WaPo: At CES, Apple, Facebook and Amazon are preaching privacy. Don’t believe the hype.

WaPo: At CES, Apple, Facebook and Amazon are preaching privacy. Don’t believe the hype. by Geoffrey A. Fowler

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WaPo: Colorado just used its gun seizure law for the first time — one day after it took effect

WaPo: Colorado just used its gun seizure law for the first time — one day after it took effect by
Derek Hawkins
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D.D.C.: No statute of limitations for equitable actions for return of property not forfeited

Plaintiff pro se and post-conviction filed a pleading for return of property. Some was forfeited, and it was treated as a motion to set aside the forfeitures. Some were not forfeited, and there is no statute of limitations for equitable relief for return of property. Motion to dismiss granted against the forfeited and denied against the non-forfeited. Ford-Bey v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1583 (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2020).

In challenging the R&R, defendant’s only claim is that the officers weren’t credible, but the USMJ found that they were. That’s the USMJ’s job. Even with de novo review, their testimony appears credible. United States v. Tillard, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1539 (W.D. N.Y. Jan. 6, 2020).*

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WaPo: FBI asks Apple for help cracking Pensacola gunman’s iPhones

WaPo: FBI asks Apple for help cracking Pensacola gunman’s iPhones by Devlin Barrett:

The FBI is pressing Apple for help opening iPhones that belonged to the Saudi military student who killed three people last month at a naval base in Pensacola, Fla., signaling a potential revival of the fight between the federal government and Silicon Valley over encryption technology.

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M.D.Pa. Delay in searching cell phones wasn’t unreasonable because def was in jail out of possession anyway

The delay between seizing defendant’s cell phones and searching them wasn’t unreasonable considering he was in jail and would have had no access to them anyway. United States v. Carey, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1150 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2020).

There was probable cause for a pharmacy’s records based on over-prescribing Oxys in multiple prescriptions to the same persons. United States v. Nasr, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1460 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2020).*

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D.Mass.: Attacking only GFE when court found both PC and GFE states no 2255 claim

The district court before conviction held that the search warrant was based on probable cause and the good faith exception would apply. In his 2255, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not better arguing the good faith exception. The court spends a lot of toner getting to the point: What difference does it make if there was probable cause anyway? “The search warrant was supported by probable cause or, in the alternative, the good faith exception under Leon with respect to the contents of Henry’s cell phone. … Henry’s counsel’s failure to raise and preserve the latter argument did not result in any prejudice to Henry.” United States v. Henry, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1344 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2020). This is an example of the appellate rationale that if two reasons are asserted for the trial court’s conclusion, merely attacking one on appeal doesn’t even merit a decision on the merits.

Before getting a child pornography search warrant, officers did not have to independently verify that the images being searched for were in fact child pornography as long as there was probable cause to believe they were there. United States v. Eller, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1255 (D.Ariz. Jan. 3, 2020).*

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OH5: Knock-and-talk led to smell of MJ grow; entry for protective sweep before getting SW wasn’t unreasonable

Police came to do a knock-and-talk, and they could smell a marijuana grow from outside. They decided to do a protective sweep for people before they left to get a search warrant because they heard music from inside the home. They testified they did the sweep to reduce the chance of violence. They photographed and took nothing. The entry was not unreasonable and the motion to suppress was properly denied. State v. Yost, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 5514 (5th Dist. Dec. 30, 2019).

The CI here was named and an eyewitness to defendant’s alleged crime, and his detail and named status was sufficient reliability for probable cause. United States v. Jones, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223699 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 19, 2019), adopted, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222281 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 2019).

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CA10: Causing a handcuffed unseatbelted arrestee to be bounced around the back seat while driving fast and recklessly states an excessive force claim; no QI

“McCowan based his excessive-force claim on his assertion that Officer Moralez placed McCowan in the back seat of a patrol car, handcuffed behind his back and unrestrained by a seatbelt, and then drove recklessly to the police station, knowing his driving was violently tossing McCowan back and forth across the backseat. This rough ride, McCowan contends, injured his shoulders, after McCowan had advised the officer before the trip to the station that he had a previous shoulder injury. [¶] As to this claim, it was clearly established at the time of these events that an officer’s gratuitous use of excessive force against a fully compliant, restrained, and non-threatening misdemeanant arrestee is unreasonable—and, therefore, violates the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we agree with the district court that Officer Moralez is not entitled to qualified immunity from McCowan’s excessive-force claim.” McCowan v. Morales, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 38816 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 2019).

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CA11: Domestic disturbance call with a report of shots fired permitted a warrantless entry and then a protective sweep for victims

A domestic disturbance call with a report of shots fired permitted a warrantless entry and then a protective sweep for victims: “Based on the 911 call reporting gunshots and a domestic disturbance, combined with Peacock’s initial observations upon arriving at the scene, the officers were, as in Holloway, permitted to conduct a limited search of the home for victims of gunfire.” United States v. Jones, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 152 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2020).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress challenging police entry onto defendant’s curtilage with probable cause despite defendant having a fence, gate, barbed wire, and a “no trespassing” sign. Defendant’s version would have hamstrung the trial, if there was one, and counsel had a valid strategic reason not to go there. Moreover, the recording of the walk through of his house belied any claim there was police coercion for him to talk. Treffinger v. United States, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 170 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2020).

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D.Mont.: With court ordered pinging of cell phone, govt violated no REP in following the pings

Once officers had a warrant authorizing capturing defendant’s cell phone pings back even in 2015, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements in public when they were following him based on the result of the pings. Therefore, defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging that, too. United States v. Bummer, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1052 (D. Mont. Jan. 5, 2020).

Defendant’s computer was passing information out from it, including child pornography, and, thus, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer when the government gathered that information. United States v. Sigouin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223695 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 19, 2019).*

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D.N.J.: Habeas pet’r doesn’t show case outcome would be different if motion to suppress had been litigated

To prevail on a Fourth Amendment IAC claim, there are essentially three things to prove, not just two: (a) defense counsel failed to litigate a search issue (b) that not only would have prevailed on the search issue, (c) but also would have changed the outcome of the trial. Capers v. Davis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223614 (D. N.J. Dec. 20, 2019):
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E.D.Tenn.: Consent to protective sweep led to plain view of money under a bed

Defendant consented to a protective sweep, and, looking under a bed, the officer saw a duffle bag with money showing. That was a reasonable search. United States v. Stanton, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 778 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2020).*

“To the extent Mack is attempting to challenge the search warrant separately from any alleged Brady violation, that claim was also waived by the guilty plea.” (Anders brief) Mack v. State, 2019 Del. LEXIS 569 (Dec. 30, 2019).*

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LA Times: Black drivers face more police stops in California, state analysis shows

LA Times: Black drivers face more police stops in California, state analysis shows by Anita Chabria (“Black drivers in some of California’s largest cities are stopped and searched by police at higher rates than white and Latino motorists, according to a new state analysis.”)

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The Recorder/Law.com: Ring Slapped With Lawsuit Following Reports of Camera Security Breaches

The Recorder/Law.com: Ring Slapped With Lawsuit Following Reports of Camera Security Breaches by Alaina Lancaster (“Despite Amazon-owned Ring’s suite of security offerings, the federal complaint contends that the company has failed to set up ‘even basic cybersecurity protections.'”)

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NM: Officer’s inferences for RS don’t require certainty

Reasonable suspicion was found here on the totality from experience, logical inferences, and the high-crime nature of the area where it was going on. “[W]hile it was possible Martinez’s conduct was innocuous, Officer Garrison was not required to wait until he was certain Martinez’s conduct was criminal before investigating. Officer Garrison was permitted to investigate to resolve whether in fact Martinez’s conduct was innocent or criminal.” State v. Martinez, 2020 N.M. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 2, 2020):
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D.Neb.: Handcuffing on RS to assure safety and maintain the status quo reasonable and not a de facto arrest

Handcuffing a person on reasonable suspicion just to protect the officer’s safety and maintain the status quo is not unreasonable. United States v. Mayfield, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 520 (D. Neb. Jan. 3, 2020).

While the exclusionary rule can apply to forfeiture proceedings instigated by unreasonable border seizures because they are quasi criminal proceedings, United States v. Modes, Inc., 16 C.I.T. 189, 787 F. Supp. 1466, 14 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1124 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992), this case does not involve a Fourth Amendment seizure, so Modes doesn’t apply. United States v. Harvic Int’l, 2020 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 1 (Ct. Int’l Trade Jan. 3, 2020).

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CA11: Exclusionary rule doesn’t apply to revocation of supervised release; SCOTUS would so hold

The exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation of supervised release conditions. While SCOTUS hasn’t ruled on that precise question, its parole and probation search cases are a clear sign it will follow them there. United States v. Hill, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 51 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020).

Defendant was stopped by a state trooper for tailgating. When defendant produced his license, a glassine bag of cocaine was visible sticking from his pocket. This was all cause to arrest and conduct a search incident. The passenger’s nervousness gave at least reasonable suspicion as to him, too. United States v. Perez, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 433 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2020).*

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CA6: 15 dogs abandoned in a house living in squalor was exigency for warrantless entry

Plaintiff kept 15 dogs in her house in squalor. She went out of town and didn’t provide for them. Her “associates” reported the situation to animal control and they entered the house and seized the animals. The entry and seizure was with exigent circumstances, and the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. More simply put: because of exigent circumstances, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment. King v. Montgomery County, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 44 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020):
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CA7: Police shooting at a car shooting at others was a reasonable use of deadly force

Police shooting at a car that just fired at others was not an unreasonable use of deadly force against the occupants. Ybarra v. City of Chicago, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 62 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2020):
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W.D.N.Y.: No PC for arrest or SW; GFE hearing wasn’t concluded, and it shall now

The defendant’s arrest on this thin claim from an unproven and unreliable CI was without probable cause, and the search of his person is suppressed. The search warrant was also issued without probable cause, but the part of the hearing spent on the good faith exception wasn’t concluded, and defendant requested it remain open. Despite that, the USMJ held the good faith exception applied. The hearing will still occur. The government carries the burden of proof on good faith. United States v. Chatmon, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 366 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020).

This alleged state law violation is not a Fourth Amendment violation. The district court did not err in denying a motion to reconsider. Van Dyke v. Fultz, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 2 (7th Cir. Jan. 2, 2020).*

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