GA: Mistaken belief def was on probation made search invalid; no GFE in GA, either; suppressed

The officer mistakenly believed that defendant was still on probation, but he wasn’t. The probation search was unlawful, and the good faith exception doesn’t apply in Georgia. State v. New, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 115 (March 12, 2015).

The officer searched defendant’s car “incident to arrest” for driving on a suspended DL, but there was no arrest for which a search incident was proper. Nevertheless, the search is valid under inventory as inevitable discovery because the vehicle would have to be towed anyway. United States v. Reed, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30825 (S.D.Ind. March 12, 2015).*

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MS: Anonymous tip for a DUI stop was insufficient without corroboration

Anonymous tip for a DUI stop was insufficient without corroboration. Cook v. State, 2015 Miss. LEXIS 130 (March 12, 2015), revg Cook v. Rankin County, 140 So. 3d 940 (Miss. App. Dec. 3, 2013) (unpublished):
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IN: Pre-Jardines dog sniff of front door suppressed

Defendant had an interlocutory appeal of a search issue, and law of the case controls that. Jardines was, however, decided one month after the appeal, and defendant can raise it on appeal now because it was preserved, and it controls. “Although the officers had a license to approach Perez’s porch and front door to conduct a knock-and-talk, they did not have a similar license to conduct a warrantless search there, with a dog or otherwise. Consent to talk at one’s door does not provide consent to search the curtilage of one’s home. See id. at 1416. ‘The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.’ Id. Thus, we hold that the warrantless canine sniff of Perez’s front door physically intruded onto the curtilage of his home and, therefore, was an unconstitutional search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Perez v. State, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 145 (March 11, 2015).

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising a Franks challenge based on what defendant proffered in the 2255. It was nothing more than a desire to cross examine that didn’t undermine the witness. The search issue was appealed; this was just another spin on it. United States v. Erickson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182721 (N.D.Fla. September 8, 2014).*

An airport encounter at LAX ended up as consensual searches of luggage. The search of defendant’s car in Pennsylvania was valid based on his abandonment: flight from it leaving the engine running. United States v. Mooty, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30092 (E.D. Pa. March 10, 2015).*

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NY3: Voluntarily removing drugs from rectum during visual body search was consent

Defendant was suspected of drug dealing because of intercepted telephone calls and the use of coded words. When he was stopped, officers found Vaseline, and they knew that was used to hide drug evidence in the rectum. They had enough for a strip search and a visual body cavity search. He pulled it out on his own, and that was consent. People v. Cogdell, 2015 NY Slip Op 02023, 2015 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1974 (3d Dept. March 12, 2015):
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E.D.Tenn.: Lack of warning book-in phone was being recorded required suppression under Title III; Fourth Amendment issue not decided

Defendant made a call on a jail phone from the booking area that had no sign or warning on the call that the call was being recorded. The Fourth Amendment generally means that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a jail, but what about pre-jail? The court decides the case on Title III grounds that there had to be a warning that the call was being recorded. United States v. Houston, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30428 (E.D. Tenn. February 18, 2015).

“[W]e decline Prusha’s invitation to craft a ‘per se’ requirement [under the state constitution] for police to inform an individual of their right to decline to consent to a search in the context of a community caretaking stop.” State v. Prusha, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 231 (March 11, 2015) (memorandum opinion).*

Entry into defendant’s home was justified after he threatened a fire marshal with a gun, was generally acting crazy, and going in and out of his house, and there was another person inside. When the police arrived, they could force entry into the home on exigent circumstances. State v. Laney, 2015-Ohio-852, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 815 (5th Dist. March 9, 2015).*

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CA2: Successive stops in two states within minutes are individually evaluated; performance records of dog discoverable

Defendant was a regular drug courier between NYC and Burlington VT. He was stopped first in Massachusetts and detained for 22 minutes because the paperwork on the rental car was suspect. The rental car company said there was no problem as long as they got the car back. The state trooper called her counterpart in Vermont and there was another stop based on another traffic stop, and this time defendant had apparent cocaine obvious in his nose hairs. That stop was 40 minutes long. The two consecutive stops are considered separately since there was a separate factual basis for both. United States v. Foreste, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3766 (2d Cir. March 11, 2015):
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Chicagoist: Are CTA Bag Checks Against Our Fourth Amendment Rights? [And NOBODY COMPLAINED?]

Chicagoist: Are CTA Bag Checks Against Our Fourth Amendment Rights?

After four months of random bag checks at more than 40 CTA stations, the results are in: Officers checked 2,600 bags, found zero explosives and made only one arrest. The bag-check initiative, which began Nov. 3 and had full support of Mayor Emmanuel, is funded by a grant from the Transportation Security Administration and currently has no end date.

The CTA announced it has not received any complaints from the public regarding the bag checks. But what about the one arrest made? Turns out, protestor Scott Davis, 43, told the RedEye he was acting in protest of the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights— which can be registered as a very public complaint, CTA— by refusing to have his bag checked and then attempting to board a Brown Line train. Davis was charged with criminal trespass to state land and disorderly conduct. According to policy, riders are able to refuse bag checks but must leave the CTA station or face arrest. However, refusing a bag check does not stop someone from entering the same station via another entrance, or boarding at a different stop.

So, are the bag checks actually against our Fourth Amendment rights?

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TN: Dead body here subject to inevitable discovery

Just because the rent on an apartment hadn’t been paid and there had been no eviction process, his property was there and he was hiding after a murder, he did not abandon the home. The affidavit for search warrant was prepared on legal sized paper but copied on letter sized page, cutting off the signature line. There was no place for the officer to swear to the warrant, although he did sign it somewhere. Even if the first warrant was invalid under the strict state rules for issuance of a warrant, a second warrant had been issued on additional information and that was sufficient to sustain the second warrant. The processes that the state claimed were exigent were “glacial under the circumstances” and they clearly took their time. Exigent circumstances thus does not work for the state. The inevitable discovery rule, however, does. State v. Davidson, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 164 (March 10, 2015). Are all dead bodies inevitably discovered? To some extent, they would be, as when decomp makes it ever so obvious to everybody within 200′ of the building. Here?
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DC: Feigning being a shooting victim made defendant’s clothes in ER reasonably subject to seizure

Defendants were convicted of a murder in D.C. When one defendant was in the hospital, he feigned that he was the shooting victim, and that made the seizure of his clothing in a red biohazard bag as reasonable and in plain view. They could thus be tested for DNA. Sheffield v. United States, 2015 D.C. App. LEXIS 92 (March 12, 2015). The court made this observation:
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CA6: Good faith exception overcomes a nexus argument, which is a form of PC

The good faith applies to the nexus argument here [which is also a probable cause question], so the question of probable cause for issuance of the warrant doesn’t even have to be decided [and how lazy is that?]. Here, there was an allegation of firearms and drugs, and defendant was a stable resident of the house, but the information was eight months old. It’s not stale as to the firearms because firearms are commonly kept [even though it would almost certainly be stale as to the drugs alone]. Also, defendant was a stable resident at the house and that heightened the likelihood the stuff would still be there. United States v. Powell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3816 (6th Cir. March 9, 2015):
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Marlin Finance: The rise of the cell phone ‘StingRay’

Marlin Finance: The rise of the cell phone ‘StingRay’

The one item an adult in 2015 never leaves home without is his or her cell phone. Pretty soon the same will be true for children as well.

But a controversial new surveillance technique brought to the public’s attention has many concerned for their mobile privacy. Regardless, the unprecedented accuracy and effectiveness of this device – known as a StingRay – may mean it could be coming to a neighborhood near you very soon.

That is, if it’s not there already.

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IA: That it was “strange” a car was parked with lights on on side of road wasn’t RS for a stop

Defendant’s car was parked on the side of the road as the officer passed from the other direction. He thought it strange, so he turned around and came back. After he pulled up behind the car, off the pavement, the car was put in gear and started to pull away. He turned on his emergency lights, and the car stopped (“was seized”). The stop was without reasonable suspicion, just because it was “strange.” There was no suggestion of a crime at all. State v. Sellers, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 220 (March 11, 2015).

Police received a call to a disturbance involving a Troy McDowell. The officer assumed it was Jerome McDowell whom he knew. Driving to the scene, he saw Jerome’s green Cadillac going in the opposite direction and turned around and stopped him. He was OWI, and the stop was found valid because it was reasonable under the circumstances, and it turned out it was the same guy. State v. McDowell, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 210 (March 11, 2015).*

While no inventory policy was shown, it was testified to, and the officer complied. “On our de novo review of these facts and circumstances, we conclude the State provided the necessary evidence to support its claim the inventory-search exception applied in this case.” State v. Arellano, 2015 Iowa App. LEXIS 205 (March 11, 2015).*

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AP: Michigan State Police officials demonstrate aerial drone

AP: Michigan State Police officials demonstrate aerial drone:

Michigan State Police officials have demonstrated the department’s first authorized aerial drone designed to aid in investigations.

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AR: Investigating pot smell at motel, officers encountered man who reeked of marijuana; stop reasonable

Officers received a call from a motel complaining of the smell of marijuana. Walking up the stairs, they encountered defendant coming down the stairs who reeked of marijuana and stopped him, asked about marijuana, and he produced a bag from his pocket. The stop was reasonable, considering that’s why the officers were called to the motel in the first place. Spradlin v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 166 (March 11, 2015).

“In this case, we consider whether there is a principled basis for interpreting Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution to require greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the context of a warrantless search of garbage set out for collection in an area accessible to the public. Applying the principles articulated in Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2005), to the facts of this case, we do not have a ‘clear and strong conviction’ that there is a principled basis for interpreting Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution to require greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We therefore affirm.” State v. McMurray, 2015 Minn. LEXIS 113 (March 11, 2015).

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CT: No guest standing in grow operation shown by defendant’s slim connection to property

Defendant did not show his own reasonable expectation of privacy in a grow operation he was arrested at in Northeast Connecticut out in the woods. The property belonged to another person, and defendant lived two hours away. There was some evidence of his connection to the property, including his getting some mail there, but it was all held not enough. The state found the grow with a helicopter and the coordinates were radioed to officers on the ground. State v. Houghtaling, 2015 Conn. App. LEXIS 89 (March 17, 2015):
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Fierce Mobile Gov’t: ACLU: Gov’t getting cellphone records without a warrant can reveal where you sleep, pray, love

Fierce Mobile Gov’t: ACLU: Gov’t getting cellphone records without a warrant can reveal where you sleep, pray, love by Dibya Sarkar:

A group of civil liberties, public interest and other groups are arguing that the government violated the Fourth Amendment by obtaining cellphone location data of two defendants without getting a warrant in a case being heard by the Sixth Court of Appeals.

The American Civil Liberties Union and its allies filed an amicus brief (pdf) March 9 with the court regarding United States v. Carpenter in which police obtained, without a warrant, four months of historical cellphone location records for defendant Timothy Carpenter and about three months of records for his brother, defendant Timothy Sanders, from their wireless carriers.

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S.D.Tex. “constrained” to grant cell phone dump of records from seven providers to pinpoint one user captured on a video using his cell phone before committing a crime

Cell phone dump of records from seven providers to pinpoint one user captured on a video using his cell phone before committing a crime is granted. In re Cell Tower Records Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28208 (S.D.Tex. March 9, 2015):
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ACLU Stingray Report: Stingrays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About

Download: Stingrays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About

Federal and state law enforcement entities across the country are using a powerful cell phone surveillance tool commonly referred to as a “StingRay.” These devices are capable of locating a cell phone with extraordinary precision, but to do so they operate in dragnet fashion, scooping up information from a target device, as well as other wireless devices in the vicinity. In addition, these devices can be configured to capture the content of voice and data communications. Although the federal government has been using these devices since at least 1995, and use by state and local governments is quite widespread, there are only a handful of published opinions addressing their use.

At this juncture, few criminal defense attorneys are aware of these highly intrusive but extremely common surveillance tools. This is entirely understandable because the federal government has a policy of not disclosing information about this device. The government appears to be withholding information from criminal defendants. It even appears to be providing misleading information and making material omissions to judicial officers when it seeks purported court authorization to use this device, inaccurately referring to it by some other name (such as a pen register device) and failing to alert courts to constitutionally material facts about the technology, such as the full breadth of information it obtains from a suspect and its impact on third parties. As a result, courts are probably not aware that they are authorizing use of this device and have not had an opportunity to rule on its legality, except in very rare instances.

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WaPo: Denver’s pilot program says very little about the effectiveness of police cameras

WaPo: Denver’s pilot program says very little about the effectiveness of police cameras by Radley Balko:

From an Associated Press report:

In a warning to law enforcement agencies rushing to equip officers with body cameras after killings by police nationwide, a new report says the devices used by Denver officers during a trial period didn’t record most of the use-of-force incidents that occurred.

Denver’s independent police monitor, Nicholas Mitchell, also said police used force more often and citizens’ complaints against officers rose during the cameras’ six-month trial period in the city’s busy downtown district. Police officials repeatedly said they expected the cameras would drive down those numbers.

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S.D.Cal.: Hotel room qualified as temporary residence for parole search

A parolee was staying in a hotel room between residences, and the officers had probable cause to believe that evidence of counterfeiting would be found there. Therefore, the hotel room qualified as a temporary residence subject to parole search. United States v. Eibeck, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28825 (S.D.Cal. February 25, 2015).

In this case, a police officer was terminated for jamming his nightstick into a suspect’s mouth in violation of the department’s code of ethics: “Police officers will never employ unnecessary force or violence and will use only such force in the discharge of duty as is reasonable in all circumstances. While the use of force is occasionally unavoidable, police officers will refrain from applying the unnecessary infliction of pain or suffering and will never engage in cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment of any person.” The excuse was that the suspect supposedly had ingested three rocks of crack. Then, they let him go without medical treatment. Melkowski v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of Kan. City, 2015 Mo. App. LEXIS 264 (March 10, 2015).*

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