GA: Knock-and-announce applies to a business search

In a search of a medical clinic with a search warrant, officers entered and fanned out through the premises with one officer presenting the search warrant to the receptionist. The knock-and-announce statute applies to any possible use of force, including opening doors, and that question wasn’t answered by the trial court. Exigency also would be an exception, and that, too, was not decided. Therefore, remand to settle these questions is required. Hourin v. State, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 711 (Aug. 28, 2017).

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CA9: Failure to cite authority for overbreadth in motion to suppress was waiver of issue

There was probable cause to search defendant’s home for evidence of child sexual exploitation based on the statement of the victim and her mother. Defendant’ overbreadth argument in the district court fails for not citing authority that it was overbroad; it is tantamount to waiver. (Treatise § 60.31) A fifteen day delay in searching defendant’s truck for evidence of the crime also wasn’t unreasonable. “The extent of the intrusion on Wilkinson’s possessory interest in the truck was minimal given the totality of the circumstances. The government had a legitimate interest in seizing and retaining the truck based on the likelihood that it was evidence of Wilkinson’s suspected crimes. The government’s course of conduct was reasonable.” United States v. Wilkinson, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16300 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017).

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Ars Technica: Man in jail 2 years for refusing to decrypt drives. Will he ever get out?

Ars Technica: Man in jail 2 years for refusing to decrypt drives. Will he ever get out? by David Kravets:
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CA8: No QI immunity for arrest for obstruction of man video recording arrest of wife from his doorway

Plaintiff awoke to hear a commotion in his front yard, and he saw officers with guns drawn on his handicapped wife. He stood in his doorway and questioned what they were doing and why, and he video recorded them. They ordered him inside, and, when he refused, he was arrested for obstruction. Their claim he was armed and could ambush them was without probable cause to believe any offense occurred, and they are denied qualified immunity for the arrest. They are also denied qualified immunity for the First Amendment claim of recording the police doing their jobs and that part of the arrest as well. Hoyland v. McMenomy, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16366 (8th Cir. Aug. 28, 2017) (2-1 with Colloton dissenting, which is no surprise).

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CA10: That search violated CO Const. was not an issue for federal court (on habeas)

Petitioner’s habeas argument that the search of his home violated the Colorado Constitution has nothing to do with a federal conviction where the search complied with the Fourth Amendment. In any event, he already lost on that issue in the direct appeal. Warren v. United States, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16171 (10th Cir. Aug. 24, 2017).*

There was no objective evidence or even subjective evidence that there was any reason to believe that there was an exigency for a warrantless entry. State v. Stanley, 287 Ore. App. 399, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 1009 (Aug. 23, 2017).*

After defendant’s stop with reasonable suspicion, the smell of marijuana enabled the officer to go further. United States v. Gerald, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16190 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2017).*

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OH1: Leaving drug house under surveillance for two weeks was RS

It was reasonable suspicion for defendant to visit a house under surveillance for two weeks as a drug house with detailed collection of information about comings and goings. State v. Donohue, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3668 (1st Dist. Aug. 25, 2017).

Petitioner was left alone in a room with drugs by those he was “partying” with, and there was a search. His disclaimer of any privacy interest in the room to distance himself from the drugs meant any motion to suppress the search of the room would fail. Therefore, no ineffective assistance of counsel. Brandon v. State, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 754 (Aug. 25, 2017).*

Officers entered a reservation and came to defendant’s house which had a barbed wire fence and a gate. They honked but nobody came out. So they entered the curtilage for a knock and talk, and this was reasonable. The officers were forthcoming about their reasons for being there, and they obtained voluntary consent. United States v. Gray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136879 (D. Ariz. Aug. 25, 2017).*

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A.F.Ct.Crim.App.: Retest of inconclusive UA was reasonable

The military judge erred in suppressing the results of a second “reinspection” UA administered as a base protocol after a first UA after an AWOL come up positive, diluted, or inconclusive. It was a reasonable command imposed requirement. United States v. Bruno, 2017 CCA LEXIS 573 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 23, 2017) (unpublished).

EMTs’ and officers’ actions in restraining plaintiff with handcuffs on a gurney when EMTs were called to her house because she was having a violent seizure and was acting irrationally. They also looked for medication in the house on top of dressers and in open places in case it was drug related. Their actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Roth v. Viviano, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16321 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).*

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M.D.Tenn.: Laches applies to Rule 41(g) motions for return of property

The doctrine of laches applies to Rule 41(g) motions for return of property. The seizure of defendant’s property was 2003. Aside from other difficulties (like forfeiture), defendant just waited too long. United States v. Kimball, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136952 (M.D. Tenn. April 13, 2017):
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TN: Cell phone warrantless search led to SW for phone; it was all unreasonable, yet harmless from other overwhelming proof

In a homicide case with plenty of other proof of motive, defendants’ cell phones were illegally searched, and then the decision was made by the police to get a warrant. The search was unreasonable. “It was only after the confirmatory search was performed, and the results of that search were shared with General Jones, that the decision to get a search warrant was made. The evidence at the suppression hearing established that the “decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what [Agent Utterback] had seen during the initial” illegal searches of the cell phones. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 542. As such, the independent source doctrine does not prevent the exclusion of the evidence recovered from the Defendants’ cell phones. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Defendants’ motions to suppress on this basis.” Moreover, the 2016 adoption of the good faith exception in Tennessee does not apply to this search because the officers could not articulate why they thought they could search a cell phone without a warrant. On this record, however, the content of the cell phone was harmless error to the strength of the state’s case. State v. Patel, 2017 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 767 (Aug. 25, 2017).*

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CA1: There was no “doorway arrest” under Santana when ptf was behind a locked door the entire time

Police entered plaintiff’s house without a warrant to arrest him. An hour had passed, and any exigency was long gone. As for whether this could be a “doorway arrest” under Santana, that too is rejected because plaintiff was behind a locked door the entire time. The law is thus clearly established, and there is no qualified immunity. Morse v. Cloutier, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16287 (1st Cir. Aug. 25, 2017):
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OR: Under automobile exception, exigency for stop may dissipate as to one thing yet arise as to another

“[T]he automobile exception continues to supply the per se exigency necessary to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle that was mobile when stopped so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime or contraband, even where that probable cause is unrelated to the reason for initially stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 287 Ore. App. 312, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 1012 (Aug. 23, 2017).

“In view of these well-established principles, the warrant issued by Magistrate Judge Eddy authorizing the tracking of the target telephone utilized by Defendant is supported by ample probable cause,” including corroborated information from a CI. United States v. Brown, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132848 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2017).*

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OH5: SW needed to obtain blood results from hospital’s blood draw

Defendant’s blood draw in the hospital was for medical purposes, and a search warrant was required to get access to that information. Trial court affirmed. State v. Saunders, 2017-Ohio-7348, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3640 (5th Dist. Aug. 23, 2017).

Playpen warrants sustained, and the good faith exception would apply in any event. United States v. Lueck, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136161 (M.D. Fla. April 12, 2017);*
United States v. Barnes, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136157 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2017).*

The co-occupant of the house consented to the entry, and the evidence supports that conclusion. Defendant’s request to use the bathroom was attenuated from that consent, and, when he asked, the police would have accompanied him in there anyway. State v. Barnes, 2017-Ohio-7284, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3578 (3d Dist. Aug. 21, 2017).*
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/3/2017/2017-Ohio-7284.pdf

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N.D.Ind.: Following Strieff, no matter the justification for def’s arrest, three FTA warrants justified search incident

Defendant was suspected of attempting a burglary by removing a screen when he fled. He refused to stop and officers finally caught up with him. Instead of submitted, he reached for his pants, and a frisk produced a gun. It turned out there were three arrest warrants out for him. Even if the chase and stop wasn’t lawful [it almost certainly was], the three warrants on defendant made the search incident for the gun valid under Strieff. United States v. Williams, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133670 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2017).

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ID: Distinguishing Strieff, when it was obvious the person stopped was not the person the police were looking for, running warrants was unnecessary and continued the stop

Distinguishing Strieff, when it was obvious the person stopped was not the person the police were looking for, running warrants on them was unnecessary and continued the stop. State v. Cohagan, 2017 Ida. LEXIS 250 (Aug. 24, 2017)
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OH2: Officer didn’t delay the stop for drug dog; it arrived two minutes into the stop [and effectively coerced consent]

While the stopping officer was running background checks, a second officer with a drug dog arrived, and the first officer asked for consent to search, planning to use the drug dog if consent was denied. The trial court held that this extended the stop, but the appellate court doesn’t agree. The total time of the stop was 12-15 minutes at 2 am. State v. Mee, 2017-Ohio-7343, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3635 (2d Dist. Aug. 25, 2017):
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CA11: All Writs Act could be used to get Apple to unlock iPad (which apparently is now really easy for them)

The All Writs Act was properly used to get Apple to unlock defendants’ iPad. Under NY Telephone, “The Supreme Court has recognized five requirements that must be met before a court can compel under the All Writs Act the assistance of a third party in a criminal investigation: (1) the order must be necessary or appropriate to effectuate a previously issued order, (2) it must not be covered by another statute, (3) it must not be inconsistent with the intent of Congress, (4) the third party must not be too far removed from the underlying case, and (5) the burden imposed on the third party must not be unreasonable.” They were satisfied here (going on at length). All Apple had to do was plug the iPad into a computer with their software and transfer the data to a flash drive. United States v. Blake, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 15891 (11th Cir. Aug. 21, 2017). [It would appear that Apple put a backdoor into its operating system to make this so easy for them. Remember the first time they objected so strenuously?]:
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arstechnica: ICE: We don’t use stingrays to locate undocumented immigrants

arstechnica: ICE: We don’t use stingrays to locate undocumented immigrants by Cyrus Farivar:

The acting head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the federal agency charged with deportations, has confirmed in a new letter that it does not use cell-site simulators, also known as stingrays, to locate undocumented immigrants.

Police agencies otherwise would lie about Stingrays claiming they could because the contract with the manufacturer made them do it.

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Infosecurity: DoJ Subject to Strict Oversight in Anti-Trump Site Investigation

Infosecurity: DoJ Subject to Strict Oversight in Anti-Trump Site Investigation by Phil Muncaster:
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Weekly Standard: Protecting Privacy; How the Fourth Amendment can keep up with high-tech surveillance.

Weekly Standard: Protecting Privacy; How the Fourth Amendment can keep up with high-tech surveillance by Matthew Feeney:
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N.D.Cal.: Use of a Stingray to track a phone is a search requiring a warrant, except in exigent circumstances

Use of a Stingray is a “search” and requires a warrant. The court notes the differing approaches of the courts, but this court has already weighed in in favor of the citizen. “Accordingly, the court determines that a warrant was not required to deploy the Stingrays to locate Ellis’s cell phone under the exigent circumstances that existed the morning of January 22, 2013. Ellis’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from use of the Stingrays is therefore DENIED.” United States v. Ellis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136217 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2017). On the privacy question:
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