IL again holds that a second officer running a dog around a car while first officer writes ticket is reasonable because it doesn’t extend the stop

A second officer arrived immediately after defendant’s stop for speeding, and he ran a dog around the car while the first officer wrote out a ticket. This process didn’t extend the stop, and that was reasonable. People v. Pulido, 2017 IL App (3d) 150215, 2017 Ill. App. LEXIS 534 (Aug. 16, 2017).

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W.D.Mo.: Motel room was illegally entered, but it was to preserve the scene not search it, so independent source applied to SW

“In this case, the evidence shows that the officers illegally entered the motel room. However, they only secured the room and did not conduct a search until they had a search warrant. The undisputed evidence shows that the warrant was obtained solely based on the information officers had gathered prior to the illegal entry into the room. Nothing from the illegal entry resulted in the application for the warrant, nor did any information obtained from the illegal entry form the probable cause basis for the warrant. Thus, ‘[b]ecause the information used to obtain the search warrant was independent of the illegal entry and the illegal entry did not contribute to the discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant, the evidence should not be suppressed.’ Marts, 986 F.2d at 1221 (citing Murray, 487 U.S. at 537-38). Therefore, Diaz-Ortiz’s Motion should be denied.” United States v. Diaz-Ortiz, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129764 (W.D. Mo. June 7, 2017).*

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E.D.Pa.: Extraterritorial Gmail SW enforced

A search warrant for Google email stored extraterritorially will be enforced. In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131230 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2017).

The request to search did not come during an unavoidable lull in the traffic stop, and it was unreasonable. State v. Reich, 287 Ore. App. 292, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 985 (Aug. 16, 2017).*

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W.D.Wash.: The mosaic theory is rejected as to P2P computer searches

A search warrant is not required before using a P2P child pornography acquiring program Roundup eMule. The mosaic theory is rejected as to P2P computer searches. United States v. Blouin, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129886 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2017). (The court could have sustained the search in less strident tones.)

A witness on the street already on the phone with 911 provided detailed information that was detailed and essentially corroborated by seeing the defendant. United States v. Timms, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130592 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 16, 2017).*

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DC Cir.: The mere fact a person has a cell phone isn’t PC to search it; must be PC evidence would be found

“Most of us nowadays carry a cell phone. And our phones frequently contain information chronicling our daily lives—where we go, whom we see, what we say to our friends, and the like. When a person is suspected of a crime, his phone thus can serve as a fruitful source of evidence, especially if he committed the offense in concert with others with whom he might communicate about it. Does this mean that, whenever officers have reason to suspect a person of involvement in a crime, they have probable cause to search his home for cell phones because he might own one and it might contain relevant evidence? That, in essence, is the central issue raised by this case.” And the answer is no. The mere fact a person likely has a cell phone, without more, doesn’t provide probable cause to search it for evidence of crime. The government has to show that the phone has a connection to the crime under investigation. United States v. Griffith, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15636 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 18, 2017):
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CA1: No RS for a protective sweep just because def was suspected of drugs

The government had no evidence of violence or reason to believe that there was anybody else in the apartment to justify a protective sweep. The crime alone, suspected drug trafficking, didn’t provide it. United States v. Delgado-Pérez, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15402 (1st Cir. Aug. 16, 2017).

Reasonable suspicion developed to extend the stop. E.g., defendant was driving to Kentucky but didn’t know where he was going. United States v. Clark, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129753 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2017),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128762 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2017).*

Defendant filed a motion to suppress DNA, and the government contested and requested a second DNA test. The first DNA sample was suppressed. When the defense claimed it was calling an expert witness, the government obtained a second. The propriety of the second wasn’t contested. Bernal v. United States, 2017 D.C. App. LEXIS 216 (Aug. 17, 2017).*

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CA8: RS on totality to frisk a gang member in the middle of a rival gang’s territory

Gang officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant when they encountered him outside an apartment building occupied by rival gang members in the middle of another gang’s territory. He was standing between two illegally parked cars talking to occupants of one when the gang unit approached him. There was reasonable suspicion on the totality. United States v. Dortch, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15639 (8th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017):
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CA7: Plainclothes officers have to ID themselves when making a stop

“The jury instructions on Terry stops, however, were inadequate. Over Doornbos’s objection, the court instructed the jury only on investigatory stops but not frisks. Yet Officer Williamson’s own testimony indicates that he was starting a frisk when he first approached Doornbos. His own testimony also makes clear that he did not have reasonable suspicion that Doornbos was armed and dangerous. Doornbos was entitled to have the jury know that the attempted frisk, which even the defense says produced the use of force, was unjustified. The court erred further during deliberations. The jury asked the judge whether plainclothes officers are required to identify themselves when they conduct a stop. The judge said no. We conclude that the answer is yes. In all but the most unusual circumstances, where identification would itself make the situation more dangerous, plainclothes officers must identify themselves when they initiate a stop. Because these errors were not harmless, we vacate the judgment for defendants and remand for a new trial.” Doornbos v. City of Chicago, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15696 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017).

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CA6: Def consented to search of person when he came out of bathroom and was accosted by two officers

“Perhaps the last thing one usually expects when exiting the bathroom is to find a police officer on the other side of the door. However, such was the situation Tremaine Cowan discovered when he exited the restroom of a private home in February 2015. The question of this case is whether, upon being asked by that officer if he would consent to a pat-down for the officer’s safety, any agreement would be mere acquiescence rather than true consent. The district court held that Cowan had consented to the officer’s request. Because Cowan had the opportunity to decline what the evidence describes as a cordial question and made no indication that he consented under protest or pressure, we affirm the district court’s holding and its denial of Cowan’s motion to suppress.” Maybe this court unconstrained by the standard of review would decide it differently, but it can’t. United States v. Cowan, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15669 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2017).* (If the facts aren’t in dispute, as here, the court of appeal could have reviewed de novo (Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)) and found it acquiescence to a claim of authority.).

“The district court properly dismissed McCain’s Fourth Amendment claims relating to the traffic stop and her later arrest because McCain failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and a reasonable basis to execute an arrest warrant.” McCain v. Stockton Police Dep’t, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15409 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2017).*

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CA6: Jail group strip searches invasive, but penologically justified; ptf must answer defs’ proffered justification

While group strip searches at a jail are invasive, there is a penological justification offered that plaintiff doesn’t answer. There is no clearly established law that these are unreasonable. “The issue we face is whether periodically conducting group strip searches when the number of jail inmates waiting to be processed makes individual searches imprudent constitutes a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law. Under the facts of this case, we answer that question ‘no’ and therefore hold that the jail official who conducted the group searches, defendant Terri Graham, is entitled to qualified immunity.” Sumpter v. Wayne County, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017):
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W.D.Mo.: Parked RV hooked up to water and electricity with satellite dish on roof with grill and trashcan outside wasn’t subject to automobile exception

Defendant’s RV was being used as a residence when it was searched, and the automobile exception does not apply. Because it was a residence, the search warrant didn’t specify it within the residences to be searched in the search warrant, and its search was thus warrantless. United States v. Houck, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130650 (W.D. Mo. June 16, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129536 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2017):
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American Conservative: Feds Searching Record Number of Our Personal Devices at the Border

American Conservative: Feds Searching Record Number of Our Personal Devices at the Border by Frank Miniter
In the name of ‘Homeland Security.’

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PA & CA2: Approaching def to talk to him about what’s in his bag was not a seizure

“Consistent with this precedent, we find the officers did not subject Appellant to a seizure when they approached him in a public place and asked him what was inside his bag. The interaction remained a mere encounter as the officers were free to ask Appellant questions without implicating the Fourth Amendment as long as they did not convey a message that Appellant was required to comply with their request. Our review of the instant case does not reveal any circumstances that showed the officers’ request for information was accompanied by a mandate to comply, physical restraint, or any show of authority. The officers merely asked Appellant about the contents of his bag. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the interaction remained a mere encounter upon their inquiry to Appellant.” Commonwealth v. Singleton, 2017 PA Super 264, 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 617 (Aug. 17, 2017).

Similar is United States v. Serrano, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15343 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2017). Note: The court also held that the affidavit in support of the motion to suppress was somewhat different on material facts to get the suppression hearing and that undermined the defendant’s credibility.

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D.D.C.: SCA allows SW for Google email stored overseas

Google’s storing information overseas doesn’t make it immune to a court order in the U.S., disagreeing with the Second Circuit’s Microsoft I decision. In re Search of Information Associated with [Redacted]@gmail.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130153 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017):
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D.Minn.: Omission of CI’s criminal history didn’t mislead magistrate or wasn’t material to PC finding

Failing to include the CI’s criminal history didn’t mislead the magistrate issuing the warrant, and there was probable cause in any event, even without including it. Moreover, the issuing magistrate would have to fairly conclude the CI had criminal involvement. United States v. Heyer, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129134 (D. Minn. July 6, 2017):
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N.D.Ga.: The SW doesn’t have to be in hand at the place of search as long as it is complied with

In a pill mill case against two doctors, the search warrant incorporated a list of what they were looking for by saying “See Exhibit B.” The use of the word “see” incorporated Exhibit B. Moreover, Exhibit B didn’t need to be in hand at the time of the search if the officers know the contents and limitations. United States v. Stokes, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128927 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2017):
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S.D.Fla.: A car broken down on the highway was still “readly mobile” enough for the automobile exception to apply

A car broken down on the highway was still “readly mobile” enough for the automobile exception to apply. United States v. Ortiz-Santizo, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128710 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2017):
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NC: Seizure of shotgun during protective sweep for misdemeanor probation arrest was unreasonable

Defendant was arrested without incident in his living room for a violation of misdemeanor probation, and there was a protective sweep of other rooms looking for others, and a shotgun was seen. The protective sweep was valid, but the seizure of the shotgun was not because there was no reason at that time to believe it was evidence of anything. “Observing the shotgun in plain view did not provide Officer Joyce with authority to seize the weapon permanently. The State’s evidence at the suppression hearing failed to establish that, based on the objective facts known to him at the time, Officer Joyce had probable cause to believe the weapon was contraband or evidence of a crime.” It turned out, however, defendant was a convicted felon–they just didn’t know it yet. State v. Smith, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 665 (Aug. 15, 2017).

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D.Nev.: Inventory invalid for not sufficiently complying with policy; bodycam video relied upon

The inventory is invalid for not coming close to complying with the LVMPD inventory policy. The lack of a written itemization and the body camera video shows it was not a valid inventory. Also, the passenger was a good friend of the owner of a pickup, and when the driver got out, he slid over and continued driving. Considering his relationship with the owner, he’s given standing. United States v. Gibson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126956 (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2017):
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D.Minn.: PC for SW doesn’t even need to be decided if the GFE would apply

Probable cause doesn’t even need to be decided if the good faith exception would apply. “Even assuming without deciding that the search warrants lacked probable cause, the Court concludes that the evidence is nonetheless admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule as articulated in United States v. Leon, ….” United States v. Burke, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127431 (D. Minn. May 22, 2017), adopted, United States v. Burke, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127857 (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2017); United States v. Forthun, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129135 (D. Minn. June 19, 2017).*

Defendant’s girlfriend consented to an entry to look for him when the police claimed to have an arrest warrant. Unresolved, however, is whether the police entered the common area of the divided home into two apartments with any kind of permission. The other apartment dweller let them into the locked common area. That has to be briefed. United States v. Wooten, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129239 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2017).*

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