D.Nev.: The fact def’s FIPF prior had a suspended sentence wasn’t material for Franks

A state telephonic search warrant was issued based on allegations that defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm. The fact he got a suspended sentence and it was omitted from the application for the warrant isn’t material. United States v. Taylor, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124770 (D. Nev. July 25, 2019).

At the time of the search, circuit precedent held that defendant didn’t have standing in a rental car, but that all changed with Byrd. Instead of deciding standing in that context the court goes to the merits. The district court found reasonable suspicion for extending the stop based on the totality [which looked really thin]. Then, there was consent for the search, and the court sustains the stop and search. United States v. Glenn, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 22338 (5th Cir. July 26, 2019).

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