. Zyst v. Kelly, 338 Or App 597 (Mar. 12, 2025).

By all accounts, plaintiff was holding a gun he wouldn’t quickly put down when officers entered his hotel room on exigent circumstances, so the use of force here was reasonable. Langiano v. City of Fort Worth, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5638 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025).*

2255 petitioner couldn’t claim defense counsel didn’t communicate with him about his case, including a failure of discovery and a Fourth Amendment claim, when he refused to communicate with counsel. Brown v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44799 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2025).*

Defendant’s traffic stop was valid; thus, the plain view of his gun when he got out of the car was valid. United States v. Christmas, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44433 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2025).*

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D.Mass.: SnapChat warrant didn’t go stale after six months [would it ever?]

SnapChat warrant wasn’t stale: “The passage of more than six months between Cardoso’s messages to Pyrtle and issuance of the October 2021 warrant did not undermine probable cause to believe that data from Pyrtle’s Snapchat account would provide evidence of marijuana trafficking.” As in: the information is still there; it’s not going anywhere. United States v. Pyrtle, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44729 (D. Mass. Mar. 12, 2025).

The affidavit for warrant wasn’t bare bones: “The affidavit in this case provided a direct link between the location, the Defendant, and the narcotics; established the narcotics had been viewed at the location within hours of applying for the warrant; and provided the basis for relying on the eyewitness. The Court, therefore, finds the warrant affidavit was valid.” United States v. Rodriguez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44721 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2025).*

“But just as was the case for the Bridgeway Apt. search warrant, the Court finds that while there may be omissions or mistakes in the affidavits supporting the GPS warrants, none of those omissions or mistakes were intentional nor were they material to the magistrates’ issuance of any of the [four] GPS warrants.” United States v. Anderson, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44758 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 2025).*

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D.D.C.: Under Grubbs, a geofence de-anonymizer SW can’t be challenged before execution

Google responded to a series of search warrants for information and finally objected to a warrant to de-anonymize the information it previously provided. It can’t challenge the warrant before execution under Grubbs. Google LLC v. United States, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44719 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2025):

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techdirt: Appeals Court: ‘Plain View” Also Includes Using iPhone Camera Options To See Through Tinted Car Windows

techdirt: Appeals Court: ‘Plain View” Also Includes Using iPhone Camera Options To See Through Tinted Car Windows by Tim Cushing (my post here):

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DoJ: Knowing false arrest leads to federal civil rights conviction

DoJ: Former Nye County Captain Pleads Guilty To Federal Civil Rights Violation And Wire Fraud (Mar. 12, 2025)

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New Law Review: Orin S. Kerr, Data Scanning and the Fourth Amendment

Orin S. Kerr, Data Scanning and the Fourth Amendment, Stanford Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series (Mar. 12, 2025): Abstract:

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WA: Officers didn’t have to check whether MJ grow was state licensed before they sought a SW

“We hold that when viewed together, the facts in the affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause to search all four properties, regardless of the fact that the odor of marijuana was only detected at two of the properties. Further, we hold that the search warrant was valid even though the affidavit did not indicate whether the marijuana grow operations were legal and registered with the state.” State v. My Le, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 436 (Mar. 11, 2025).

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is barred by SOL. “In Mr. Topolski’s claim for violation of his right to privacy, he cites Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution in addition to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. … But ‘Washington law has no counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 … and Washington courts have rejected attempts to create a private right of action for damages under the Washington Constitution absent guidance from the legislature.’ … Because there is no private right of action for this claim, it too will be DISMISSED with prejudice.” Topolski v. Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44011 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2025).*

Abandoning the ineffective assistance claims in CoA pleadings on appeal is waiver. United States v. Scott, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5652 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025).*

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The Guardian: ICE accessed car trackers in sanctuary cities that could help in raids, files show

The Guardian: ICE accessed car trackers in sanctuary cities that could help in raids, files show by Johana Bhuiyan:

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CA10: Shooting yourself and calling 911 is consent to removing the bullet

Defendant reported he was shot by an intruder and called 911. He went to the hospital and a surgeon removed the bullet. The search warrant for his office for evidence of him shooting himself was specific and the good faith exception would apply anyway. More to the point, however, calling 911 for help was consent to everything that happened thereafter. “He admits that his 911 call and request for aid was consent to the surgical removal of the bullet.” There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bullet removed from him. Finally, firing the gun was an abandonment of the projectile, even though it ended up in him. United States v. Gaye, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5469 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025):

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CA10: Eight 911 calls about shots from a car essentially corroborated each other

“Taken together, eight corroborating emergency calls, all from the same general geographic area, all reporting gunshots, combined with the time of night and an exact match to the make, model, and color of the vehicle described in the call shows more than mere ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.’ Chavez, 660 F.3d at 1221; accord Juvenile T.K., 134 F.3d at 904 (holding officers had reasonable suspicion when told a man had ‘broken out a window to a vehicle and that he had gotten into a gray vehicle and that he had a gun’); United States v. Burgess, 759 F.3d 708, 709 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding officers had reasonable suspicion when told ‘shots were fired from a black car traveling south’ on a particular street); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding officers had reasonable suspicion when told about a ‘four-door gray Cadillac with three black males, one of whom was armed with a gun’). Here Officer DeGeorge had enough facts to warrant reasonable suspicion. Thus the district court did not clearly err when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the initial stop.” United States v. Sherwood, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5471 (10th Cir. Mar. 10, 2025).*

Not a Franks violation: “the fact that Officer Allen knew Mr. Griffey had a medical marijuana card isn’t material to the probable-cause finding, because having a medical marijuana card doesn’t make it lawful to drive under the influence of alcohol or marijuana.” United States v. Griffey, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42908 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2025).*

“[E]ven if the vehicle stop were unconstitutional, the stop appears no more than an ‘error[] in judgment,’ like in Strieff, rather than flagrant police misconduct.” United States v. Frye, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42295 (D. Alaska Mar. 10, 2025).*

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CA9: State officers can consider federal crimes in assessing PC

The district court erred three ways in this case: The potential of a federal crime could be considered by the officer in determining probable cause. There was reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. The automobile exception applied. United States v. Steinman, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 5127 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2025).

Defendant staying in an Airbnb that he didn’t rent had standing, just like Olson. United States v. Cotto-Cruz, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40512 (D.P.R. Mar. 4, 2025).

The warrant was for defendant’s premises. Before execution of the warrant, officers called the issuing judge and asked about the car parked outside. That was orally included. Making no decision on the oral amendment, the warrant included cars on the premises under existing precedent, and there was probable cause as to the car for the automobile exception. State v. Cruz, 2025 Iowa App. LEXIS 204 (Mar. 5, 2025). [Think about it: an oral amendment violates the “four corners rule.”]

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N.D.Ohio: Pole camera view into second story window of house was unreasonable search, but govt prevails anyway

A second story pole camera that actually could see into defendant’s house was unreasonable as to that. But, “[b]ecause there is an independent basis for upholding the validity of the search warrant, this Court will not suppress the evidence seized from the Ansel Residence during the execution of that warrant.” United States v. Gilbert, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39151 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2025). Interesting narrative:

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