The inventory of defendant’s car was reasonable and followed policy. “The problem with Defendant’s argument is that he advanced no legal authority that the Fourth Amendment requires police to execute an arrest warrant on a suspect in a way that avoids impoundment and inventory. [¶] Next, to the extent that Defendant argues that the decision to tow the car was unreasonable because officers did not contact a third-person to take custody of it, this too is not required under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Vallejos, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203662 (D. N.M. Nov. 22, 2019).

“Regardless, even if Vado’s challenge to the search could properly be recast as claim of ineffective assistance, his theory that the search warrant was somehow defective is frivolous. Although Vado’s precise grievance is elusive, he appears to view the warrant as overbroad or to claim that the agents who searched his electronic devices exceeded the scope of the warrant. Vado does not explain coherently why either of these claims is factually so. On the contrary, this Court became privy to the warrant, the affidavit supporting it, and the agents’ conduct in executing it in the course of litigation over the separate suppression motion that Vado’s counsel made, directed to the agents’ interview of Vado the day of the search. The Court did not then perceive any legal lapse with respect to the warrant or its manner of execution.” Vado v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203611 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 22, 2019).*