Bloomberg Businessweek: Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From Above by Monte Reel:
Since January, police have been testing an aerial surveillance system adapted from the surge in Iraq. And they neglected to tell the public.
Bloomberg Businessweek: Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From Above by Monte Reel:
Since January, police have been testing an aerial surveillance system adapted from the surge in Iraq. And they neglected to tell the public.
Reviewing the affidavits for the three search warrants, the court is convinced that there is still a risk of compromising the investigation, so the search warrants will remain under seal as to the potential defendant. The court recognizes the right of access; just not yet. In re Three Sealed Search Warrants, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111838 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 17, 2016).
By the time defendant consented, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for investigation after issuing a warning. Defendant gave an unusually elaborate reason for traveling on the highway: He was driving a rental vehicle one way, which was a common tactic of drug smugglers; he had two boxes wrapped in Christmas paper, also a common drug smuggler tactic; he had been charged with selling drugs in Florida; and he changed his story when he was asked to get out of the vehicle to receive the warning. Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 2016 PA Super 181, 2016 Pa. Super. LEXIS 458 (Aug. 19, 2016).*
Incidental capturing of content information during use of a pen register is not unreasonable. The technology only allows for capture some, and it can’t be used without a separate order based on probable cause. In re: Certified Question of Law, FISCR 16-01 (Apr. 24, 2016):
h/t: Tim Cushing at Techdirt with a fuller explanation.
California statute that requires same judge hear a subsequent motion to suppress is designed to prevent forum shopping, and it must be complied with unless the same judge is unavailable or just can’t hear the motion. People v. Rodriguez, 2016 Cal. LEXIS 6975 (Aug. 22, 2016):
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“This appeal presents a question of first impression about the Fourth Amendment: Can the police arrest someone based solely on a civil writ of bodily attachment for unpaid child support? Ted Phillips appeals his conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm and an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). A police officer discovered Phillips’s firearm while arresting him on a writ of bodily attachment …. Phillips argues that the firearm should have been suppressed, but we disagree. Writs of bodily attachment are ‘Warrants’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. IV, so the officer found the firearm during a valid search incident to arrest.” The common law supports this conclusion. United States v. Phillips, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15419 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016).
See Orin Kerr in WaPo: Does the Fourth Amendment allow arrest warrants for civil offenses?
“This case asks us to determine whether, under the totality of circumstances, Kansas Highway
Patrol Officers Richard Jimerson and Dax Lewis … had reasonable suspicion to detain and search the vehicle of Peter Vasquez. In particular, this case presents the question of what weight to afford the state citizenship of a motorist in determining the validity of a search. Vasquez alleges that after stopping him for a traffic violation, the Officers detained him and searched his car without reasonable suspicion. As justification, the Officers assert, among other indicators detailed herein, Vasquez was a citizen of Colorado, driving alone on Interstate 70 from Colorado through Kansas, in the middle of the night, in a recently purchased, older-model car. [¶] The district court concluded the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity because Vasquez’s asserted right was not clearly established. We disagree. We conclude that the Officers acted without reasonable suspicion and violated clearly established precedent. In particular, we conclude that the Officers impermissibly relied on Vasquez’s status as a resident of Colorado to justify the search of his vehicle.” Vasquez v. Lewis, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15424 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 2016).
Mere presence in a high crime area isn’t reasonable suspicion, and defendant was unreasonably seized by police. People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 132615, 2016 Ill. App. LEXIS 555 (Aug. 19, 2016).
“Reed Dempsey brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Bucknell University, Bucknell University Public Safety (‘BUPS’) officers, and Bucknell University officials (collectively, the ‘Bucknell Defendants’) claiming violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful search and seizure. Because we agree with the District Court that, even taking into account certain facts recklessly omitted from the affidavit of probable cause, a reasonable jury could not find a lack of probable cause, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Bucknell Defendants.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15334 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2016).
Despite the handcuffs, the detention remained a Terry stop. “Use of handcuffs does not elevate an investigatory detention to an arrest when concern that weapons are present and officer safety provide the bases. Continued use of handcuffs after a frisk of the suspect reveals no weapons does not convert the detention into an arrest when the suspect’s unsearched vehicle remains in close proximity, the criminal investigation is unfolding and the duration the suspect is in handcuffs before arrest is short.” Chase v. State, 2016 Md. LEXIS 507 (Aug. 19, 2016).
Remanded for making findings on whether the drug dog jumping in the car was a warrantless search. State v. Larose, 2015 N.H. LEXIS 353 (Oct. 9, 2015) (unpublished).
Defendant fled from police who were attempting to stop him for DUI, and he entered the garage. The officer lawfully entered the garage in hot pursuit because of defendant’s flight. State v. Wright, 280 Ore. App. 259, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 1004 (Aug. 17, 2016).
A baggie seen during a traffic stop in a car that was near defendant, but not within his line of sight, did not give probable cause to search the car for heroin. State v. Keller, 280 Ore. App. 249, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 1001 (Aug. 17, 2016).* [This case seems to be Oregon specific.]
Defendant was subjected to a valid probation search. While his probation officers were present, law enforcement actually conducted the search, but this was not unreasonable. United States v. Mills, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104903 (W.D.N.C. July 21, 2016), adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104902 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2016).
Defendant was stopped because the expiration date on his license was covered. Then he was found with an expired DL. The officer offered to avoid impoundment if defendant could get somebody to come and get it, but he couldn’t. The inventory was validly conducted, and a handgun was found. Weathers v. State, 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 297 (Aug. 17, 2016).*
The court of appeals found the entry into defendant’s home to arrest him for DUI was unreasonable and without sufficient exigency, but, on the totality, it was not prejudicial error. There was plenty of evidence defendant was driving drunk without the entry into the house. The court thus applies harmless error and does not even decide the exigency question. State v. Keenan, 2016 Kan. LEXIS 440 (Aug. 19, 2016).
Reasonable suspicion from: no DL or ID, admitted arrest warrant out, two nervous individuals whose answers conflicted, and defendant had what looked to be dried blood on her sleeve, fresh track marks on her arm, and admitted to recent heroin use. State v. Emmons, 2016-Ohio-5384, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 3287 (1st Dist. Aug. 17, 2016).*
Defendant’s warrantless arrest for murder was based on probable cause. The statement that followed would not be suppressed. State v. Thomas, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 605 (Aug. 16, 2016).*
Defendant claimed that the search warrant wasn’t particular enough because it described defendant’s house as the first structure on the left on private road. Defendant shows that there were two others, but the first wasn’t visible from the road and the second was just a shed. This was sufficient particularity. State v. Hardy, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 792 (Aug. 18, 2016) [Note to readers: While generally the product of a search can never justify it [except perhaps for the unfortunate Utah v. Strieff], that rule doesn’t apply to particularity. If the police found the right house and didn’t hit the wrong one first or second, and that has happened plenty of time, the proof is in the pudding.]
Stop sign violation was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop, then he fled from the car. Commonwealth v. Brantley, 2016 Mass. App. LEXIS 103 (Aug. 18, 2016).*
NYLJ: Warrantless Cell Phone Pinging Exigency Analysis by Peter A. Crusco
Defendant was subjected to a parole search of his person, something permitted under Michigan law and his parole status. A baggie of drugs was found in his buttocks. The search was reasonable and only intruded somewhat on his higher privacy interest in his person. This wasn’t a strip search. United States v. Doxey, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15184 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2016).
While the good faith exception isn’t applicable in the Sixth Circuit to a failure to show nexus (United States v. Buffer, 529 Fed. Appx. 482 (6th Cir. 2013)), here the affidavit for search warrant did. United States v. Kelly, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107708 (W.D.Tenn. May 10, 2016), adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107278 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 12, 2016).
Defendant’s admission that she “trashed” defendant’s stuff and it was in her hotel room was probable cause to believe there was evidence of a crime, but there was no exigency for a warrantless entry. Simply arguing that the government could have obtained a search warrant makes it inevitable discovery doesn’t hold any water here. [After all, they can always say that could have gotten a search warrant.] Gore v. United States, 2016 D.C. App. LEXIS 313 (Aug. 18, 2016):
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Defendant gave his attorneys his cell phone, and it likely had text messages on it relevant to a murder investigation. A subpoena for the phone previously failed because of attorney-client privilege. Now the state seeks an anticipatory search warrant for the cell phone on probable cause, and the court orders it granted. The phone is not immune from production just because it is in the hands of a criminal defense lawyer, and the attorneys can do without it for the duration of the download and get it back. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 2016 Mass. LEXIS 608 (Aug. 19, 2016). Note also that the process for the search warrant was an adversary proceeding, as it should have been:
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Officers lacked sufficient information on the totality defendant would be found at his girlfriend’s apartment when they entered on an arrest warrant. Most of the information was from a CI that it was logical he was there and he hadn’t been found in other places he’d likely be. Denial of motion to suppress reversed. United States v. Young, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15275 (1st Cir. Aug. 19, 2016):
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The Atlantic: How Did Justice Scalia Shape American Policing? by Barry Friedman:
Donald Trump wants a Supreme Court appointee like the formidable late judge. But Scalia had a controversial and sometimes conflicted opinion on law enforcement.
Statute mandating GPS monitoring of all Tier III sex offenders granted parole or probation without reference to their individual risks of recidivism did not violate the Fourth Amendment under Vernonia’s “special needs” exception. Plaintiffs did not have a legitimate privacy interest that sufficient to shield them from GPS monitoring. Also, the incremental infringement on plaintiffs’ privacy imposed by the GPS monitoring requirement was not unduly burdensome, and the statute was relatively efficacious in advancing Delaware’s legitimate interest in reducing sex offender recidivism. Doe v. Coupe, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122 (Aug. 12, 2016):
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There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP address one is using because it’s broadcast far and wide. It is a mere business record under the third party doctrine, and Jones doesn’t alter the third party doctrine. United States v. Caira, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15098 (7th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016):
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