OR: Def didn’t abandon backpack by not affirmatively claiming ownership of it during vehicle search by consent

The officer had reasonable suspicion something was up and the driver of a van already stopped consented to a search of the van, but that did not include a backpack that didn’t belong to him. Defendant did not abandon the backpack by not affirmatively claiming that it was his when he was claiming other property in the vehicle. There was no affirmative disclaiming ownership. State v. Jones, 280 Ore. App. 135, 2016 Ore. App. LEXIS 975 (Aug. 3, 2016).

Defendant claimed the search warrant was overbroad because his bedroom was actually a separate dwelling unit within the house named in the warrant. The court finds as fact that it wasn’t a separate dwelling unit and that the place was objectively a single family dwelling. United States v. Hoston, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102737 (E.D.N.C. July 11, 2016), adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102423 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 2016).*

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S.D.N.Y.: Lack of full detail and minor discrepancies from reports didn’t make officers unbelievable

In a Bronx stop and frisk, the fact that the four NYPD Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheets for each person frisked didn’t have the detail of the officers’ hearing testimony or resulted in minor discrepancies doesn’t make them unbelievable. United States v. Winkfield, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104260 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016):
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D.Neb., M.D.Fla., C.D.Cal. also sustain an NIT search warrant for IP addresses

Another NIT warrant upheld in a child pornography case. United States v. Laurita, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103405 (D.Neb. Aug. 5, 2016)* (collecting cases):
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M.D.Fla.: CSLI information captured by Stingray would be unreasonable under 4A except defs had no standing in burner phones they disassociated themselves from

Use of a Stingray to capture defendants’ cell phone location information in real time was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [without much discussion], but the defendants lack standing to complain. The mere fact the government referred to the phones as the “defendants’” was insufficient in itself to confer standing. They still had to prove their connections to the phones and their reasonable expectation of privacy in them. They used burner phones not registered to anybody except one was listed to “LOL LOL,” and they disassociated themselves from the phones. United States v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102731 (M.D.Fla. July 25, 2016):
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New law review article: How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform

Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144 (2016). Abstract:
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M.D.Fla.: Reliance on a state court tracking order years ago was entitled to good faith

Under the Stored Communications Act, one must still prove standing as an “aggrieved person.” A state court cell phone tracking order is entitled to good faith exception deference, particularly since it was issued prior to any cases on the subject. United States v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102732 (M.D.Fla. July 31, 2016):
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WSJ Blog: Study Links Police Bodycams to Increase in Shooting Deaths

WSJ Blog: Study Links Police Bodycams to Increase in Shooting Deaths by Jacob Gershman:

In the wake of high-profile police shootings, the Obama administration has encouraged local police departments to equip their officers with body-worn cameras. The devices, said Attorney General Loretta Lynch, ‘hold tremendous promise for enhancing transparency, promoting accountability, and advancing public safety.’ A new study by Temple University researchers, however, suggests that the wearable video cameras may not lead to fewer police shootings of civilians, but may actually make officers more likely to use lethal force.

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New law review article: A Tactical Fourth Amendment

Brandon L. Garrett, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 102 Va.L.Rev. __ (2016). Abstract:
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TX11: A search for evidence under an unconstitutional statute still suppressed in Texas despite good faith

Search for evidence under a statute later declared unconstitutional in state court had to be suppressed because Texas has only a limited good faith exception. Siller v. State, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8733 (Tex.App. – Eastland Aug. 11, 2016).

Speculative allegations of the CI’s motive to falsify don’t rise to the level of a Franks violation. “Such speculative allegations do not amount to the substantial preliminary showing required to trigger a Franks hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (explaining that a defendant’s attack on a search warrant affidavit ‘must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine’).” The officer’s failure to include the CI’s criminal history was negligence at worst, and it wasn’t material. United States v. Shaw, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102491 (D.Ore. Aug. 4, 2016).*

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CA5: Def consented after drug dog didn’t alert, and it was valid

Defendant was stopped at an immigration checkpoint at Laredo, saying he was going to San Antonio. The officer found the story dubious, ran the paperwork in seconds, and then got a drug dog which did not alert. Then defendant consented to a search and the officer found eleven kilos of methamphetamine in the lining to two empty suitcases. The stop was reasonable in length and the consent was valid. United States v. Hipolito-Ramirez\, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14637 (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2016).*

After defendant’s arrest, his bag was found and searched by private parties before turning it over to the police. the private search was valid. United States v. Jordan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102365 (N.D.W.Va. Aug. 4, 2016).*

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D.Ore.: Driver doesn’t have standing to challenge search of passenger’s person

Although the stop of defendant’s car was unreasonable, defendant still doesn’t have standing to question the search of his passenger. United States v. Kuespert, 773 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1985). United States v. Abarza, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103035 (D.Ore. Aug. 5, 2016).

It wasn’t error to deny defendant’s motion to suppress his warrantless blood draw because the State showed the implied consent exception to the warrant requirement applied. The officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was DUI, so he gave his implied consent to having his blood drawn due to the implied consent statute based on the totality of the circumstances. Defendant’s consent was voluntary and continued through to the blood draw; nothing showed he drove involuntarily or withdrew his consent. The State did not have to prove the consent was continuous, and he did not claim he was told he had to submit to the blood draw. State v. Charlson, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 230 (Aug. 5, 2016).*

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N.D.Ga.: PC to arrest isn’t a high burden, and the govt can’t meet it here

“Here, the Government has adduced no testimony or other evidence explaining the basis of Defendant’s arrest or even identifying the officers who arrested her. The Government has also not introduced any evidence of the circumstances of Defendant’s arrest, including when and where she was arrested. The closest thing that the Government points to is a statement from a Detective that encountered Defendant at the station, that ‘[a]s far as I understand, she was arrested on the scene.’ … This Detective had no personal knowledge of the arrest, however, and provided no facts to show a reliable foundation to support his unexplained ‘understanding].’ [¶] Obviously, unexplained suspicions or conclusions do not amount to probable cause. Thus, the Government appears to mainly focus on the conversation overheard by EMT Reese. Oddly, instead of calling the officers who actually investigated and arrested Defendant, or the officer who actually interviewed the shooting victim, the Government only called an EMT who overheard that interview. [¶] The Government’s burden to prove probable cause is not a high one. And, while unusual, the Court is aware of no legal barrier preventing the Government from relying on indirect, circumstantial evidence of the facts surrounding an arrest and reasons for it. But there are simply too many holes in the evidence presented here for the Court to find that the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant.” United States v. Jackson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103275 (N.D.Ga. June 16, 2016),* adopted 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102916 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2016).*

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E.D.Wis.: Rule 41 violation isn’t necessarily a 4A violation

A violation of Rule 41 simply is not a Fourth Amendment violation. The case defendant cites isn’t on point. “[T]he defendant ignores the fact that, thirteen years after [that] decision, and almost thirty years before the search that resulted in the defendant’s prosecution, the Seventh Circuit addressed, and rejected, the argument he makes in this case.” The court won’t adopt Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones. “The defendant argues, based on the above language in Justice Alito’s concurrence, that this court should hold (a) that the question of whether a GPS warrant violates the Fourth Amendment should be based on the duration of the monitoring period, and (b) that monitoring periods of longer than four weeks (including the eight-week period authorized by the warrant in his case) violate the Fourth Amendment.” No court has yet. United States v. Felton, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101727 (E.D.Wis. Aug. 2, 2016).

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TX9: RS for a stop supported defendant’s fleeing charge

The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for domestic assault, so defendant’s flight was an offense. Rodriguez v. State, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8494 (Tex. App. – Amarillo Aug. 8, 2016).

Plaintiffs in a civil case sought search warrant materials that had nothing to do with the civil case, and it’s denied without prejudice to do a separate action. Societe D’Equipments Internationaux Nigeria, Inc. v. Dolarian Capital, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104335 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).

The government executed five search warrants and seized thousands of pages of paper and eleven computer hard drives. The filter team hasn’t completed its review. It needs to and the parties file a report within ten days as to when it will be done. United States v. Musto, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103078 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 5, 2016).*

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techdirt: Botnet Bill Could Give FBI Permission To Take Warrantless Peeks At The Contents Of People’s Computers

techdirt: Botnet Bill Could Give FBI Permission To Take Warrantless Peeks At The Contents Of People’s Computers by Tim Cushing:

The DOJ may be headed into the business of breaking blinds in bulk. Innocuous-sounding legislation that would allow the FBI to shut down botnets contains some serious privacy implications.

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NYTimes: Justice Department to Streamline Tracking of Police Killings

NYTimes: Justice Department to Streamline Tracking of Police Killings by Charles Savage:

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is moving forward with a plan to better track killings by police officers, as heightened national scrutiny of such deaths has reinforced criticism of its reliance on self-reporting by state and local law enforcement agencies.

In a notice published in the Federal Register this week, the Justice Department said it would ask law enforcement agencies and medical examiner’s offices to fill out forms when there is a news report or another indication that a person died while in police custody.

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CA7: Reused civil eviction order was without legal authority and qualified immunity denied

Defendants used a civil eviction order twice. The first time was lawful and based on a court order. The landlord let the plaintiffs back in. Then the first order was somehow stamped by the clerk to reuse it to evict again. Defendants obtained summary judgment but it’s reversed. Zoretic v. Darge, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14537 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2016):
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CA7 grants rehearing en banc in case described as “parking while black”

From How Appealing:

Seventh Circuit grants rehearing en banc in a case the dissent criticized as “enabling police seizures for ‘parking while black'”: Thanks to a reader of the blog, I have learned that yesterday the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued this order granting rehearing en banc in the case.

Yesterday’s order granting en banc review vacated the earlier opinion of a divided three-judge Seventh Circuit panel. This blog’s coverage of that earlier decision appeared here and here.
Posted at 04:18 PM by Howard Bashman

The case: United States v. Johnson, posted here.

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Utah v. Strieff, 2016 Supplement, § 10.02; maybe overcoming Strieff

Utah v. Strieff is discussed in six sections in the 2016 supplement, primarily in § 10.02:

§ 10.02 on the attenuation doctrine
Page 10-12 Add at end of section:

In Utah v. Strieff,63 the officer had been tipped that drugs were being sold out of a particular house, and the police had been watching it, noticing the short stay of the visitors. Strieff came out of the house after his short stay, and the officer followed and stopped him just to see what he had to say for himself. The officer asked Strieff for his identification, and then ran it, as department policy dictated, finding a warrant which led to Strieff’s search incident and finding methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.64 The stop was conceded by the state to be unreasonable and without reasonable suspicion, but the Utah Court of Appeals found the evidence admissible because the finding of the warrant happened as a matter of course, searching for warrants wasn’t the purpose of the stop, and the discovery of the warrant was not the officer exploiting the primary illegality of the stop.65 The Utah Supreme Court reversed holding that the Supreme Court’s attenuation cases require that there be an intervening act of the defendant’s free will.66
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CA9: Motion to suppress after conviction wasn’t timely

Defendant’s motion to suppress her cell phone search two weeks after conviction wasn’t timely, and no good cause shown. Riley being decided after her conviction is not “good cause.” United States v. Gonzalez, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14298 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 2016).* (Besides, won’t she lose under Davis?)

Police had been receiving information for a long time about defendant’s alleged drug dealing, so they did a trash pull and found incriminating evidence [considerably more than the usual trash pull that I’ve seen]. The information was not stale because the drug operation was ongoing. United States v. Smith, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14418 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 2016).*

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