Transcript here. Orin Kerr’s video comments here. Kerr’s twitter post with link added:
Summary of Carpenter argument using the “four models” framework: Carpenter may win based on several Justices relying on the policy model and one Justice relying on the positive law model.
Posted inSCOTUS|Comments Off on Carpenter argument now online and Kerr’s comments
While the general reasonable expectation of privacy in a cell phone is weighty, it still succumbs to the state’s interest in parole searches of a cell phone to insure compliance with parole requirements. The record also supports consent given by defendant’s aunt with whom he lived. United States v. Johnson, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23911 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017): Continue reading →
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“[W]here officers observed a group of individuals openly drinking what appeared to be an alcoholic beverage and one of them threw a bottle to the ground, the officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate a potential open container violation and to determine who threw the bottle. The defendant’s flight from the group upon the officers’ approach should have been considered as one factor among others in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” Utah v. Strieff attenuation on finding a preexisting warrant is followed. Sizer v. State, 2017 Md. LEXIS 772 (Nov. 28, 2017).
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Suppression of a firearm in the criminal court was not collateral estoppel to a civil case for false arrest, particularly where plaintiff offered no evidence at all. Davidson v. City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 08313, 2017 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8391 (1st Dept. Nov. 28, 2017).
There is no bright line rule for what’s too much time under Rodriguez. Here, reasonable suspicion was developing. United States v. Gomez-Hernandez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192069 (D. N.M. June 13, 2016).
Defendant’s truck was stopped at an immigration checkpoint, and the bill of lading had white-out and handwriting on it, which is unusual for a bona fide commercial load and common for drug couriers. That, coupled with defendant’s shaking hands when he handed it over, was reasonable suspicion and the dog sniff was valid. United States v. Escobar, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194838 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2017).*
According to the vehicle code and the driver’s license manual, when a police car has its lights on, a driver is to stop until let go. Here, the officer pulled up next to defendant’s car on the side of I-79 with overhead lights on to inquire what was going on. She was entering an address into the car’s GPS. She looked at him, and he thought she looked impaired, so that led to more of a stop. The stop here was unreasonable. Stopping to check GPS isn’t reasonable suspicion. “For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Appellant was subjected to an illegal investigatory detention. Furthermore, although we take this opportunity to recognize the public servant ‘exception’ to the warrant requirement under the community caretaking doctrine, which in certain circumstances will permit a warrantless seizure, we conclude that the doctrine does not justify the detention of Appellant under the facts of this case. Thus, we hold that the Superior Court erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of her illegal investigatory detention, and we reverse the Superior Court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 3244 (Nov. 27, 2017) (concurring and dissenting; dissenting).
Posted inCommunity caretaking function, Seizure|Comments Off on PA: Flashing overhead lights on a police car means stop and stay until released; stopping to check GPS isn’t RS
First defendant denied ownership of the backpack, and the police searched it. “[T]he fact that defendant claimed ownership of the backpack after the search is of no moment.” That was abandonment. United States v. Ferebee, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193791 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 22, 2017).
New Mexico operates a state truck inspection station at the Lordsburg port of entry. Defendant’s truck stopped there, and a valid administrative inspection occurred of the truck. A box was opened, and the box did not conform to the bill of lading. This was administrative probable cause to search further. United States v. Guzman-Dominguez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192064 (D. N.M. July 5, 2016).*
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Even though somebody else owned the van, defendant was a regular user and that gave him standing. At the time of the seizure, it had broken down, and he used it then for storage. The government failed to show any justification for the seizure and then search of the van in response to defendant’s motion to suppress. Instead, it simply relied on standing, which it lost on. The search of a house, however, was by consent of the owner. United States v. Hill, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193796 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192106 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2017). (There’s a moral here. Defendant’s standing was evident, so address the merits of the vehicle search. Maybe they didn’t think they could win on it anyway.)
Defendant’s argument to suppress the search doesn’t really even address reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and is “meritless,” but there is an intervening source of information that moots all that. United States v. Wilkerson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192201 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 20, 2017).*
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Federal officers can seek a pilot certificate inspection (PCI) of any airplane. 14 C.F.R. 61.51(i). “Although it seems obvious that the agents were interested in Defendants’ plane for drugs—and therefore that the PCI was merely a pretext to dig around—officers need no reason at all to conduct a regulatory stop. Id. Such an encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Massi, 761 F.3d at 521. ‘Therefore, we consider the issue of suppression to turn solely on what occurred after the [PCI].’ Id.” After the stop of the plane on the tarmac, officers tried to look at the passengers, but the curtains were drawn. They could smell marijuana coming from the plane. The detention of the airplane and occupants was reasonable and with reasonable suspicion, although some factors the government relied on were innocuous. There had been past cash seizures from airplanes of the owner. There was a dog sniff, and probable cause developed. Gant’s search incident does not apply, but the automobile exception does [without explicitly saying so because the plane was inherently mobile]. United States v. Koutsos, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192397 (S.D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2017).
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“As noted, the troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants. The troopers had watched a man, at night, in a high crime area during Mardi Gras, the busiest weekend of the year, peer into several unoccupied vehicles, and then enter the Nissan. Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer would have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot. Accordingly, the officers properly approached the vehicle, bearing lit flashlights.” The side windows couldn’t be seen through because of tinting, but the windshield could, and the officers saw baggies on the console. When a door was opened they could smell marijuana. They validly searched the car finding marijuana, heroin, and a gun. United States v. George, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191379 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2017).
Posted inProbable cause, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on E.D.La.: Casing parked cars the weekend before Mardi Gras then all getting in one car was RS
“The district court did not clearly err in determining that Pavon’s consent to the search of his vehicle was voluntary and without coercion. Officer Josh Walters testified that he twice asked for and received consent from Pavon to search the trunk of the vehicle and the duffel bag. Walters also testified that he informed Pavon of his right to refuse consent. Although Walters testified that he drew his weapon upon approaching Pavon’s vehicle, he indicated that he holstered his weapon after checking Pavon for weapons. And Pavon does not argue that he did not speak English or understand the advisement of his rights. Although it is true that Walters had earlier drawn his firearm, and it is unclear from the record whether Pavon was in handcuffs at the time he gave consent, the record, in the totality of the circumstances, does not support clear error by the district court in crediting Walters’s testimony that the consent to search was voluntarily given and without coercion.” United States v. Pavon, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 23778 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 2017).
Posted inConsent|Comments Off on CA6: Def had a gun pointed at him during arrest, but it was put away after he was handcuffed; consent found on totality
[D]oes the third-party doctrine apply the same way to cellphones, which only became commercially available a few years after the court’s decisions in Miller and Smith?… That question is at the heart of Carpenter v. United States, in which the justices will hear oral argument next week.
Carpenter’s oral argument is tomorrow.
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on SCOTUSblog: Argument preview: The justices return to cellphones and the Fourth Amendment
POs found defendant parolee at his girlfriend’s house that he was not approved to live in. It was arguable he didn’t have standing, and his reasonable expectation of privacy was reduced there [I think he would have standing as an overnight guest, but that’s not the point. The point is that the search could happen in his own home, so it could happen elsewhere, too.] but he was on parole because of his status. They had reasonable suspicion. The fact the officers entered a third party’s home doesn’t make the parole search unreasonable. United States v. Curtis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189055 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 10, 2017): Continue reading →
A local police officer was working off-duty security at a grocery store on the night shift. He’d seen defendant in there many times in the previous four years in the store, and defendant was usually under the influence. Plus, the officer went to elementary school with defendant and even knew him from then. This time, defendant pulled a gun out and then put it away, and the officer saw it. He relieved defendant of the gun, and defendant was a felon in possession. The search for the gun was reasonable whether he was acting as a law enforcement officer or private actor. His testimony is credited because he wrote his report three days after the occurrence from memory and never saw the video of the occurrence which is entirely consistent with his testimony. United States v. Cross, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193747 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2017).
Police were called because defendant was alleged to have punched his mother, with whom he lived, in the face. She consented to a search of the house. United States v. Jones, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193566 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2017).*
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The trial court didn’t err in finding that defendant consented to search of his cell phone and DNA at the hospital after a murder. He was strenuously trying to show the police that he wasn’t involved and was volunteering consent. Three weeks later, he withdrew consent by a letter, but, once the incriminate nature of the evidence has been discovered, the police don’t have to give it back. His girlfriend had apparent authority to consent to seizure of three trash bags from the house. State v. Hemminger, 2017 SD 77, 2017 S.D. LEXIS 158 (Nov. 21, 2017).
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Defendant was a sex offender on probation after prison, and he had a search condition. The police and probation had information that he had child pornography on his computer. A probation search of an SD card revealed the child pornography. A suspicionless search was lawful. Even if reasonable suspicion were required, the police had it. United States v. Coffin, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193246 (D. Me. Nov. 22, 2017).
Based on a CI, officers suspected that defendants would be doing a heroin deal in a McDonald’s parking lot, and they watched them. “But, to the Court, law enforcement reasonably assessed this amalgamation of circumstances and reasonably suspected Bernal and Perez of criminal activity. The above facts, in the Court’s view, combine to form a particularized and objective basis for suspecting Defendants of criminality. Thus, Bernal and Perez, driving a vehicle with an Illinois plate, arrived at the exact location at the approximate time that law enforcement anticipated a heroin delivery with those specifics. They lingered, with no obvious explanation, inside the McDonald’s for 45 minutes after concluding their meal, after 10:00 p.m., while Bernal periodically looked out a window to monitor the Element and otherwise sat inside clutching a cell phone.” United States v. Bernal, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193809 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 26, 2017),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193172 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 22, 2017).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.