TX14: State const. affords no broader privacy in CSLI than Fourth Amendment

Defendant was an occasional guest in the house of another. Assuming he had standing, it’s clear that the owner had authority to consent and did consent to a search. Randolph doesn’t require seeking out the defendant to get consent from him. Defendant twice consented to a search of his cell phone, so a warrant under Riley wasn’t required. Defendant also challenged the state’s acquiring CSLI without a warrant under the predecessor section to Article 18.21 § 5(a), but the court concludes that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would not find the state constitution broader than the Fourth Amendment on this issue, and that court just denied relief on the Fourth Amendment in Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) posted here. Jackson v. State, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 3294 (Tex. App. – Houston (14th Dist.) March 31, 2016).

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W.D.Pa.: Leaving car in street after being taken away by ambulance after being shot justified impoundment and inventory of the car

Defendant called the police because he was shot in the chest while in his car. An ambulance arrived and took defendant to the hospital. His car was left in the middle of the street. Impoundment of the car and inventory discovering drugs was proper. At the hospital, hospital security turned over to the police defendant’s personal effects including five cell phones and crack cocaine the medical staff found hidden under his scrotum. This was a private seizure. The warrant for the cell phones was based on probable cause. United States v. Lawrence, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43735 (W.D.Pa. March 31, 2016).

Defendant was identified as a drug dealer by two CIs, and IDed him by a unique facial feature. Police set up surveillance of where he was dealing from. Gaunt men would enter with defendant with nothing in their hands and come out in three minutes with their hands in their pockets. The government proved reasonable suspicion by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Brown, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44527 (E.D.Va. March 31, 2016).*

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RI: Looking back up stairs in response to demand from a tactical team to produce defendant was not voluntary consent

Considering the value in the law of privacy of the home, the court concludes defendant’s mother did not consent to entry into and search of the house for him. Three to six officers came to the door, one carrying a tactical shield, demanding production of the defendant, and she merely looked up the stairs. On this record, that’s not voluntary consent; it’s mere acquiescence. State v. Gonzalez, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 43 (March 29, 2016):
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CA6: Separate warrant not required to isolate def in his own house in bathroom to talk to him

Police executed a search warrant and took defendant to the bathroom so they could talk to him about becoming a CI. The detention in the apartment and then the bathroom was justified by the probable cause for this search warrant and Michigan v. Summers. Defendant’s questioning in the bathroom didn’t require a separate warrant. United States v. Binford, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5870 (6th Cir. March 31, 2016).

Defendant was followed in his SUV on a bad road, going too fast after he saw officers. They decided to follow and lost sight. They found defendant at an illegal dump site dragging something, and they approached and defendant fled on foot. In the back of the SUV was a body. They had reasonable suspicion of illegal dumping to approach. [And defendant’s unprovoked flight also giving reasonable suspicion. What about abandonment?] The circumstantial evidence here supported the conclusion that defendant murdered the victim. State v. Thigpen, 2016-Ohio-1374, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 1252 (8th Dist. March 31, 2016).*

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The Hill: Groups pressure FBI to disclose how it hacked into shooter’s iPhone

The Hill: Groups pressure FBI to disclose how it hacked into shooter’s iPhone by Katie Bo Williams:

Technologists and digital rights activists say it’s a mater of public safety.

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CA9: City’s policy on dogs that attacked innocent worker asleep in building keeps city in case

Plaintiff stopped at work after an evening of drinking to sleep on the couch rather than drive home. She got up to pee in the night and accidentally set off the building silent burglar alarm, and she went back to the couch to sleep. Police arrived with a dog to check the building. They knew the dog would attack any person it encountered. Plaintiff was asleep and didn’t respond to police commands. The dog found her and bit her face. Summary judgment for the city reversed. “A reasonable jury could find that police officers responding to an office building’s burglar alarm used excessive force when they deliberately unleashed a police dog that they knew might well ‘rip[] [the] face off’ any individual who might be present in the office. Because a reasonable jury could find that the force used was excessive and because the City conceded that the use of the force involved was in conformance with its policy, the panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City and remanded for further proceedings.” Lowry v. City of San Diego, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5989 (9th Cir. April 1, 2016) (2-1 (still no city liability)).

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FL3: Asking for consent while holding DL makes consent involuntary

While the stop lasted only 11 minutes, asking for consent while holding defendant’s driver’s license makes the consent involuntary because the defendant is not free to leave. Villanueva v. State, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 4891 (Fla. 3d DCA March 30, 2016).

When the driver’s license was returned, the stop continued as a permissible encounter when consent was given. United States v. Asghedom, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5751 (11th Cir. March 29, 2016).*

2255 claim fails. First warrant was returned unexecuted, and another was issued. The second warrant was timely executed. United States v. Glover, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43260 (D.D.C. March 31, 2016).*

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CA9: Officer’s lie to def about basis for stop isn’t a Fourth Amendment violation

Officers had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop based on wiretaps. The fact the officer deliberately lied to defendant about the basis of the stop doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5891 (9th Cir. March 31, 2016):
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OH9: Randolph doesn’t require target be asked for consent first

Defendant’s wife consented to the search of their house. There is no duty of the police to first ask the target of the search for consent under Randolph. The claim her consent wasn’t voluntary wasn’t in the motion to suppress nor litigated so it’s waived. State v. Nestor, 2016-Ohio-1333, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 1223 (9th Dist. March 30, 2016).

Defendant was stopped for doing 95 on I-84 in Massachusetts. His passenger didn’t have a seatbelt on, and the officer asked her for her ID. She didn’t have it, but gave name and DOB and didn’t seem sure of the year of birth. With her out of the car, they gave inconsistent answers about each other. She had her cell phone and allowed officers to call her mother, who said she was a 16 year old runaway. She permitted a search of her phone, and text messages from defendant were there about pimping her out. She consented; he had no “standing.” United States v. Gemma, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5852 (1st Cir. March 30, 2016).*

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WaPo: Radley Balko’s “The Watch” Blog: Video shows white cops performing roadside cavity search of black man [quoting author]

Radley Balko’s “The Watch” Blog: Video shows white cops performing roadside cavity search of black man:
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WaPo: FBI ponders sharing tool to help unlock iPhone with local law agencies

WaPo: FBI ponders sharing tool to help unlock iPhone with local law agencies by Ellen Nakashima and Adam Goldman:

The FBI and Justice Department are debating whether the hacking tool that helped the bureau unlock the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino, Calif., terrorists can be used to help state and local law enforcement, officials said Friday. That will be a challenge because the bureau has classified the tool, making it difficult to use in state and local criminal prosecutions requiring disclosure of evidence to defendants, officials said.

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NYTimes: Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?

NYTimes: Police Body Cameras: What Do You See? by Timothy Williams, James Thomas, Samuel Jacoby, and Damien Cave:

Public frustration with policing has led to calls nationwide for more cameras worn by officers. But what do those cameras actually reveal?

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OH5: Entry permitted by 911 call of unresponsive person; protective sweep factually unjustified

A 911 call about an unresponsive man was justification for a warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment, but no facts justified a protective sweep once inside. Heroin in bedroom suppressed. State v. Levengood, 2016-Ohio-1340, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 1227 (5th Dist. March 22, 2016):
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DC Velocity: Electronic logging devices do not improve safety; mandate is unconstitutional, trucking group says

DC Velocity: Electronic logging devices do not improve safety; mandate is unconstitutional, trucking group says:

OOIDA files brief asking court to overturn ELD mandate, saying it violates Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
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D.Neb.: Can’t prove judge issuing SW was a “rubberstamp” for the police when there was, in fact, probable cause

When arguing that the good faith exception does not apply, the “wholly abandoned his judicial role” exception needs an offer of proof. If, however, there is, in fact, probable cause, how do you prove that? You can’t. United States v. Thompson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40215 (D.Neb. Feb. 19, 2016)

COA petitioner had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” the search in state court and lost. “She argues, instead, that the state courts could not have ‘possibly’ applied the correct legal standards because it is ‘manifestly evident’ that the October 17, 2007 warrant is overbroad on its face and, yet, the state courts reached the opposite conclusion. She further asserts the OCCA’s resolution of the claim was ‘brief and conclusory.’” It was decided on the merits, and that’s binding. Salado v. Aldridge, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5892 (10th Cir. March 31, 2016).

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MO: Where items included in SW without PC, severance of the warrant is required, not blanket suppression

Officers checked off boxes on a search warrant form about what to search for (not a good way to present a warrant). Items 1-9 (property) that were found were supported by probable cause, and item 10 (corpse) wasn’t, but that does not justify suppressing the entire search as the trial court did. Severance of the invalid portions is the remedy. State v. Douglass, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 300 (March 29, 2016).

The 2255 in this case is approached as a motion for F.R.C.P. 60 relief for fraud on the court, and it’s denied because the court can’t see it. Conrad v. United States, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185390 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 28, 2014),* mandamus denied 566 Fed. Appx. 217 (4th Cir. 2014),* adopted and COA denied 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39252 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2016).*

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TN: Failure to leave the SW not a “clerical error” subject to cure or GFE

In 2011, Tennessee adopted the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act with a statutory good faith exception that included “clerical errors.” Failing to leave a copy of the warrant at the place searched or with the householder is not a “clerical error.” The statute doesn’t say that, and the court won’t add it. Failure to leave a copy of the warrant is a fatal defect under state Rule 41(g)(6). Leaving the warrant serves an important purpose in the law. State v. Daniel, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 220 (March 29, 2016):
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IL: Once officers leave the premises after executing a SW, they need another to come back

Police searched defendant’s house with a warrant, unhandcuffed defendant, and left. Then they returned to search again. A second warrant was required. Just because they could have obtained a second warrant doesn’t mean that was inevitable discovery. [And what’s the probable cause for the second search? We forgot something?] People v. Carter, 2016 IL App (3d) 140958, 2016 Ill. App. LEXIS 181 (March 29, 2016):
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PA: Warrant said “residence,” so it was not limited to garage, even though the PC was directed at it

The drug search warrant specified “the residence,” but the primary focus was the garage because that’s what the police knew. That did not mean, however, that only the garage could be searched. In the course of the drug investigation, police found evidence of murder and dismembering of the decedent. The warrant permitted the seizure of that which came into plain view. Commonwealth v. Chapman, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 550 (March 29, 2016).

A question to defendant about a gun in his truck was not barred by Miranda’s public safety exception (Quarles). Thus, defendant’s admission of the gun was probable cause for search for it. United States v. Milen, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41364 (E.D.Tenn. March 3, 2016).

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MD: Stringray/Hailstorm cell phone tracking device a search; nondisclosure agreement unconstitutional

The use of a Stingray/Hailstorm device to track a cell phone is a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Nondisclosure Agreement is essentially unconstitutional because of the state’s argument they don’t have to disclose what they were doing. The court also finds the third party doctrine inapplicable. State v. Andrews, 2016 Md. App. LEXIS 33 (March 30, 2016):
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