eff.org: EFF Sues for Secret Court Orders Requiring Tech Companies to Decrypt Users’ Communications:
San Francisco—The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a Freedom of Information (FOIA) lawsuit today against the Justice Department to shed light on whether the government has ever used secret court orders to force technology companies to decrypt their customers’ private communications, a practice that could undermine the safety and security of devices used by millions of people.
The smell of burnt marijuana during a search of house is not probable cause to believe that the house contains marijuana for distribution. While it might be in a car, it’s not for a house. Also, a key fob was not “indicia of ownership” in a search warrant for a house, and it could not have been seized. Ogburn v. State, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 111 (April 18, 2016):
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HuffPo: Cops Are Still Killing People, But The Nation Has Stopped Paying Attention by Nick Wing & Julia Craven:
Politics Reporter(“Police have fatally shot at least 20 unarmed civilians this year, and cable news hasn’t covered a single case.”)
NPR: The Next Apple-FBI Question: Who Can Know How The iPhone Was Hacked?
We know that a third party helped FBI crack the iPhone used by one of the San Bernardino shooters. But many questions remain. Should the FBI reveal the software loopholes, or vulnerabilities, of the iPhone to Apple? If yes, then what’s the process? Can the hackers hold onto the technique and re-sell it in the future? And who can own a software vulnerability to begin with?
The officer here based his claim of reasonable suspicion to continue the detention on defendant’s past drug conviction. That alone is not reasonable suspicion. Even new syringes in the door pocket didn’t add to it. State v. Oller, 277 Ore. App. 529, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 413 (April 13, 2016).
Information from a CI led to surveillance of defendant. “[T]he detention was based on a series of events that, considered in combination, an officer with training and experience regarding drug transactions could identify as distinctively associated with criminal activity: the quick meet-up of two people in a parking lot, their brief examination of something that one of them pulled from his clothing, their subsequent ‘smoking something,’ and their quick departure. The trial court did not err when it concluded that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, denied defendant’s motion to suppress.” State v. Walker, 277 Ore. App. 397, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 431 (April 13, 2016).*
Defendant moved her bags out of her Indian casino hotel room to her car. She left her purse intending to come back and get it. She, however, was late, and hotel housekeeping entered the room after the noon check out time and found her purse. The housekeeper called security who came to take charge of the purse. The security officer opened the purse to look for ID and found drugs, too. The search by hotel security was not in the nature of a law enforcement search governed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, adopting the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Nealis, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50233 (N.D.Okla. April 14, 2016):
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A GPS tracker was placed on defendant’s vehicle nearly two years before Jones, and he’d been under investigation for more than a year prior to that. Davis good faith would apply to the tracking, but that’s really not important: On the day in question, defendant was under visual surveillance, and the officers moved on him to make a stop, and he fled and then abandoned the car. There was thus probable cause for an arrest for flight from the officers. State v. Freeman, 2016 La. App. LEXIS 680 (La.App. 2 Cir. April 13, 2016).*
Defendant was stopped when his Texas LPN was run, and it came back expired. When officers walked up to the car they could smell marijuana. They asked about it, and he produced some. He also had a gun that came back “clean.” A drug dog was called and arrived in five minutes. The detention for the dog sniff was based on reasonable suspicion. State v. Prince, 2016 La. App. LEXIS 686 (La.App. 2 Cir. April 13, 2016).*
Officers acted reasonably in entering defendant’s house without a warrant to both prevent destruction of evidence and protect the safety of the officers. United States v. Aguirre, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50236 (N.D. Okla. April 14, 2016):
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Oregon adopts the objective test of the Restatement of Agency in determining whether a private party is acting as an agent of the police in seizing evidence. Here it was a housekeeper suspecting her employer of sexually abusing a 9 year old foster child in the home, and she purloined a pair of her underwear to give the police for testing. She called DHS before she did it. They didn’t actively encourage her to do it. State v. Sines, 359 Ore. 41, 2016 Ore. LEXIS 252 (April 14, 2016), rev’g 263 Ore. App. 343, 328 P.3d 747 (2014) (cited in Treatise § 18.05 n.5):
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Plaintiff’s decedent was shot in the back six times, and the officers’ version was that they told him to get on the ground, and he quickly turned into his house and they thought he was going for a weapon. On these facts, the officers acted reasonably, and plaintiff doesn’t rebut their version. Kenning v. Carli, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6863 (11th Cir. April 15, 2016)*:
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The collective knowledge doctrine supports the extension of defendant’s stop beyond the normal part of a traffic stop incident to its purpose under Rodriguez. The DEA had additional information that added up to reasonable suspicion, almost probable cause. United States v. Alonzo, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51043 (D.Minn. April 15, 2016).
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress that clearly would have failed. “These facts established not only reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which the three men were driving and question them, but also probable cause to stop the vehicle and arrest them since a prudent person would view these facts as showing that the men had committed or were about to commit a drug-trafficking offense. … Additionally, there was also probable cause to stop the car and arrest Fernando, who was driving, based on his outstanding probation violation warrants.” Moreno-Azua v. United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50969 (W.D.N.C. April 15, 2016).*
The facts on this package in the mail gave reasonable suspicion to pull it out of the stream of mail for a further inspection. “The affidavit sworn to by Springer contains many of the same indices giving rise to reasonable suspicion as Demoss, Alexander, Underwood, and Johnson. Springer’s affidavit explains each of the factors he cites as indicative of packages containing controlled substances and his experience enabling him to make the deductions and inferences to support his decision to briefly detain the package. (Springer Aff. 1-2). In sum, the affidavit contains ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’ reasonably warrant the brief detention of the package. Terry v. Ohio, …” United States v. Ickes, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48867 (W.D.Ky. April 12, 2016).
A cursory search of a cell phone of a person arrested for importation of drugs was permissible under the border search exception. This was no deep forensic evaluation. Defendant also showed standing in the cell phone in his possession. “Specifically, in his declaration, Caballero says that at the time of the arrest he possessed a black LG cell phone, that he used the cell phone, and that the phone was given to him by an ex-girlfriend. He did not consent to the search of that cell phone. This comports with the interrogation transcript and the officer’s arrest report and is sufficient for standing.” United States v. Caballero, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51132 (S.D.Cal. April 14, 2016):
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The police entry was here was justified because of the possibility that the person inside was unable to communicate and potentially held against her will or otherwise in danger. United States v. Smith, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6749 (8th Cir. April 14, 2016):
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“There is no evidence to suggest that the State of Connecticut did not afford the petitioner a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims. The fact that the petitioner chose not to testify at the hearings before the trial court does not make the state process unavailable or inadequate. Furthermore, his disagreement with the state court’s rulings ‘is not the equivalent of an unconscionable breakdown in the state’s corrective process.’ Capellan, 975 F.2d at 72; Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (‘Stone v. Powell … holds that we have no authority to review the state record and grant the writ simply because we disagree with the result reached by the state courts.’). The petitioner has not met either of the exceptions to permit the court to review his Fourth Amendment claims. The court concludes that federal review of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims as asserted in the third and fourth grounds of the petition is barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stone.” St. Louis v. Erfe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50185 (D.Conn. April 14, 2016).
“Smith denominates this claim as a § 1983 claim based on ‘impermissible interference in family relationships’ in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The substance of her argument makes clear, however, that the Fourth Amendment is irrelevant to the claim. The claim depends on substantive due process doctrine, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and arguably the Equal Protection Clause, see Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.” Smith v. City of Wyoming, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6833 (6th Cir. April 15, 2016).*
A landowner challenged a property rental inspection as a search under the Fourth Amendment, but the record is wholly inadequate to determine the question. “ Rakowski points to no facts indicating whether or how a search was made. We have been provided with no meaningful record as to what prompted the rental inspection, what actions the inspector took during the inspection or any efforts Rakowski made to refuse such an inspection. ‘If the record on appeal does not allow a meaningful and intelligent review of the alleged error, we decline to review it.’” City of Fargo v. Rakowski, 2016 ND 79, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 78 (April 12, 2016).*
