While the government didn’t argue standing in the USDC, it was decided, so it can appeal on that question. Passengers in a vehicle have standing to challenge the search of their own luggage. Here, the driver’s consent to search the car didn’t extend to the luggage of the passengers since they were never informed. No apparent authority, and the police seemed to recognize it during the process. United States v. Iraheta, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15960 (5th Cir. August 19, 2014)
As the district court correctly noted, there are two cases in this Circuit applicable to these facts. In the first case, Jaras, the co-defendant, who was the driver and owner of the car, gave consent to search the car. 86 F.3d at 386. However, when the trunk was opened the co-defendant stated that the suitcases, where incriminating evidence was later discovered, belonged to the defendant, Jaras. Id. The officer informed Jaras that his co-defendant had consented to the search but did not ask for Jaras’s consent to search the suitcases. Id. The officer did ask Jaras what was inside of the suitcases. Id. Jaras responded that he did not know. Id. We held that the officer did not have authority, actual or apparent, to search the suitcases. Id. at 389-90. Importantly, there was no apparent authority because the officer was clearly informed by the co-defendant that the bags were Jaras’s; therefore, he was “on notice that [the co-defendant’s] consent to search did not extend to the luggage.” Id. at 389. Reliance on the co-defendant’s consent thereafter was unreasonable. Id. at 390.
In the second case, Navarro, a co-defendant consented to a search of the vehicle he was driving with two passengers, including the defendant, Navarro. 169 F.3d at 230. The officer found methamphetamine in a brown duffle bag on the back seat of the vehicle on which Navarro had been leaning. Id. We held that Navarro’s co-defendant’s consent was voluntary and that his general consent extended to “the entire vehicle, including the luggage contained therein.” Id. at 232. We distinguished Jaras by noting that: (1) there was no indication that the co-defendant had advised the officers that the luggage in the vehicle was not his and (2) the luggage was located not in the trunk but in plain view on the back seat of the car. Id. Additionally, we found it instructive that neither Navarro nor his co-defendant objected to the search of the bag. Id.
The Government argues that the luggage in the trunk was within the scope of Iraheta’s consent because all of the requirements for objective reasonableness under Jimeno have been met. However, as the district court found, an officer cannot conduct a search outside the scope of what a consenting party has authority to consent to. Iraheta clearly did not have actual authority to consent to the search of multiple pieces of luggage in the trunk of a vehicle occupied by him and two passengers. The Government has failed to point to any facts, other than the fact that the duffle bag was in the trunk of the car, that demonstrate “mutual use” or “joint access” sufficient to confer such authority. Without more, the fact that the luggage was found in the trunk of a car is insufficient to establish actual authority. See Jaras, 86 F.3d at 386 (“The fact that [defendant’s] suitcases were contained in the trunk of a car in which he was a passenger is insufficient to show that [the driver] mutually used and had joint control over the suitcases.”).
In terms of apparent authority—what the officers reasonably believed Iraheta had authority to consent to—the Government agrees that this case lies somewhere in between Jaras and Navarro. It is unlike Jaras in that no one alerted the officers to the fact that the luggage was not Iraheta’s. It is also unlike Navarro in that it cannot be said the officers did not have notice that the bag did not belong to Iraheta and the bags were in the trunk. Defendants consistently stated that they were traveling from California to Miami and even asked Deputy Waggoner how far it was from where they were stopped to Miami while the car was being searched. There were three people in the car and the number of bags in the trunk was consistent with three people traveling from California to Miami. The car was stopped in Louisiana, had California plates, and was previously registered in California. Taken together these circumstances would put reasonable officers on notice that Iraheta could not give consent to a search of all of the bags in the trunk.
Although Defendants did not object to the search nor claim ownership of the luggage searched, we conclude that that is not decisive under these facts. It is undisputed that both Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia did not hear Iraheta give consent to the search nor were they ever informed of Iraheta’s consent by the officers. Under these circumstances, the onus was on the officers to act reasonably. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 667 (“[T]he factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what the reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given.”). All of the facts indicated a likelihood that the bag did not belong to Iraheta, and therefore, it was unreasonable to rely on Iraheta’s consent alone in searching the bag. See United States v. Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253, 257-58 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that Jaras “has been the law of this circuit for almost 15 years” and holding that where an officer knew the bag searched belonged to someone else who had not given consent, the search was illegal), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 357 (2011). Therefore, the search was unconstitutional. The district court properly granted Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia’s motions to suppress.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)