SAN JOSE (CN) – A woman may pursue claims that Santa Clara County sheriff’s deputies planted drugs in her home, a federal judge ruled.
Allison Ross sued the sheriff, her crime lab and 12 officers in April, claiming that officers’ dashboard camera and audio caught the deputies conspiring to plant drugs after their first search of her house came up empty in 2009.
“The Incident Report states that two bags of white powder were found and confiscated. However, pursuant to the vehicle dash camera video and transcript, the officers are heard on the recording saying: ‘the house is clean, there is no meth in the house’, ‘we’re gonna spike that and we’re gonna spike him.’ ‘I got the meth in the ——- car,'” the complaint states. (Epithet deleted in complaint.)
Ross v. Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165929 (N.D. Cal. November 26, 2014)
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There is no state law privacy interest in electric company usage records for a grow operation. The state supreme court had already upheld access by subpoena to telephone records. State v. Sparks, 267 Ore. App. ___, 2014 Ore. App. LEXIS 1650 (November 26, 2014).*
Defendant was seen standing in the parking lot of a high crime area at night talking to somebody, and he looked startled and ran on seeing the police car. That was reasonable suspicion. State v. Robertson, 2014 La. App. LEXIS 2846 (La.App. 1 Cir. November 25, 2014).*
The difference between a motion in limine and a motion to suppress is discussed in United States v. Perez-Gomez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165439 (M.D. Ala. November 26, 2014):
n.2. This is as opposed to a motion to suppress. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a motion in limine as a “pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Black’s defines a motion to suppress as a “request that the court prohibit the introduction of illegally obtained evidence at a criminal trial.” Id. Here, it would not be accurate to say that the evidence was illegally obtained, in the sense of a violation of the Searches and Seizures Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v. Wilk, 572 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2009) (treating a “motion to suppress” as “a motion in limine to exclude [evidence] as privileged under Federal Rule of Evidence 501” “[b]ecause Wilk did not address this issue in a Fourth Amendment context …”).
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“‘Ellis submits that some of the evidence seized were [sic] so done in violation of his Fourth Amendment right[s] against unreasonable search and seizure.’ (Mem. Supp. § 2255 Mot. 6-7.) Ellis supplies no basis upon which counsel could have filed a suppression motion. Thus, Ellis’s conclusory claim fails to state claims for relief. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 19, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963) (finding denial of habeas action appropriate where it ‘stated only bald legal conclusions with no supporting factual allegations’).” United States v. Ellis, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165685 (E.D. Va. November 25, 2014).
A 911 call about a stabbing on an Indian reservation brought local officers, and they had exigent circumstances for the entry based on the call and observations of bloody footprints in the snow outside the house. United States v. Youngbear, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165698 (N.D. Iowa November 25, 2014).*
Probable cause supported issuance of the search warrant for defendant’s house based on two CIs. Both said they used meth with defendant there in the previous couple of days, and one tested positive for meth. Since the warrant was properly issued, the finding of a silencer in plain view meant it could be seized. United States v. Housholder, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164831 (D. Kan. November 25, 2014).*
Illinois’ implied consent statute is not unconstitutional per se under McNeely. Every case has to be judged on its own facts. This involved a serious accident with injuries requiring hospitalization and defendant consented to the blood draw. People v. Hasselbring, 2014 IL App (4th) 131128, 2014 Ill. App. LEXIS 811 (November 24, 2014).
The government’s CI information was that defendant was traveling in a car with two other cars involving four people on the way to a drug robbery, and it all added up to probable cause for a search under the automobile exception. United States v. Speller, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164144 (S.D. N.Y. November 24, 2014).*
After defendant’s traffic stop, his excessive nervousness to the point of sweating and hands shaking along with contradictory stories and passengers feigning sleep was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Williamson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163803 (E.D. Mich. November 24, 2014).*
Officers responded to a possible burglary 911 call in an area known for recent burglaries. They talked to the 911 caller, and she told them that the car parked across from the defendant’s house didn’t belong in the neighborhood, and she saw a strange man who also didn’t belong there walking in the front yard of the house. Officers checked the front and back doors which were unlocked, so they entered. Inside in the basement, while looking for the potential “prowler” they saw marijuana plants. They retreated and got a search warrant. The entry was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances. United States v. Friskey, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165583 (E.D. Ky. November 26, 2014): Continue reading →
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Defendant’s failure to refer to a Miranda violation as a product of an illegal arrest in the motion to suppress was a waiver. It did come up at the hearing, but it’s still considered waived. [See Treatise § 60.31] Gregory v. Commonwealth, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 385 (November 25, 2014): Continue reading →
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First, defendant’s Franks argument fails. The negative information that he complains about not being more prominently displayed was “hidden” in a footnote in the 42 page affidavit. There is nothing that says that there can’t be information in footnotes. Second, it’s not prejudicial that the inventory of items seized accidently left something out. Third, there clearly was probable cause for the warrant. Fourth, because of lack of remedy from Hudson, the court doesn’t even have to consider the “no knock” provision of the warrant. Fifth, defendant’s overseizure argument about surveillance equipment and his Mercedes being seized is sufficient to require a hearing. United States v. Harris, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164365 (D. Kan. November 25, 2014): Continue reading →
Officers got word that a man was trying to sell a stolen car, and they gave defendant’s address. One drove by defendant’s house five times before finding the car there, so he called for back up, doing a knock-and-talk over the car. One officer stayed by the car and two went to the door. A woman answered the door, and they asked to talk to any man inside. Defendant appeared and walked to the door. When he saw it was the police, he turned around and briskly walked away. One officer at the door entered to stop him. The warrantless entry was unlawful because there was no exigency. The state’s claim that he was capable of destroying evidence or fleeing out the back door is completely unpersuasive; this wasn’t hot pursuit. First, the car was guarded, so it wasn’t going anywhere. Second, there was no belief there was any physical evidence inside [except maybe the keys] that could be destroyed by defendant. The finding of papers for the car was thus suppressed. State v. Hastings, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 1308 (November 25, 2014).
There was probable cause for an automobile search, not just reasonable suspicion based on furtive movements. United States v. Law, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22116 (9th Cir. November 21, 2014).*
The officer here ran an LPN check and determined that the owner of the vehicle, a man, had a suspended DL. A woman was driving, but the officer could see that from the rear. “Given the road and weather conditions, the Fourth Amendment did not require that Naaktgeboren affirmatively identify the sex of the driver or further investigate the driver’s physical appearance before initiating a traffic stop. Thus, Naaktgeboren had an articulable and objectively reasonable suspicion that a motorist without a valid license was driving the vehicle, and his decision to initiate a traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Chartier, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22323 (8th Cir. November 26, 2014).
While the brake light had multiple bulbs in it, the officer reasonably believed [so says the appellate court] that one of the bulbs was out, and that was enough for a stop. The video didn’t corroborate to dispute it. State v. Williams, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 1149 (November 26, 2014).*
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The McNeely DUI warrant requirement is subject to the Davis good faith exception. People v. Jones, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 1083 (1st Dist. November 26, 2014):
Prior to McNeely, all binding judicial precedent in this state, both at the Supreme Court and intermediate appellate levels, consistently interpreted Schmerber to permit warrantless blood draws incident to a valid arrest and done in a medically approved manner. (See People v Harris (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 5 and cases cited therein [“California cases uniformly interpreted Schmerber to mean that no exigency beyond the natural evanescence of intoxicants in the bloodstream, present in every DUI case, was needed to establish an exception to the warrant requirement”].) “[W]hen binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety responsibilities.” (Davis, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2429.) McNeely affords no basis for exclusion of the evidence here, and the motion to suppress was properly denied.
A computer tech working on a computer saw “pictures of pre-teen girls in gymnast uniforms,” so he searched the search history and found searches for non-nude preteens and “pre-teen porn.” He reported it to the local police who did not yet seem interested in pursuing it. So, he searched deeper and found what appeared to be child pornography. He called the police again, and they came for the computer. This was purely a private search. His desire to help the police doesn’t make it a governmental search. United States v. Tapley, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165344 (D. Me. September 24, 2014).
Gratuitously and wilfully assaulting a detainee is excessive force and violates 18 U.S.C. § 242. United States v. Cossette, 13-3691-cr (2d Cir. November 24, 2014).*
A private civil action against somebody other than the government can’t be premised on Rule 41(g). Karalis v. Gun Vault, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165030 (D. Nev. November 24, 2014).
In a federal criminal indictment for excessive force, the government’s use of an expert witness on “nationally accepted police procedures” on excessive force was not admissible because a violation of those undefined standards is not a violation of the constitution. United States v. Rodella, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164773 (D.N.M. November 19, 2014): Continue reading →
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After a few dozen appellate decisions on McNeely and Texas’s implied consent law, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals takes one on the state’s petition for discretionary review and holds “the warrantless, nonconsensual testing of a DWI suspect’s blood does not categorically fall within any recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, nor can it be justified under a general Fourth Amendment balancing test.” State v. Villarreal, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1898 (November 26, 2014): Continue reading →
It’s that time again. We’re on the move — feasting, sharing, shopping, giving thanks. And we are being tracked every step of the way. So here’s a quick guide to the state of the unblinking electronic eye, 2014 Holiday Edition.
Pranksters’ antics are forcing public safety officials to look at the air above them, generally thought safe and secure, as a place for potential trouble.
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"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
