MO: Homeowner had apparent authority to consent to search his basement where def had been living for 12 days

Police were investigating the defendant for child pornography, and located him at a friend’s house where he’d been living in the basement for 12 days. Because of the layout of the basement and its access, the court finds that the homeowner had the ability to consent to a search of the basement. It wasn’t locked off at the time of the search and there were two ways there. It was reasonable for the police to believe in the homeowner’s apparent authority to search his own basement. State v. Feldt, 2017 Mo. App. LEXIS 128 (March 7, 2017).

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ID: 4A waiver not mentioned at sentencing couldn’t later be imposed by PO

When defendant was sentenced, there was no Fourth Amendment waiver mentioned by the court, and the sentencing and probation order didn’t mention it. Six weeks later, he was forced to sign a Fourth Amendment waiver by his PO. That waiver was without legal effect. Nevertheless, defendant’s admissions to his PO about alcohol and marijuana use were reasonable suspicion for a separate probation search. State v. Santana, 2017 Ida. App. LEXIS 27 (March 6, 2017).

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IL: SI on an arrest with PC but made without a warrant removing def from house was valid; SI occurred outside

Defendant was unlawfully arrested inside his home without a warrant. He was taken outside and frisked and a gun was found. The gun will not be suppressed under existing Illinois precedent. “As a result, we find the cases cited by the State to be more convincing. Here, defendant, like the defendant in Alexander, does not dispute that probable cause existed for his arrest. Thus, according to Alexander and Houston, we find that where officers had probable cause to effectuate defendant’s arrest, and while their entry into his home to do so was unlawful under Payton, the evidence recovered outside his home is not required to be suppressed. The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.” People v. Garcia, 2017 IL App (1st) 142141, 2017 Ill. App. LEXIS 118 (March 6, 2017).

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techdirt: Court Tells Cops They Can’t Use GPS Data Gathered After Suspect They Were Tracking Sold The Vehicle

techdirt: Court Tells Cops They Can’t Use GPS Data Gathered After Suspect They Were Tracking Sold The Vehicle by Tim Cushing:
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S.D.Fla.: No Franks hearing: The omitted would only have added to PC

Defendant isn’t entitled to a Franks hearing: “The addition of the omitted information to the search warrant application would not have detracted from the probable cause and may very well have strengthened the probable cause stated in the affidavit.” United States v. Mustelier, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28784 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2017).

Boilerplate allegations of official custom or usage showing excessive force don’t survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Marsh v. Long, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30308 (N.D. Okla. March 3, 2017).*

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AZ: No REP in conversations about def’s driving under influence when officer was there to hear it

Defendant was in a hospital room and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversations on his cell phone or with medical personal admitting driving under the influence when he knew that the officer was near and could overhear it. Besides, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since it was established by other evidence. State v. Peltz, 2017 Ariz. App. LEXIS 27 (March 2, 2017).

The officer had no reasonable suspicion to search defendant’s jacket. When he took possession of it, and started into it, defendant admitted he had contraband. The government didn’t rely on consent. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. Allen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30677 (M.D. N.C. March 3, 2017).*

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D.S.D.: Court credits that officer could smell burnt marijuana coming from def’s car while driving

The court credits the officer that while driving behind defendant’s vehicle, the officer could smell burnt marijuana coming from it, and that was at least reasonable suspicion. United States v. Theus, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26719 (D. S.D. Feb. 27, 2017).

The continuation of the stop here was with reasonable suspicion because of extreme nervousness, air fresheners (including one on a dufflebag), and incongruous travel plans. And, the Eighth Circuit’s de minimus length of detention rule prior to Rodriguez applied because this stop was a year before Rodriguez. United States v. Robinson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184680 (D. Neb. Dec. 30, 2016), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28847 (D. Neb. March 1, 2017).*

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S.D.Tex.: RS developed during immigration checkpoint stop of U.S. citizens

Defendants were U.S. citizens and had already crossed the border. The car had Louisiana plates. They were stopped at the Falfurrias Border Patrol checkpoint and citizenship was quickly resolved, but reasonable suspicion developed for the car to be referred to a secondary checkpoint. United States v. Knight, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28442 (S.D. Tex. March 1, 2017):
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CNN: Wikileaks claims to reveal how CIA hacks TVs and phones all over the world

CNN: Wikileaks claims to reveal how CIA hacks TVs and phones all over the world by Jose Pagliery:

The CIA has become the preeminent hacking operation, sneaking into high-tech phones and televisions to spy on people worldwide, according to an explosive WikiLeaks publication of purported internal CIA documents on Tuesday.

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EFF: Secret Court Orders Aren’t Blank Checks for General Electronic Searches

EFF: Secret Court Orders Aren’t Blank Checks for General Electronic Searches by Mark Rumhold:
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Ark. Dem.-Gaz.: Amazon will turn over any data recorded in man’s hot-tub death

Ark. Dem.-Gaz.: Amazon will turn over any data recorded in man’s hot-tub death by Tracy Neal:
Murder suspect allows access to voice-activated device
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D.Colo.: GPS tracking a car after it had been sold by target was unreasonable

Defendant bought a car that had a GPS device placed by the police with a 60 day tracking warrant. He paid for it for his girlfriend, with whom he had a child, and he drove it at the time of the stop and considered it his car, too. He had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car because his interest was beyond mere possession. Tracking the car after it was sold to defendant was unreasonable, and the officer should have known it. Even the driver’s patterns all changed to indicate somebody else had the car. The officers saw signs on the car before that it was for sale. United States v. Wood, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27086 (D.Colo. Feb. 25, 2017):
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N.D.Iowa: Rejecting R&R, court finds stop pretextual and without RS

After USMJ sustained the stop (United States v. McLemore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177419 (N.D.Iowa Dec. 21, 2016), posted here), the USDJ disagrees and disbelieves the officer’s testimony and finding the stop pretextual that the paper temporary tag couldn’t be read except after the stop. The stop thus lacked reasonable suspicion and is suppressed. United States v. McLemore, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27489 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2017):
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NJ permits limited search of the console when the def makes a half-hearted attempt to locate the papers for the vehicle

New Jersey again permits a limited search of the console [and likely glove compartment] when the defendant makes a half-hearted attempt to locate the papers for the vehicle. This is a limited search for the papers only, which would be expected to be there, but a plain view of drugs here was permissible. State v. Hamlett, 2017 N.J. Super. LEXIS 28 (March 3, 2017):
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W.D.Mo.: Def’s primary language wasn’t English but he also spoke Spanish, and his reading aloud the consent form showed he understood it

Defendant was found to have consented. His primary language was Portuguese because he was from Brazil. He also spoke Spanish and he read aloud the Spanish consent form. United States v. Dacruz-Mendes, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30094 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26833 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 27, 2017).

Recounting the evidence, there was probable cause for defendant’s arrest for conspiracy to traffic cocaine. He voluntarily made statements. United States v. Valdez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28555 (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017).*

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CA10: Habeas appellant had full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, and evidence supported verdict

Under Stone v. Powell, defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that he was the right person arrested even though he didn’t match the description of the person wanted. The finding of guilty survives AEDPA review under Jackson v. Virginia. Brown v. Lengerich, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3836 (10th Cir. March 3, 2017):
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OH10: Smell of MJ from car justified its search; suppression reversed

The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress because the officer smelled marijuana in defendant’s car, and that justified its search. Moreover, defendant wasn’t in custody when he was speaking to the officer, so his statements aren’t suppressed. State v. Drake, 2017-Ohio-755, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 741 (10th Dist. March 2, 2017).*

“Both troopers acted promptly and professionally in investigating the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that arose during the traffic stop. As soon as Strickland made contact with Defendant Guardiola (the driver of the Impala), Strickland noticed that Guardiola was visibly nervous and would not make eye contact when answering basic questions. Trooper Strickland shook Guardiola’s hand and noticed that it was very sweaty. Guardiola stated that he was going to meet his brother about a job at a refinery, but Guardiola could not identify the refinery or what city it was in. Guardiola had no idea where he was going. Guardiola stated that he was traveling from Houston, Texas, which Trooper Strickland knew is a major entry point for narcotics. Guardiola could not find any paperwork for the vehicle, which Guardiola said was owned by his uncle.” United States v. Aviles, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184420 (N.D. La. Oct. 21, 2016),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25806 (W.D. La. Feb. 22, 2017).*

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E.D.Cal.: 26 U.S.C. § 7609 and the Code of Professional Conduct for CPAs creates no REP; Couch remains good law

“[D]efendant Galloway moves to suppress from admission into evidence the tax records received from CPA Livsey by IRS agents, arguing that 26 U.S.C. § 7609 and the Code of Professional Conduct for CPA’s conferred upon him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents he had provided to his accountant, Livsey. (Doc. No. 67 at 6-7.) Alternatively, defendant Galloway argues the court should exercise its equitable powers to exclude from evidence at trial the business records that the government obtained due to the failure to comply with the requirements of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7603 and 7609. (Id. at 11.)” Valiant try but rejected. “Fatal to this aspect of the pending motion is the fact that defendant Galloway had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the tax records he had turned over to his accountant. Generally speaking, one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information revealed to a third party which is passed on to the government.” Couch and the third-party doctrine require rejection of the argument. United States v. Galloway, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26362 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017):
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W.D.Mo.: Dispute over inventory didn’t need to be resolved because automobile exception applied in any event

Defendant was stopped for no front license plate, and that led to a finding that his DL was revoked and the vehicle unlicensed. During his arrest, it was determined that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The officer noticed a joint in defendant’s boot, and he acknowledged that it was. On the keychain the officer saw a pill container and opened it finding methamphetamine. Defendant was arrested for all that. The officers at the scene couldn’t agree whether the inventory policy was written or oral, but inventory didn’t matter because the automobile exception applies. United States v. Price, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184693 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2016).

Defendant’s claim of, inter alia, false testimony at his trial about everything including consent to search (affirmed in 2010) didn’t state a ground for coram nobis relief. Clemmons v. State, 2017 Ark. 75, 2017 Ark. LEXIS 58 (March 2, 2017).*

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E.D.N.C.: Officers first said they were from Publishers’ Clearinghouse, then said “open the door or we are going to knock it down.” Consent after that was valid

Officers first knocked at door saying they were with Publishers’ Clearinghouse, but defendant didn’t come to door. Then they said in Spanish “open the door or we are going to knock it down.” It was on body camera. On the totality, defendant consented to the entry after opening the door. The fact she didn’t know their identity until after opening the door wasn’t determinative because, when she consented, she did know. United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184702 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 27, 2016),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29321 (E.D. N.C. March 2, 2017).*

Defendant was leaving his house when police arrived with a search warrant. They detained him. He wouldn’t keep his hands away from his pockets according to one officer, and he hadn’t been patted down. A frisk for officer safety was then justified. Sweets v. State, 2017 WY 22, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 22 (March 1, 2017).*

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