CA11: Shooting of ptf during drug raid was reasonable and subject to QI

This § 1983 case arose from a shooting death by police during execution of a drug search warrant. The pre-search briefing told the officers that the suspect inside was involved in drug dealing and was likely armed, so a no-knock entry was performed. Once inside, defendant was seen running away with a gun in hand. He was next seen crouching against a wall pointing the gun at the officer, and they fired after he was too slow to respond to commands to drop the gun. The shooting was justified, and, even if it wasn’t no case law at the time of the shooting shows that it wasn’t. Santana v. Miami-Dade Cty., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8644 (11th Cir. May 17, 2017).*

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IA: Def plead guilty and later overruling of case law suggested the stop was unreasonable; no IAC claim on direct appeal

An LPN check showed the 77 year old owner of the car had an expired DL. When the officer encountered the driver, it was obviously not the owner because of age. It was the owner’s daughter. The officer shortly determined that the defendant was likely under the influence. The stop and what continuation of it there was was reasonable at the time, and defendant pled guilty. After the appeal was filed, the state supreme court held that the stop must end when there no longer is reasonable suspicion. Defendant can’t pursue this as an IAC claim on direct appeal. State v. Welch, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 516 (May 17, 2017).*

Defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim was rejected by the state trial court and wasn’t cognizable on habeas. The COA was properly rejected. Dukes v. Warden, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23696 (6th Cir. May 25, 2016).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his Fourth Amendment claim, so he can’t pursue it under § 2255. United States v. Good, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75864 (D. Neb. May 18, 2017).*

Posted in Ineffective assistance, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on IA: Def plead guilty and later overruling of case law suggested the stop was unreasonable; no IAC claim on direct appeal

CA1: 82 minute stop was with RS

Reasonable suspicion developed from defendants’ stop to extend it for 82 minutes. United States v. Ramdihall, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8727 (1st Cir. May 18, 2017).*

Defendant was stopped by police after getting off Amtrak at Minot ND. A great collection of suspicious facts, somewhat thin, both at the time of the stop and his actions since the stop were presented to a magistrate who issued a search warrant for defendant’s backpack looking for drugs. Giving due deference to the magistrate, there was probable cause, even absent the dog sniff of the backpack. State v. Hall, 2017 ND 124, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 120 (May 16, 2017).*

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TX4: Conversation over fence with officer led to consent

The conversation with the officers led to a consent search. There were no weapons shown or coercion, and officers had a fence between them and the defendant. Anthony v. State, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4478 (Tex. App. – San Antonio May 17, 2017).*

The CI’s story was corroborated and detailed, and it provided justification for the stop. State v. Collins, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 384 (May 16, 2017).*

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CA11: A police dog can’t be sued for excessive force under § 1983 or for negligence under state law

A police dog can’t be sued under § 1983, although the handler can. Here, the handler has qualified immunity for this use of force. Jones v. Fransen, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8816 (11th Cir. May 19, 2017):
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IA: Plain view of a baggie is enough to seize it without also knowing that there are drugs in it

Plain view of a plastic baggie is enough to seize it without also knowing that there are drugs in it. State v. Taylor, 2017 Iowa App. LEXIS 517 (May 17, 2017).

Defendant’s speeding and his condition was reasonable suspicion for a pre-arrest warrantless onsite screening test of breath. Barrios-Flores v. Levi, 2017 ND 117, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 128 (May 16, 2017).*

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NYLJ: Computer Searches: A ‘General’ Warrant Can No Longer Satisfy Requirements

NYLJ: Computer Searches: A ‘General’ Warrant Can No Longer Satisfy Requirements by Roger L. Stavis (May 19, 2017):
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HI imposes triggering condition in anticipatory warrants under state constitution

“We are faced with a question of first impression for this court: Does the Hawai’i Constitution require that an anticipatory search warrant identify the triggering condition on the face of the warrant? In light of the privacy protections contained in article I, section 7 of the Hawai’i Constitution, we hold that an anticipatory search warrant must, on its face, identify the triggering condition to be valid.” Under Grubbs, anticipatory warrants are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The Hawai’i Supreme Court holds that the state constitution requires more: “To ensure that governmental intrusions into citizens’ privacy is no greater than absolutely necessary, we hold that an anticipatory search warrant must itself identify the triggering condition.” State v. Curtis, 2017 Haw. LEXIS 83 (May 15, 2017).

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N.D.N.Y.: Def’s prior drug involvement justified a drug search condition on supervised release

Defendant’s prior convictions for drugs from age 17-22 justified a drug search condition on supervised release. United States v. Betsy-Jones, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75157 (N.D. N.Y. April 28, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74113 (N.D. N.Y. May 16, 2017).*

Police received a call about a fight in a park and a man in a black car with a gun. When officers arrived, defendant was walking from a black car, and a patdown of his person was justified. State v. Sylvester, 2017-Ohio-2845, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 1873 (5th Dist. May 15, 2017).*

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M.D.Pa.: Def’s version in pro se motion to suppress used against him in third on credibility

Defendant files three motions to suppress. The first one was pro se and never mentioned that his stop was pretextual, that the headlights were actually on, and the stop was without reasonable suspicion. A later motion to suppress challenged the basis for the stop. At the hearing, defendant was questioned about the failure to challenge the basis for the stop the first time as a credibility attack, and it worked: The court finds defendant lacked crediblity on his version of the stop. Defendant’s patdown during the stop was justified. “Here, I find that Mr. Greene’s suspicious movement inside the vehicle, the nature of the neighborhood, and the Officer’s detection of a strong odor of illegal drugs were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down.” United States v. Greene, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75854 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).

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Cal.4th: Passenger’s parole status permitted search of entire passenger compartment

Defendant was in a car with a parolee. After a valid stop, the parolee gave a false name, and the officer eventually got the right name and parole status. A search of the whole car was permissible even though the passenger was a parolee under People v. Schmitz, 55 Cal.4th 909 (2012), decided two years before this search. First, there is a reduced expectation of privacy in a car in general. Second, supervision of parolees is far more intense than probationers. Third, the entire passenger compartment is essentially a common area. People v. Cervantes, 2017 Cal. App. LEXIS 448 (4th Dist. May 18, 2017).

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S.D.N.Y.: Overseizure during SW wasn’t so bad this was a general search

In a forfeiture case of a building worth about $1B, the good faith exception applies to a prior search where there was an overseizure. This overseizure wasn’t enough to make the search a general search. In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73867 (S.D. N.Y. May 15, 2017).

Police responded to a 911 call about a domestic disturbance. The objective evidence shows that the police entry was with consent or based on exigency. United States v. Moore, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74346 (S.D. Fla. April 27, 2017),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73814 (S.D. Fla., May 15, 2017).*

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E.D.Pa.: Def saw police car and walked to other side of street, dropped his gun, and came back to submit to police, and that was abandonment

“Defendant unequivocally intended to abandon the firearm. After the patrol car was near the scene, Defendant walked away from it. While walking, Defendant bent down next to a parked vehicle on Pacific Street and dropped a metallic object on the ground. … After Defendant dropped the metallic object, he walked in front of the patrol car to cross the street away from the parked vehicle and the object he had dropped. … Then, Officer Agudo saw that the metallic object was the firearm in question. … Defendant’s actions clearly show that he intended to abandon the firearm next to the parked vehicle on Pacific Street. He did so before he was seized by Officer Agudo.” United States v. Archie, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74890 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2017).*

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NC statute that probation search be for “purpose” of probation is a limitation on the search power

A 2009 amendment to the state probation search condition required that the search serve the purpose of the supervision, so it’s not carte blanche for a probation search. The trial court’s order refusing to suppress is reversed. State v. Powell, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 375 (May 16, 2017):
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WaPo: Is voluntariness of consent to search or seize a question of fact, law or both?

WaPo: Is voluntariness of consent to search or seize a question of fact, law or both? by Orin Kerr:
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WA: Implied consent law now includes testing for THC influenced driving, and it’s constitutional

The implied consent law includes testing for THC concentration, and it is constitutional. Kandler v. City of Kent, 2017 Wash. App. LEXIS 1176 (May 15, 2017).

Officers adequately explained date discrepancies in the paperwork and use of a search warrant to search a package in transit. United States v. Jones, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73398 (S.D. Ill. May 15, 2017).*

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OH5: Def without DL and not on rental agreement as authorized driver had no standing

Defendant never had a DL, and he was driving a rental car and wasn’t on the paperwork as an authorized driver, so the renter had no authority to let him drive. Therefore, he lacked standing. State v. Nicholson, 2017-Ohio-2825, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 1856 (5th Dist. May 15, 2017).

The Seventh Circuit hasn’t ruled on CSLI and the third-party doctrine. This court sensitively considers the issues on its own, noting other authorities, and finds that the third-party doctrine has to be followed. United States v. Rosario, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73921 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2017).*

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Hacked again

WordPress has been updated, and it’s acting a little funny. But at least it’s working again.

Getting phishing reports that tell us of the hacks.

We do this whole operation on a shoestring since there is no income from it, and the local tech guy is doing his best to resolve them. I hate it that we’re done at all, but it’s not like we have 2500 viewers a day ….

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techdirt: Appeals Court Pretty Sure DOJ Use-Of-Force Guidelines Don’t Violate Police Officers’ 2nd And 4th Amendment Rights

techdirt: Appeals Court Pretty Sure DOJ Use-Of-Force Guidelines Don’t Violate Police Officers’ 2nd And 4th Amendment Rights by Tim Cushing:
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D.Minn.: Delivery of meth to house in past was nexus

Nexus to the premises was shown by the observation of five pounds of methamphetamine being picked up there. United States v. Barron-Celis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73083 (D. Minn. April 4, 2017),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72250 (D. Minn. May 11, 2017).*

“Defendant’s considerable similarity to the description of the shooter, his presence in the vicinity of where the shots were fired, and the closeness in time of these events to the report of shots fired are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that Defendant was the man who fired the shots near the bar. Even before Officer Korus spotted the magazines and handgun in the red car that Defendant was standing next to, there was probable cause to arrest Defendant.” United States v. Perry, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73087 (D.Minn. April 12, 2017).*

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