After USMJ sustained the stop (United States v. McLemore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177419 (N.D.Iowa Dec. 21, 2016), posted here), the USDJ disagrees and disbelieves the officer’s testimony and finding the stop pretextual that the paper temporary tag couldn’t be read except after the stop. The stop thus lacked reasonable suspicion and is suppressed. United States v. McLemore, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27489 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 28, 2017):
While the officer in Givens was able to articulate a suspicion of an actual crime (failure to have proper temporary registration), the officers in this case make no such claim. In her report, Del Valle stated:
I observed the BMW had promotional/advertising dealer plates and I observed a paper plate affixed to the left portion of the rear window, but I was unable to see the letters or numbers on the paper plate from my vehicle, or when even when I got close to the vehicle. It wasn’t until I was standing near the rear window, when I was able to see the paper plate.
Def. Ex. B at 1. Del Valle did not state that that she suspected Rode or McLemore were violating Iowa Code § 321.25 by not having proper registration. See Def. Ex. B. Similarly, the audio recording reflects no discussion suggesting that Del Valle or Richter suspected fraudulent registration. See Def. Ex. A. Rather, the conversation shows that the officers were looking for a pretext to stop the vehicle and that Richter specifically directed Del Valle to scrutinize the temporary registration that both officers knew to be a temporary registration. Id. At that point, Del Valle stated that because of darkness she could not read the registration. Id.
Moreover, Del Valle’s testimony contains no indication that she actually suspected a motor vehicle registration infraction. Rather, as quoted above, when asked whether she even glanced at the temporary registration, she stated, “as I approached the vehicle, I already had the probable cause, which was a temporary tag. I wasn’t focused on whether that tag was valid or not at that time.” Tr. at 43. Del Valle also openly referred to the temporary tag as a pretext for the stop. There is no contemporaneous record that Del Valle ever articulated a suspicion that Rode or McLemore were committing a traffic code violation based on the temporary tag.
This is the precise factual situation that occurred in Wilson and that the Eighth Circuit relied upon in distinguishing Givens. In Givens, the officer plausibly explained why he believed a crime might have been occurring. He stated that he typically could read temporary tags at night, that he could not read Givens’ tag, and that there had been a rash of fraudulent tags. There are no similar facts here. Thus, Givens is not controlling. The record in this case contains no evidence that the traffic stop was based on a reasonable suspicion that a crime was actually occurring. Rather, the Government’s argument is based on the incorrect premise that an officer’s inability to read some letters and numbers on a temporary registration, by itself, gives rise to reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle.
For there to be reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring, an officer must be able to point, at least generally, to the actual criminal activity. That determination “is not to be made with the vision of hindsight, but instead by looking to what the officer reasonably knew at the time” United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999). In many cases, the contemporaneous belief standard favors the Government because even if an officer is mistaken about facts or law, a stop will not be suppressed if the officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time. See United States v. Sanchez, 572 F.3d 475, 479 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, however, the opposite is true. At the time of the stop, Del Valle had no suspicion, reasonable or otherwise, that Rode or McLemore were engaged in any criminal activity related to the temporary registration sticker. The stop was made simply because officers wanted to investigate other crimes. This is a classic case of a pretextual detention that was not supported by valid reasonable suspicion. Eldridge, 984 F.2d at 947. Accordingly, the defendants’ motions to suppress must be granted.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)