CA8: A home security system alarm is an invitation for a protective sweep when police see a broken window

A home security alarm went off signaling a burglary and police responded. Seeing a broken window, they could enter to conduct a protective sweep, and contraband in plain view could be seized. A cell phone was also seized and later searched with a warrant. United States v. Williams, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5965 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2020).

Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for being involved in drug trafficking from a house where there likely were guns. After his arrest, defendant consented to a buccal swab for DNA. United States v. Welch, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5963 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2020).*

“[W]e find that the court properly denied his motion to controvert a search warrant, and that there was no basis for a hearing.” People v. Groome, 2020 NY Slip Op 01385, 2020 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1427 (1st Dept. Feb. 27, 2020).*

Posted in Consent, Protective sweep | Comments Off on CA8: A home security system alarm is an invitation for a protective sweep when police see a broken window

D.Neb.: Def questioned in his front yard was effectively in custody for Miranda

Defendant questioned in his front yard was effectively in custody and should have been Mirandized. United States v. Leon, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32964 (D. Neb. Feb. 18, 2020):

Continue reading →

Posted in Custody | Comments Off on D.Neb.: Def questioned in his front yard was effectively in custody for Miranda

WaPo: My car was in a hit-and-run. Then I learned it recorded the whole thing.

WaPo: My car was in a hit-and-run. Then I learned it recorded the whole thing. by Geoffrey A. Fowler (“The car is becoming a sentry, a chaperone, and a snitch”)

Posted in Surveillance technology | Comments Off on WaPo: My car was in a hit-and-run. Then I learned it recorded the whole thing.

D.N.M.: A “manpower shortage” for seizure of possible evidence isn’t exigency without PC

Defendant consented to a search of his car and his hotel room, but not to a search of his guitar case in the room. Thinking there might be drugs there, the officer seized the guitar case to preserve the potential evidence while he got a search warrant. There was no probable cause whatsoever to seize the guitar case or for the warrant. The claim of evidence preservation was based on lack of manpower and not a legal justification. The search also couldn’t be justified by inevitable discovery. United States v. Montes, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32969 (D. N.M. Feb. 25, 2020).

“Even assuming the officers improperly questioned Defendant about the PIN prior to providing a Miranda advisement, the contents of the phone were accessible through alternate, legal means. Thus, the inevitable discovery exception renders the phone’s contents admissible.” The officers were able to access it with computer tools. United States v. Fischer, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32965 (D. Neb. Feb. 16, 2020).

Posted in Emergency / exigency, Inevitable discovery | Comments Off on D.N.M.: A “manpower shortage” for seizure of possible evidence isn’t exigency without PC

D.Idaho: Faint smell of MJ and “excessive nervousness” not RS

Faint smell of marijuana and nervousness was not reasonable suspicion. The court also doesn’t find the travel plans at all suspicious. United States v. Lee, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33091 (D. Idaho Feb. 25, 2020).

Plaintiff’s nolo plea barred his malicious prosecution suit under Heck. Massey v. Pfeifer, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5843 (3d Cir. Feb. 26, 2020).*

Defendant’s claims were raised and rejected on direct review and can’t be in a 2255. United States v. Christian, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32788 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2020).*

Posted in Issue preclusion, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on D.Idaho: Faint smell of MJ and “excessive nervousness” not RS

N.D.Ohio: An open container in a car is probable cause under the automobile exception to search for other open containers

An open container in a car is probable cause under the automobile exception to search for other open containers. In addition: “Here, Patrolmen Link and McClamroch had received information that a retaliatory shooting could occur near the location they stopped Defendants. Defendants drove at strange speeds and then sped up as police approached. Against the backdrops of the day-before killing and shooting, Patrolmen Link and McClamroch could believe Defendants were armed and dangerous.” Thus, a sweep of the car for weapons under Long was reasonable. United States v. Farrow, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32499 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2020).

Defense counsel’s affidavit in this 2255 was credited that any motion to suppress would be meritless and would be denied. The court agrees. Polanco-Jimenez v. United States, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32593 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2020).*

Posted in Automobile exception, Ineffective assistance, Protective sweep | Comments Off on N.D.Ohio: An open container in a car is probable cause under the automobile exception to search for other open containers

N.D.Iowa: “Let’s step inside and talk for a second” did not lead to consent

“Let’s step inside and talk for a second” did not lead to consent. “Although the language itself implies some joint or equal action, it also implies some level of insistence. See Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (finding a person’s failure to object to an officer’s statement ‘I don’t want to discuss my business out in the hallway, let’s go inside where its private’ was not a consent to search); United States v. Roldan, No. 97 CR. 567(JFK), 1997 WL 767564, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1978) (finding an officer’s use of the imperative form ‘let’s look in the bag’ was a command and the defendant’s acquiescence did not constitute consent to search the bag). In context, that implied insistence combined with the lack of opportunity to object gives the statement the effect of a command. Barner had no time to respond either affirmatively or negatively before the officers advanced.” United States v. Hatcher, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33792 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 5, 2020), adopted, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32777 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 26, 2020).

Posted in Consent | Comments Off on N.D.Iowa: “Let’s step inside and talk for a second” did not lead to consent

CA10: NCMEC’s receipt of suspected CP from AOL was subject to GFE

The good faith exception applies to NCMEC’s receipt of suspected child pornography from AOL from an account holder. NCMEC objectively relied upon a statute that had never been challenged before. United States v. Ackerman, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5806 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020):

Continue reading →

Posted in Good faith exception | Comments Off on CA10: NCMEC’s receipt of suspected CP from AOL was subject to GFE

CA10: Shooting a person fleeing a shooting scene without determining he was the shooter might have been unreasonable, but right not to be shot in this situation not clearly established (Really)

In a § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force suit, officers heard a gun shot and saw people running as a crowd left a concert. They shot and killed the decedent, and a jury could conclude that the officers unreasonably determined that the decedent was the active shooter and thus that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. However, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the officers on the basis of qualified immunity because the officers had not violated clearly established law under the facts presented. In particular, the state of the law on the date of the incident did not provide the officers with fair warning that it was unconstitutional for them to open fire on a fleeing person they, perhaps unreasonably, believed was armed in what they believed to be an active shooter situation. Estate of Smart v. City of Wichita, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5811 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 2020). (Note: Reading this opinion left me incredulous. Qualified immunity is working to destroy trust between government and its citizens, and SCOTUS doesn’t seem to care.)

Posted in § 1983 / Bivens, Excessive force, Qualified immunity | Comments Off on CA10: Shooting a person fleeing a shooting scene without determining he was the shooter might have been unreasonable, but right not to be shot in this situation not clearly established (Really)

TN: Def’s consent came before implied consent reading occurred

No credible argument can be made that the statutory implied consent actually supplies the type of voluntary consent sufficient to create an exception to the warrant requirement. For purposes of the Fourth Amendment and state constitution, however, defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw before the officer even read the implied consent form to her. She’d been advised she could refuse the blood draw, and she could be convicted of the offense of violating the implied consent law and lose her license for one year. No evidence suggested that defendant’s will was overborne or her capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Thus, the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress. State v. Hafer, 2020 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 143 (Feb. 26, 2020).*

It was reasonable to stop a vehicle already stopped in the turn lane of a five lane street, perpendicular to traffic, blocking one lane. The smell of marijuana and alcohol coming from the car justified a search. Sexton-Johnson v. State, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (Feb. 26, 2020).*

Posted in Consent, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on TN: Def’s consent came before implied consent reading occurred

OR: Stop of def for being either involved in accident or material witness to it lacked RS

Defendant was in a vehicle that passed by the scene of a one vehicle accident the police were working. The officer somehow decided that the occupants of the passing vehicle had knowledge of the stop, and he engaged in a significant show of authority. That stop was without reasonable suspicion or even that defendant was a material witness to the accident. The motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Middleton, 302 Ore. App. 339 (Feb. 20, 2020).

DOC employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their employment records as to outsiders, but not the agency itself. It can monitor employee performance. Speer v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 2020 MT 45, 2020 Mont. LEXIS 578 (Feb. 25, 2020).

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Off on OR: Stop of def for being either involved in accident or material witness to it lacked RS

TX3: Cell phone in evidence room from 2009 could be searched with SW after def charged with 2018 capital murder

Defendant had a cell phone seized from him in 2009 that remained in the police evidence room. After another crime, this time a capital murder, the phone was searched with a warrant in 2018. The delay wasn’t unreasonable because defendant never asserted recovery of the phone. Harmel v. State, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1584 (Tex. App. – Austin Feb. 26, 2020).

Eight day delay from NYSP taking possession of defendant’s devices for suspected child pornography and then seeking a search warrant wasn’t an unreasonable delay. United States v. Schohn, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32195 (W.D. N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020),* adopted, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31222 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020).*

Posted in Staleness | Comments Off on TX3: Cell phone in evidence room from 2009 could be searched with SW after def charged with 2018 capital murder

D.Ariz.: SW wasn’t shown to be willfully without PC or overbroad, so GFE applies

Officer’s negligence [my word, not the court’s] in drafting and obtaining a search warrant that was potentially without probable cause and overbroad in scope didn’t overcome the good faith exception. United States v. Snow, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31713 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2020):

Continue reading →

Posted in Good faith exception | Comments Off on D.Ariz.: SW wasn’t shown to be willfully without PC or overbroad, so GFE applies

CA5: Citizen of China on ship stopped on high seas by U.S. officers had no 4A rights

“Liang’s first argument, concerning the denial of a hearing on his motion to suppress evidence, is wholly frivolous. Because Liang is ‘a citizen and resident of [China] with no voluntary attachment to the United States’ and the challenged search occurred in international waters, ‘the Fourth Amendment has no application’ to this case. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990).” United States v. Wu, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5634 (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020).

At a traffic safety checkpoint, officers smelled marijuana coming from defendant’s car. A search of the car produced a gun. The checkpoint complied with the Fourth Amendment. “[T]he court finds that the police checkpoint was a reasonable intrusion into the privacy interests of motorists and thus constitutional.” United States v. Fishburne, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31080 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2020).*

Posted in Foreign searches, Roadblocks | Comments Off on CA5: Citizen of China on ship stopped on high seas by U.S. officers had no 4A rights

CA9: Facebook copying an account for a coming SW was not a seizure

Facebook’s merely copying defendant’s account for a search warrant was not a seizure. United States v. Perez, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5541 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2020).

Probable cause existed for plaintiff’s arrest for constructive possession when she was found asleep and undressed in a drug house when a search warrant was executed. Suero v. City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 01301, 2020 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1344 (1st Dept. Feb. 25, 2020).*

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Off on CA9: Facebook copying an account for a coming SW was not a seizure

WV: Court order generally needed to send in wired CI

West Virginia requires an intercept order for officers to send in a wired CI to record a drug transaction, but exigency is an exception, which the court finds. It is determined on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Howells, 2020 W. Va. LEXIS 118 (Feb. 25, 2020) (dissent):
Continue reading →

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Off on WV: Court order generally needed to send in wired CI

OH3: Handcuffing detainee for safety when officers outnumbered 4-2 was reasonable

Defendant’s vehicle stop was by an officer outside his jurisdiction, but others with jurisdiction immediately showed up. Handcuffing defendant when the officers were outnumbered 4-2 was reasonable during the stop. State v. Davis, 2020-Ohio-619, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 570 (3d Dist. Feb. 24, 2020).*

A successor habeas petition doesn’t lie for ineffective assistance for not pursuing a Fourth Amendment claim because it was known all along. In re Nolley, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5643 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2020).*

Posted in Seizure | Comments Off on OH3: Handcuffing detainee for safety when officers outnumbered 4-2 was reasonable

CA9: Ptf stated claim for SSA CID’s unlawful entry into home

Plaintiff’s civil claim against Social Security Administration’s CID and local investigators stated a claim for unlawful entry into her home in a criminal investigation. Anh Tuyet Thai v. Saul, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5425 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2020).*

Plaintiff was the target of a search warrant when his auto repair shop had a vehicle involved in a murder inside. He didn’t [and couldn’t] plead that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Baeza v. Munro, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5661 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2020).*

Posted in § 1983 / Bivens, Qualified immunity | Comments Off on CA9: Ptf stated claim for SSA CID’s unlawful entry into home

CA4: Wrestling a passive misdemeanant to ground and Tasing him was excessive force and unreasonable

It was clearly established at the time of the incident that wrestling a passive misdemeanant to the grown and beating him up and tapering him was unreasonable and excessive force. Livingston v. Kehagias, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 5681 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2020).

A police officer on duty in a marked police car in his own neighborhood saw a car that wasn’t local to the neighborhood. He started to follow, and the car was engaging in evasive behavior. By the time of the stop, he had reasonable suspicion. “Nervous, evasive behavior is a factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Another consideration is unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Other pertinent circumstances include the officer’s own direct observations, dispatch information, directions from other officers, and the nature of the area and time of day during which the suspicious activity occurred.” State v. Krannawitter, 305 Neb. 66 (Feb. 21, 2020).*

Posted in Excessive force, Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on CA4: Wrestling a passive misdemeanant to ground and Tasing him was excessive force and unreasonable

TX14: Client had standing to object to seizure of her files from her attorney’s office for his misapplication of her fee into trust account

A search warrant was executed on a divorce lawyer’s office for some client files after a $75,000 retainer was paid into the IOLTA account which had a -$49,000 balance. The district court erred in holding the client had no standing in her own files in the attorney’s office. There was probable cause for the search warrant to seek to prove the lawyer’s alleged crime of misapplication of funds of the client. The Houston County DA’s office was using a taint team to separate the client files. In re Cook, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 1563 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) Feb. 25, 2020):
Continue reading →

Posted in Privileges, Scope of search, Standing | Comments Off on TX14: Client had standing to object to seizure of her files from her attorney’s office for his misapplication of her fee into trust account