N.D.Iowa: It is proper for court to focus on pre-warrant police activities in deciding GFE question

Focusing on the officer’s pre-warrant activities, the court finds that their conduct in entering defendant’s hotel room was unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the good faith exception should not apply because it’s not reliance on the showing of probable cause. United States v. Zarate, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127632 (N.D. Iowa July 31, 2019):
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C.D.Ill.: Prior judicial complaints of thin PC from officer go unheeded, but this SW survives GFE anyway

The district court once chided the officer here for a lackadaisical attitude toward showing probable cause with thin facts. The Seventh Circuit concurred but upheld it. And, the officer does it again. Commenting on the past, the court finds it just barely gets over the bar for probable cause or the good faith exception would apply. [One would think the prior warning would undermine the good faith argument, but it didn’t.] United States v. Ware, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126862 (C.D. Ill. July 30, 2019)*:
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For those who think the Fourth Amendment is “dead” …

Lexis added 155 search cases to its database in the last 48 hours. It’s going to take a while to get caught up.

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FL2: State doesn’t justify entry into motel room on any exigency after suspect’s arrest; standing raised too late

The court declines to remand for more evidence of standing when the state sat on the claim. The state’s protective sweep argument and associated search incident fails for its failure to show exigency for any entry or officer safety. The state raised standing after all the proof was in at the suppression hearing and it’s de facto waived. State v. M.B.W., 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 11944 (Fla. 2d DCA July 31, 2019):
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S.D.Tex.: Emergency court order to remove children from home satisfied warrant requirement of 4A

An emergency family court order to take custody of children satisfied the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. “The April 6, 2017 order is equivalent to a warrant satisfying the Fourth Amendment. See Gates v. Tex. Dept. of Prot. & Reg. Svs., 537 F.3d 404, 429 n.16 (5th Cir. 2008) (‘An order properly issued by a court pursuant to Texas Family Code § 262.102, which authorizes state courts to issue emergency orders to take possession of a child, [is sufficient] to meet the ‘warrant’ requirement.’).” Smith v. Tex. Dep’t of Child Protective Servs., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127738 (S.D. N.Y. July 31, 2019).

Defense counsel did, in fact, make the only viable challenge to the state’s case: the validity of the search warrant, and lost. Counsel wasn’t ineffective. State v. Lambert, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 358 (June 27, 2019).*

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FL2: Def gets benefit of Byrd where issue raised before it was decided; remanded

Defendant was not listed as an authorized driver of a rental car, and he moved to suppress the search of the rental car. Because his case was in “the pipeline,” he gets the benefit of Byrd and the case is remanded for a new suppression hearing. Jeansimon v. State, 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 11973 (Fla. 2d DCA July 31, 2019).

The CI’s information was specific and substantially corroborated. Nexus to the premises was also shown. United States v. Calhoun, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124367 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2019).*

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CA4: Denial of post-trial Franks motion here subject to plain error review

Defendant’s motion for a Franks hearing came post-trial. The court of appeals declines to deny it for lack of timeliness and denies it on the merits. The Franks burden is heavy, and the record is scant. So, he’s relegated to plain error review and does not make it over the hurdle on materiality or recklessness. United States v. Moody, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22416 (4th Cir. July 29, 2019).*

Police were properly in defendant’s house with an arrest warrant under Payton when he confessed. People v. Quinones, 2019 NY Slip Op 05922, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5927 (4th Dept. July 31, 2019).*

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CA6: Ptf arrested for a police parody Facebook page has much of case survive QI on retaliatory arrest

Plaintiff made a parody Facebook page of the Parma Police Department which ultimately led to his arrest for impeding police operations because the Parma Police had to field 12 minutes of phone calls over which was the real Facebook page. He was acquitted for that and sued. On qualified immunity, most of his case survives but some of it doesn’t. Ohio law may be unconstitutional, but qualified immunity would still apply to part of the case for lack of clearly established law. Novak v. City of Parma, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22398 (6th Cir. July 29, 2019)*:
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D.Nev.: Under probation interstate compact, probationer subject to rules of both states

Defendant was placed on probation in Arizona, and he was subject to suspicionless searches there. He transferred probation to Nevada under the Interstate Compact for probationers, but Nevada required reasonable suspicion. He knew he was subject to the probation conditions of both Arizona and Nevada. Therefore, the suspicionless search was valid. United States v. Buenrostro, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124327 (D. Nev. June 14, 2019) (R&R).

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CA1: Police chief’s order to officer to turn over cellphone and home phone records not a constitutional violation under third-party doctrine; chief gets qualified immunity

Plaintiff is a police officer, and the chief ordered production of his cell phone and home phone records in an internal investigation. The chief gets qualified immunity because of the third party doctrine. Those records were obtainable by subpoena from third parties anyway. Johnson v. Duxbury, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22426 (1st Cir. July 29, 2019):
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S.D.W.Va.: Computer SW for drugs led to healthcare fraud evidence; second SW needed; exclusionary rule should apply to deter

The government had a search warrant of ESI for drugs. When the search warrant was executed, they found evidence of healthcare billing fraud. A second search warrant was required, citing the government’s own search manual [noted and linked on the sidebar on this blog]. The evidence should be suppressed to deter other such occurrences, and the good faith exception doesn’t apply because this is an Fourth Amendment execution violation, not a close question of probable cause. United States v. Nasher-Alneam, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125576 (S.D. W.Va. July 29, 2019):
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Fix Congress First: Federal Government Seizure of President Trump’s New York State Individual Tax Returns is Most Likely a Violation of the Fourth Amendment

Fix Congress First: Federal Government Seizure of President Trump’s New York State Individual Tax Returns is Most Likely a Violation of the Fourth Amendment by Don Suarez, arguing that Carpenter applies: “We hold only that a warrant is required in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party.”

Statutorily, there is a heightened privacy interest in federal tax returns because of the Nixon-era privacy protections in tax returns. Many states have similar protections. Query: Assuming Carpenter applies, and why shouldn’t it, if the taxpayer has publicly and repeatedly said for four years that he wants to make them public but can’t because of an alleged audit, has he publicly waived any reasonable expectation of privacy?

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Legal Intelligencer: Commentary: Coming Face-to-Face With Facial Recognition Technology

Legal Intelligencer: Commentary: Coming Face-to-Face With Facial Recognition Technology by Jeffrey N. Rosenthal and Huaou Yan:

Facial technology identifies an image of a face by breaking down the depicted face into several characteristics (e.g., the relative position, shape, contours and size of facial features) and then searching a database of pre-identified faces for matching characteristics.

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OH2: 911 caller whose number is recorded isn’t really anonymous

911 caller whose number was recorded wasn’t truly anonymous, and the information was detailed and first hand. Even if anonymous, it was still reliable enough. State v. Gregory, 2019-Ohio-3000, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 3093 (2d Dist. July 26, 2019):
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OH2: Def’s case was pending when Carpenter decided, so he gets benefit of it, but there was exigency for ping

Defendant was arrested in 2016 for a murder. He raised a CSLI issue, and he was tried after Carpenter was decided. He gets the benefit of Carpenter because his case was still pending when it came down. Nevertheless, there was exigency and that exception applies. State v. Snowden, 2019-Ohio-3006, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 3096 (2d Dist. July 26, 2019).

Defendant was frisked, and in the watch pocket, it was immediately apparent to the officer, a former jailer who’d searched thousands, that a small baggie of drugs was there by its feel. Removing it was reasonable. State v. Oliver, 2019-Ohio-3007, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 3097 (5th Dist. July 24, 2019).*

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WaPo: A police department is handing out coupons, not tickets, to people who follow the law. Not everyone is thrilled.

WaPo: A police department is handing out coupons, not tickets, to people who follow the law. Not everyone is thrilled. By Antonia Noori Farzan:
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WaPo:Analysis: The Trump administration wants to be able to break into your encrypted data. Here’s what you need to know.

WaPo:Analysis: The Trump administration wants to be able to break into your encrypted data. Here’s what you need to know. By Tim Maurer and Garrett Hinck:

And so do governments around the world.

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IL: Chicago PD’s “investigative alert” arrest is without judicially approved PC and unconstitutional

“Cordell Bass was arrested solely on the authority of what the Chicago Police Department calls an ‘investigative alert.’ Department regulations allow officers to arrest people on the basis of an alert where there is probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime. But, the regulations allow for police supervisors to internally make that probable cause determination. Officers are not required to take their case for probable cause to a judge, as they would for an arrest warrant. We are asked to determine whether this practice is constitutional [under the Illinois constitution]. We hold that it is not.” People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 638 (July 25, 2019). (It would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, too. My own local police had what they called an “‘S’ docket” back in the 60s and 70s where people were arrested on “suspicion” and detained for days. A federal judge struck it down noting that “suspicion” isn’t even probable cause. The case was filed in 1972, and that ruling came shortly. The attorneys fee award didn’t come until 1984 after damages claims were exhausted. Phillips v. Weeks, 586 F.Supp. 241 (E.D. Ark. 1984). The original order isn’t online.)

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D.Nev.: The fact def’s FIPF prior had a suspended sentence wasn’t material for Franks

A state telephonic search warrant was issued based on allegations that defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm. The fact he got a suspended sentence and it was omitted from the application for the warrant isn’t material. United States v. Taylor, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124770 (D. Nev. July 25, 2019).

At the time of the search, circuit precedent held that defendant didn’t have standing in a rental car, but that all changed with Byrd. Instead of deciding standing in that context the court goes to the merits. The district court found reasonable suspicion for extending the stop based on the totality [which looked really thin]. Then, there was consent for the search, and the court sustains the stop and search. United States v. Glenn, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22338 (5th Cir. July 26, 2019).

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W.D.Ark.: The “traffic stop” was actually a PC stop for drugs

This was not even a traffic stop, although it appeared one to the defendant. Actually, it was based on a CI’s information involving drugs and was with probable cause, so the extension of the stop with reasonable suspicion didn’t even matter. United States v. Wilson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124800 (W.D. Ark. July 24, 2019).

Defendant’s motion to suppress a geolocation warrant to Facebook to compare defendant’s car to one seen in a bank robbery video didn’t make a sufficient allegation that it was false to get a Franks hearing. There may have been an error, but nothing shows that it was anything more than negligence at worst. Counsel’s claim at a pretrial that it was made recklessly was speculative. United States v. Prather, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125029 (N.D. Ga. July 11, 2019).*

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