NY3: Forced prison body cavity search was unreasonable

Defendant’s forced body cavity search in prison was unreasonable under all the circumstances. People v. Holton, 2018 NY Slip Op 02836, 2018 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2830 (3d Dist. Apr. 26, 2018):
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D.D.C.: Drug testing school teachers violated 4A

Drug testing of some school teachers in the District of Columbia violated the reasonable expectation of privacy and didn’t serve government interests. There was no indication one group of teachers (really small kids) even deserved to be included for a complete lack of drug history. Defendant’s motion to dismiss denied; plaintiff’s summary judgment motion granted. Ass’n of Indep. Schs. of Greater Wash. v. D.C., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70146 (D.D.C. Apr 26, 2018):
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AZ: Statutory GFE interpreted same as 4A GFE absent reason not to

The state’s statutory good faith exception is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment good faith exception, absent a compelling argument from the defendant. A pre-Birchfield breath test was valid under the good faith exception of Davis, already applied in Arizona. Alsarraf v. Bernini, 2018 Ariz. App. LEXIS 66 (Apr. 25, 2018).

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CO: Def was ticketed, but car was impounded without reasonable justification; suppressed

Defendant was issued a citation for a traffic offense, and then the officers decided to impound his car. There was no justification for the impoundment, and the search of the vehicle is suppressed. People v. Brown, 2018 CO 27, 2018 Colo. LEXIS 285 (Apr. 16, 2018):
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W.D.Ky.: Backup officer to traffic stop immediately used drug dog, and that wasn’t unreasonable

Defendants’ failure to stop at stop signs was justification for the stop. A backup officer with a drug dog did a dog sniff around the car while the basic stuff of the traffic stop was being done. This did not violate Rodriguez because it didn’t extend the stop at all. United States v. Miles, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67922 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 23, 2018).

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s name and DL during a traffic stop. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 2008). Even if the traffic stop was without reasonable suspicion, there is no fruit of the poisonous tree argument to keep it from ICE. “See United States v. Cervantes-Malagon, 457 F. App’x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2012) (‘Furthermore, even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, this court has held that evidence of identity, such as one’s fingerprints and A-file, is not suppressible.’).” United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67463 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018).*

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CA10: Under the Franks doctrine, relevance doesn’t equate with materiality; district court erred in finding Franks violation from omission of report

Under the Franks doctrine, relevance doesn’t equate with materiality. Defendant was the target of a health fraud investigation with a detailed affidavit that omitted a reference to a letter from state regulators that made no reference to health care fraud. It was maybe relevant, but it wasn’t determinative of fraud. The district court’s finding of a Franks violation is reversed. [A long opinion, and unpublished.] United States v. Gehrmann, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 10350 (10th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018).

Another Playpen warrant sustained. United States v. Bateman, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67542 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 23, 2018).*

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E.D.Mich.: A 16 year old girl, over the age of consent, was in a hotel room with a 45 year old man; that alone was not exigency

A 16 year old girl, over the age of consent, was in a hotel room with a 45 year old man. That alone did not create exigent circumstances. Certainly the parents would be concerned, but there was no evidence that she was being harmed or prostituted. The warrantless entry into the hotel room was unreasonable. United States v. Gordon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67460 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2018):
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OH6: Challenge to credibility of one witness at suppression hearing wasn’t the PC challenge made on appeal

A challenge in the trial court that one of the officers wasn’t credible isn’t the same argument as there being a failure of probable cause. Therefore, the probable cause issue hasn’t been preserved. State v. Gibbs, 2018-Ohio-1549, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1696 (6th Dist. Apr. 20, 2018).

“Considering the above facts, Sergeant Palmer’s initial detention of Cooper was based on reasonable suspicion. Sergeant Palmer observed Cooper driving away from the area where he had, less than a minute before, heard shots being fired. There was no one else in the immediate vicinity and Cooper engaged in the type of evasive behavior that is well recognized as supporting reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Cooper, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67840 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 23, 2018).*

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Cato: Pretextual Stops and the General Warrant: Stopping the March of the Whren Doctrine

Cato: Pretextual Stops and the General Warrant: Stopping the March of the Whren Doctrine by Jay Schweikert:
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N.D.Iowa: SW for car was still sufficient despite the LPN being wrong

The search warrant for defendant’s vehicle properly described it and with California plates except the LPN was wrong. Even if the warrant was insufficiently particular, which the court does not admit, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Ross, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67923 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 11, 2018), adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67528 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 23, 2018).

Defendant knew that he was withdrawing his motion to suppress by pleading guilty. State v. Hampton, 2018-Ohio-1544, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1694 (6th Dist. Apr. 20, 2018).*

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S.D.Fla.: SW can issue after def charged with crime and for the same crime

The fact defendant has already been charged with a crime does not prevent a search warrant issuing for DNA to link him further to it. Humbert v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68779 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2018).

Sale of crack to a known and reliable CI in the 48 hours before the search warrant was sought was with probable cause. United States v. Hanzy, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68803 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 25, 2018).*

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N.D.Tex.: Neither 4A or Rule 41 requires SW be served on def before its execution

“Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 requires the executing officer to serve a search warrant on the owner before beginning the search. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2006). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress on that basis. See United States v. Childs, No. 3:12-CV-1405, 2012 WL 7801603 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2012), rec. accepted, 2013 WL 1197745 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2013) (counsel not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on the officer’s failure to present a search warrant before conducting the search).” Blackburn v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68743 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2018).

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N.D.Ga.: No suppression remedy for alleged HIPAA violation by police

“Moreover, although Defendant initially responded to Kinser’s request for consent by stating, ‘You’re going to do what you’re going to do’ (Tr. 45), Kinser did not then begin searching his car. Instead, Kinser again asked for Defendant’s consent (id.), thus indicating that the deputy did not intend to search the car without Defendant’s consent, and Defendant gave it. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Deputy Kinser did not coerce Defendant into consenting to the search of his vehicle and that his consent was voluntarily given.” In addition, assuming the officers violated HIPAA in getting information about defendant’s exposure to ricin, there doesn’t appear to be a remedy for a HIPAA violation. United States v. Gibbs, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67860 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2018).

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WA: SW for firearms in house permitted forcing open gun safe

A search warrant for firearms necessarily includes the ability of the police to open a gun safe found in the place to be searched, even though the officer was aware there might be a gun safe and it wasn’t specifically mentioned. State v. Witkowski, 2018 Wash. App. LEXIS 941 (Apr. 24, 2018).

“[P]etitioner has failed to show how trial counsel’s failure to seek suppression of the search warrant on the basis of an alleged insufficient description of the petitioner’s property would have affected the outcome of his trial.” Rogers v. State, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 305 (Apr. 23, 2018).*

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Business Insider: Three pleadings from Special Counsel in U.S. v. Manafort, two on motions to suppress

Business Insider: We read all 67 pages of Mueller’s latest court filings on Paul Manafort — here are the main takeaways by Sonam Sheth

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NACDL establishes Fourth Amendment Center

Press release: NACDL establishes Fourth Amendment Center:
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S.D.Ohio: Riley‘s cell phone SW requirement doesn’t apply to probation searches of a cell phone

Riley does not require a warrant for a probation search of a probationer’s cell phone. United States v. Fletcher, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65591 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2018).

Officers had probable cause to search the trunk of a car after a traffic stop was initiated in a high-crime area. The stopping officer was a twelve-year veteran with experience in drug interdiction. The driver and front-seat passenger were making simultaneous furtive movements throughout the stop. Both gave evasive answers to questioning, and both were extremely nervous during an otherwise routine traffic stop. Two of the vehicle’s three occupants had prior convictions related to drug distribution. A consent search of the front-seat passenger revealed 13+ grams of marijuana on his person and an odor of PCP on his breath. That was probable cause to search the trunk. State v. Johnson, 2018 Md. LEXIS 193 (Apr. 20, 2018).*

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OH9: “Counsel’s decision not to pursue every possible angle [in a suppression motion] is not ineffective assistance.”

“Counsel’s decision not to pursue every possible angle [in a suppression motion] is not ineffective assistance.” State v. Palmer, 2018-Ohio-1486, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 1631 (9th Dist. Apr. 18, 2018).

Defendant’s swerving vehicle and trailer provided reasonable suspicion for a stop that he was impaired. United States v. Budde, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67096 (D. Mont. Apr. 20, 2018).*

Apprising motorist of the consequences of refusal of a BAC test satisfies due process. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Smith, 2018 Md. LEXIS 192 (Apr. 20, 2018).*

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D.Minn.: Citizen informant wasn’t material witness under Roviaro

A citizen informant who called police to say that a store video shown on the news looked like defendant wasn’t a material witness at trial under Roviaro. The government wasn’t calling the person, and defendant didn’t show a reason to. United States v. Moman, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66923 (D. Minn. Apr. 20, 2018).

Defendant contended he wasn’t the driver of the vehicle involved, but the court finds the officers’ testimony persuasive and that defendant was the driver. Therefore, there was probable cause for his arrest. United States v. Jivens, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66255 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2018),* adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65846 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2018).*

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W.D.Ky.: Drug dog sticking his nose into defendant’s car was instinctual and wasn’t caused by the police

A drug dog sticking his nose into defendant’s car was instinctual and wasn’t caused by the police, following United States v. Sharp, 689 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2012). United States v. Miles, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66899 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 20, 2018).

The circuit court’s finding that the drug dog was reliable was not clearly erroneous. The officer had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle because the State presented the most credible and unbiased expert witness, the dog’s training records supported the reliability determination, and the officer’s and the dog’s certifications provided even more support for the reliability finding. The whole of the evidence, including the dog’s training records and field performance, established that the dog was reliable. Grimm v. State, 2018 Md. LEXIS 190 (Apr. 20, 2018).*

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