The government doesn’t have the authority to have its officers simply stop a motorist under the guise of a traffic stop to remove a tracking device. Because tracking devices are always removed surreptitiously, there is no law on this anywhere. Inevitable discovery, however, leads to no suppression here because officers had search warrants for his house that would have led to probable cause to search or impound the car. United States v. Christian, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115651 (N.D. Ohio August 19, 2014).
After a heroin overdose death, officers got word on the location of the dealer. They went to that house and found baggies discarded in the yard that field tested positive for cocaine. The back door was open, and drug paraphernalia was in plain view in the kitchen. Officers entered and got consent to search the common areas. They did a protective sweep of the other rooms and woke up a couple and frisked them. Marijuana was in plain view on a nightstand. Then a search warrant was obtained. The entry and searches were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Medina, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115575 (S.D. Fla. August 18, 2014).*
A warrant is not required to arrest on probable cause for a felony. The court says that this shouldn’t need explaining, but this is a pro se defendant. Commonwealth v. Dozier, 2014 PA Super 177, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2869 (August 20, 2014).*
Officers came to defendant’s rural property to do a knock and talk and “lingered” for an hour wandering around. They obviously made a decision to search before they got there, and their actions were that of searching officers and the knock and talk was really just a pretext to wander defendant’s property. United States v. Ferguson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115486 (W.D. Mich. August 20, 2014): Continue reading →
Posted inScope of search|Comments Off on W.D.Mich.: Police wandering rural property for an hour was invalid knock and talk
The repeated presence of defendant’s car and cell phone at the place searched under the warrant added to the probable cause that that was a place where evidence could be found. It wasn’t misleading to the USMJ to not tell him about the other potential addresses of the defendant. United States v. Jones, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15950 (7th Cir. August 18, 2014).*
Defendant had no standing to complain of a seizure of a bag of drugs dropped by someone else in the stairway of a public housing project. United States v. Rodriguez-Irizarry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114641 (D. P.R. August 18, 2014).*
Defendant had no standing to object to an officer approaching him parked in a defunct car wash bay just because his uncle owned it. Plain view sustained. United States v. Evans, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115227 (E.D. Mo. July 30, 2014).*
Posted inProbable cause, Standing|Comments Off on CA7: Def’s car with his phone in it parked repeatedly outside a house supported PC to search that place
Defendant’s “puppy dog look” isn’t enough for a stop. State v. Wilburn, 2014 Kan. App. LEXIS 56 (August 15, 2014):
At the time of the stop, the officers had no reasonable and articulable suspicion that Wilburn or Curtis had committed any crime. Pierce testified that the sole basis for the stop was the puppy dog “look.” We have no trouble concluding that a puppy dog look is insufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. This was nothing more than a hunch. “[A] hunch has never been the benchmark of a proper police seizure.” Martinez, 296 Kan. at 488. The hunch resulted in Wilburn’s arrest and subsequently in Pierce answering Wilburn’s phone, which he had seized. Still based upon his hunch, Pierce proceeded to the Chick-fil-A where the whole case started to come together. Therefore, even if Judge Bennett’s ruling on the legality of the stop and the resulting suppression of the evidence obtained had been properly appealed, we find it was supported by substantial evidence and we reached the same legal conclusion.
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on KS: “puppy dog look” isn’t enough for a stop
While the government didn’t argue standing in the USDC, it was decided, so it can appeal on that question. Passengers in a vehicle have standing to challenge the search of their own luggage. Here, the driver’s consent to search the car didn’t extend to the luggage of the passengers since they were never informed. No apparent authority, and the police seemed to recognize it during the process. United States v. Iraheta, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15960 (5th Cir. August 19, 2014) Continue reading →
Posted inApparent authority, Consent|Comments Off on CA5: Consent to search trunk doesn’t include passengers bags, too; no apparent authority
But the technology raises privacy concerns both for the police and the public, and there are no national guidelines for how they should be used. The crucial questions of when police should begin recording their work and who gets to decide which encounters should be recorded are still being worked out.
Earlier this month, a police officer shot and killed an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri. The shooting and the response have reignited concerns about racial profiling, police brutality and police militarization. The incident has also drawn attention to a remarkable lack of knowledge about a seemingly basic fact: how often people are killed by the police.
Posted inExcessive force, Reasonableness|Comments Off on 538.com: Nobody Knows How Many Americans The Police Kill Each Year
Prior to Jones’s GPS ruling, Knotts governed all the GPS cases in this circuit, so Davis good faith has to apply to a 2011 GPS installation. United States v. Stephens, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15920 (4th Cir. August 19, 2014): Continue reading →
Defendant was arrested for a murder and DNA was found on his lawfully seized shoe linking him to the crime. A search warrant was not needed to test the DNA already lawfully seized. Guilmette v. State, 2014 Ind. LEXIS 650 (August 13, 2014).
Defendant was stopped because a random LPN check showed the owner’s DL was expired and the owner was driving. During the stop the driver was put in a patrol car, and this was unnecessary. Ultimately, the driver was subjected to FSTs and failed. The extent of the stop became unreasonable because it was for a possible expired tag and it escalated. Lucas v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 393 (August 14, 2014).*
Reliance on a polygraph test as reasonable suspicion for a parole search of a convicted child pornographer’s place was not unreasonable, just because the test was not admissible as evidence. United States v. Beyers, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115224 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 2014).*
Several police cars from Knoxville PD pulled up at a house with arrest warrants for people known to hang out there. Defendant saw them and fled and was pursued. The arrival of that many police was a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution despite the flight, following prior state precedent. State v. Nelson, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802 (August 18, 2014): Continue reading →
Defendant’s cell phone call records were obtained by subpoena. This is governed by Smith v. Maryland, and not by any of the cases involving search warrants for the contents of cell phones. [Riley not cited because case arose pre-Riley.] Big difference between mere records and phone contents. State v. Knutson, 288 Neb. 823, 2014 Neb. LEXIS 130 (August 15, 2014).
Police contact with defendant at an amusement park was justified by his attempting to touch young girls and admitting to videotaping them with a camera hidden in his glasses which he said he downloaded to a laptop in his semi-truck. He consented to a search of his computer and the truck, and a lot more electronic media was found. A search warrant was obtained for suspected child pornography but none was found. Instead, defendant was charged with drugs and FIPF. His stop was valid, and his consent was voluntary. State v. Grisham, 2014-Ohio-3558, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3496 (12th Dist. August 18, 2014).*
The appointment of a special constable was valid under state law, so defendant’s DUI arrest was valid. State v. Buckland, 2014 Conn. LEXIS 280 (August 19, 2014).*
Michael Brown’s death sparks a national conversation about what happens when police don’t reflect the communities they serve. As the Justice Department investigates police tactics across the country, we discuss new questions about police, race and the use of deadly force.
Posted inExcessive force|Comments Off on NPR: Police, Race And The Use Of Deadly Force
In this case, a codefendant decided to roll, and he finally provided information to the government. He was not a government investigator, and what he subsequently told the government in its debriefing about how the searches went down didn’t really help the defendants enough to satisfy Brady’s prejudice prong, even if the government was chargeable with that knowledge. In fact, considering it for all that its worth, it doesn’t even change the outcome. United States v. Barcelo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113906 (S.D. N.Y. August 15, 2014).
Defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of motion to suppress without a hearing doesn’t allege anything that suggests that the court was wrong in the first place or that a hearing was even required. What are the disputed material facts? None. United States v. Wilson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113638 (D. Ariz. August 15, 2014).*
Plaintiffs in this § 1983 case ran a pawn shop where police believed they were fencing stolen goods. With the cooperation of Home Depot, expensive stuff was sold there for little or nothing [which proves nothing; it is, after all a pawn shop]. They were charged with these “controlled sales” but ultimately the local DA declined prosecution. So they sued the police involved. There was at least some probable cause there, and that’s enough to defeat the 1983 claim. Also, after the initial controlled sales, other stolen property showed up there, and that was a valid inference the police could rely on. [See Treatise § 43.11 on pawnshops as regulated businesses and why.] Young v. Owens, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15768, 2014 FED App. 0634N (6th Cir. August 15, 2014).*
Posted inUncategorized|Comments Off on S.D.N.Y.: Brady, a snitch’s new information, and suppression motions
A 20 month sentence to a police officer for false arrest, pepper spraying, repeatedly and unjustifiably beating an arrestee into unconsciousness, writing a false police report about it, and then perjuring himself at the citizen’s trial which resulted in the citizen’s acquittal was substantively unreasonable, and the sentence is reversed. The Sentencing Guideline range was a minimum of 151 months. The officer never expressed remorse and his attitude at sentencing was that he was just doing his job, despite the fact the civilian witnesses to the incident were compelling enough for the jury to convict. United States v. Dautovic, 13-1145 (8th Cir. August 14, 2014).
Posted inPolice misconduct|Comments Off on CA8: 20 mo. sentence for officer committing false arrest, beating, and perjury at state trial was unreasonably low
Joel Celso, Comment: Droning on about the Fourth Amendment: Adopting a Reasonable Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to Prevent Unreasonable Searches by Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 43 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461 (2014). Introduction: Continue reading →
Posted inDrones|Comments Off on New law review article on drones as “searches”
An anonymous tip that defendant was selling stuff from her car allegedly without a proper city permit didn’t justify defendant’s stop. Her subsequent consent was invalid. Pineda v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8824 (Tex. App. – San Antonio August 13, 2014).*
The second search of defendant’s vehicle after his arrest was valid as an inventory search. The first search was likely an invalid search incident, but it didn’t produce anything. United States v. Shaw, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15628 (5th Cir. August 14, 2014).*
Whether a law enforcement officer could not make at least a community caretaking custodial “arrest” of an apparently intoxicated person standing on the side of the road is not clearly established. What little law there is on this favors the officer, so he gets qualified immunity. Meehan v. Thompson, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15601 (8th Cir. August 14, 2014).*
Age alone doesn’t determine staleness; it’s the totality. Here, defendant provided an alibi to a murder and the police learned he had a surveillance system at home. It was reasonable to conclude that evidence would still be found by the time the search warrant was sought. United States v. Ruffin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113214 (W.D. Pa. August 15, 2014): Continue reading →
Posted inStaleness|Comments Off on W.D.Pa.: Home surveillance system recordings were target of SW, and staleness wasn’t a valid objection
The anonymous tip here that there would be a gun in the car defendant was in was not supported by objective facts of any sort. This was not a 911 call report, either, as in Navarette, and the court just isn’t crediting reasonable suspicion. A long explanation of both sides of the argument, and the mere fact of a gun in the car, in a concealed carry state, isn’t enough. United States v. Robinson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112382 (N.D. W.Va. August 8, 2014)*: Continue reading →
Posted inReasonable suspicion|Comments Off on N.D.W.Va.: Navarette doesn’t save this anonymous tip; seemingly even undermines it
Defendant challenged his stop as unlawful, but he slowed for a second and then fled at high speed until he crashed and then he was arrested. There was no stop–he fled. Gonzalez v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8934 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi – Edinburg August 14, 2014).
Defendant’s McNeely claim against the Tennessee implied consent statute wasn’t preserved in the trial court, so it’s waived it. State v. Chrystak, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 787 (August 13, 2014).*
Defendant challenged his conviction for evading arrest without specifically challenging the arrest pretrial. Therefore, it’s deemed waived. State v. Smith, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (August 13, 2014).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
