N.D.Ind.: Collective knowledge doctrine doesn’t require any specifics be held by officer making the stop

Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the officer actually making the stop doesn’t have to know much of anything that the officers with knowledge know. Nothing needs to be communicated, other than the identity of the person or car stopped. There was reasonable suspicion for the stop held by those with knowledge. United States v. Beachem, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179951 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2018 10:45:15 p.m. CDT).

Defendant waived the search issue of his cell phone by pleading guilty. Even if it could be raised, by all appearances, he abandoned the phone in flight, so the issue had no chance of success. United States v. Bradbury, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176374 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2018).*

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MI: Controlled buys and corroborated CI was PC

The trial court erred in suppressing the search under the search warrant. There were controlled buys and a corroborated informant, and that was enough for probable cause. People v. Higgins, 2018 Mich. App. LEXIS 3355 (Oct. 18, 2018).

Defendant’s right brake light didn’t work and that was a reasonable basis for the stop under Texas law. Saenz v. State, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8524 (Tex. App. – El Paso Oct. 17, 2018).*

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D.S.D.: Community caretaking function permitted search of unconscious person’s bag for source of his condition

Police responding to a medical emergency found defendant unconscious in his bathroom with a belt tourniquet at his arm and a brown liquid in a syringe. That was not a sign of diabetes shock. It was reasonable under Eighth Circuit precedent for the officer to make a limited search of the immediate area and defendant’s bag to determine the source of his unconsciousness. United States v. Kempf, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179232 (D. S.D. Oct. 18, 2018):
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CO: Once a dog alerts on a car, there is PC, and putting dog in car wasn’t unreasonable

Once a dog alerted on a car during a stop that was valid up to that time, putting the dog inside the car wasn’t unreasonable. The officers had probable cause at that point. People v. Bailey, 2018 CO 84 (Oct. 15, 2018).

CSLI obtained prior to Carpenter was validly obtained under Krull. United States v. Remus, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179405 (D. Neb. Sep. 27, 2018).*

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CA9: Casual conversation with a motorist isn’t barred by Rodriguez despite officer’s motive

Casual conversation with a motorist during a traffic stop isn’t prohibited by Rodriguez even though the officer is hoping to pick up on something supporting reasonable suspicion. United States v. Kash, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 29057 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2018).

Defendant’s effort for return of rents paid on his forfeited rental property after the forfeiture fails. It isn’t a violation of the plea agreement or Rule 41(g). United States v. Sperow, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179453 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2018).*

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E.D.Ky.: Pleading a constitutional violation without saying how preserves nothing for review

“Cruz next present a series of direct challenges, obviously hoping one will stick. He generally asserts that his ‘conviction and sentence are violative of the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution.’ (DE 32, at 7). He claims violations of ‘his right to freedom of speech and to keep and bear arms and to petition, his right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, his right to due process of law, his rights to counsel, to jury trial, to confrontation of witnesses, to present a defense, and to compulsory process, and his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Constitution.’ Id. …. Nowhere throughout his many submitted pages (as well as in reply) does Cruz append any meat to these claims’ bones. Quite to the contrary, he says he merely ‘pleaded [them] to protect the record … in the event of a change in law or new facts or circumstances which come to light during the litigation of this motion.’ Id. at 17.” United States v. Castenada, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179360 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 11, 2018).*

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N.D.Miss.: Officer’s credibility on cause for stop fails because the tag light was working and he couldn’t see in car

Officer’s testimony varied sufficiently from his reports of his reasonable suspicion for the stop and detention that it’s just unreliable. Motion to suppress granted. It apparently started with the justification for the stop as inoperable tag lights [how many times have we heard that?], but he admitted in testimony that it was working after shown a photograph. Then the windows were so tinted that he couldn’t see the passenger he claimed he saw had no seatbelt on. United States v. Gordon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177610 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 16, 2018):
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NC: Officers doing a knock-and-talk didn’t unreasonably “linger” in violation of Jardines

Officers could enter defendant’s driveway to conduct a knock-and-talk, and they didn’t “linger” long in violation of Jardines. They smelled marijuana coming from the garage, and that was sufficient to get a search warrant. Defendant’s argument about the sign on his property denying consent or the ability to stay on the property wasn’t presented to the trial court, so it’s waived for appeal. State v. Piland, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1031 (Oct. 16, 2018):
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D.Haw.: “Intended recipient” of a parcel whose name isn’t on it has no standing.

As an “intended recipient” of a parcel, defendant has no standing. His name isn’t on the package as sender or recipient. United States v. Williams, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177669 (D. Haw. Oct. 16, 2018).

Officers could reasonably believe that there was a person in distress inside the house when they arrived on a domestic disturbance call based on what they were told and hearing crying inside. United States v. Sanders, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176401 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 15, 2018).*

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CA6: Officer spent 90 minutes at plaintiff’s house on the curtilage trying to get him to come out for a probation breath test; that violated 4A but officer gets QI

Plaintiff is a probationer who had a police officer show at his house to get a breath sample per his probation conditions. Despite repeated knocking and use of the police car’s PA system, plaintiff didn’t come to the door and the officer hung out for 90 minutes four or five times going around the house knocking on windows and trying to get plaintiff to come up. Finally, plaintiff did and he blew .000. Plaintiff was accused of not complying with the demand for the breath sample. The officer’s conduct of spending 90 minutes on the curtilage violated Jardines and the Fourth Amendment despite plaintiff’s probation status. However, it did not violate clearly established law and the officer gets qualified immunity. Brennan v. Dawson, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28895 (6th Cir. Oct 15, 2018).

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AL: Def waived REP in cell phone by leaving it at crime scene

Defendant waived any reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone by leaving it at the crime scene. Tolbert v. State, 2018 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 65 (Oct. 15, 2018).

The child pornography affidavit for search warrant wasn’t a “model of clarity” but it did show probable cause and it was timely. United States v. Linton, 2018 CCA LEXIS 492 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2018).*

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CO: Unauthorized taking of juvenile’s DNA requires suppression

Unauthorized collection of DNA from a juvenile offender is subject to suppression and it should be purged from CODIS. Casillas v. People, 2018 CO 78M, 2018 Colo. LEXIS 832 (Oct. 15, 2018).

A routine traffic stop outside of a municipal officer’s jurisdiction that “did not present an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property and where he did not otherwise have probable cause to do so” was subject to suppression. Commonwealth v. Bergamasco, 2018 PA Super 280 (Oct. 16, 2018).*

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VA: CSLI obtained before Carpenter was valid

CSLI obtained in 2012 and 2015 was lawful at the time before Carpenter, so the good faith exception applies. (The case was GVR’d because of Carpenter.) “We adopt the analytical framework set forth in Chavez. Appellant’s CSLI was acquired in the same way used by the government in Chavez. … Appellant does not contend that the statutes were invalid at the time the Commonwealth obtained his CSLI in 2012 and 2015 because Carpenter was decided in 2018. Thus, it necessarily follows that both the detectives and the Commonwealth’s attorney had a reasonable, good faith belief that their actions were constitutional at the time. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule does not apply as there was no police or governmental conduct that needed to be deterred at the time it occurred.” Reed v. Commonwealth, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 275 (Oct. 16, 2018).

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CA5: Unconditional guilty plea waives 4A claims

Even after Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018), an unconditional guilty plea waives search and seizure claims. “So under Class, Torres may not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge on appeal, given his voluntary unconditional guilty plea. See United States v. Tineo-Gonzalez, 893 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing post-Class that ‘[b]y pleading guilty at trial, [the defendant] waived his right to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress’).” United States v. Torres, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28948 (5th Cir. Oct 15, 2018).

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CA6: Police cannot summarily kill dogs in houses they search

From 1919-2014, it violated Michigan law to have an unlicensed dog over six months old, and state law and city ordinance permitted officials to kill them. In 2014, that changed. Plaintiffs became squatters in an abandoned house in Detroit, and police alleged that they did a $10 drug deal with an informant in November 2015. Police came to arrest and search, and they summarily shot plaintiffs’ dogs. They had three in the house, and one plaintiff was there alone with them, trying to put them up before the police entered. One passive dog was shot, and another was shot as it charged up the basement stairs showing its teeth. One was shot through a bathroom door. The defendants argued that the dogs were contraband, but they were not. Police cannot summarily kill the dogs of persons living in the places police search without violating the Fourth Amendment. Smith v. City of Detroit, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28890 (6th Cir. Oct 15, 2018):
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CA11: Work-related injuries don’t necessarily translate into OSHA violations; records request quashed as overbroad

Existence of work-related injuries or illnesses do not translate directly into reasonable suspicion that an OSHA violation occurred. The district court was correct in quashing the inspection warrant for lack of a proper showing, without prejudice to OSHA establishing the proper standard. United States v. Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc., 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28400 (11th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018):
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NYTimes: How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations

NYTimes: How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations by Heather Murphy:

Fifteen murder and sexual assault cases have been solved since April with a single genealogy website. This is how GEDmatch went from a casual side project to a revolutionary tool.

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WaPo: Opinion: Little Rock’s dangerous and illegal drug war

WaPo: Opinion: Little Rock’s dangerous and illegal drug war by Radley Balko (with security video of the raid) (and this is a product of Hudson v. Michigan, which we can thank SCOTUS for):
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OH2: Motion for return of property after a forfeiture order is final is moot

A motion for return of property after a forfeiture order is final is moot. State v. Housley, 2018-Ohio-4140, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4467 (2d Dist. Oct. 12, 2018).

There was no Franks violation. Officers got permission from a child to look for a parent, which they did, and there was no deception. There were some minor omissions, but they weren’t material to anything. State v. Brittain, 2018-Ohio-4136, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4457 (2d Dist. Oct. 12, 2018).*

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DE: Officer’s training and experience in intoxicated drivers was relevant and significant to the PC showing

The officer’s training and experience in intoxicated drivers was relevant and significant to the probable cause showing in the affidavit for defendant’s BAC. He was not a mere layperson making an observation as defendant says. State v. Law, 2018 Del. Super. LEXIS 437 (Oct. 11, 2018).

Officers entered defendant’s house with an arrest warrant for him and a third party. [After a long roundabout discussion:] The entry was justified under Payton as to defendant and with hot pursuit as to the other, aside from his status in the premises. State v. Daboni, 2018-Ohio-4155, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 4475 (4th Dist. Oct. 5, 2018).*

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