WaPo: Fatal shootings by police remain relatively unchanged after two years

WaPo: Fatal shootings by police remain relatively unchanged after two years by Kimbriell Kelly, Wesley Lowery, Steven Rich, Julie Tate and Jennifer Jenkins:
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W.D.N.Y.: CI with good track record isn’t less believable because she had a relationship with the def which “soured”

The CI in this case had a track record. Then she was involved with defendant, and then she set defendant up, too. The fact their relationship “soured” didn’t undermine her credibility on the question of probable cause. United States v. Goolsby, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176196 (W.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016), adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175926 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016). [Maybe that’s what happens when you live with a snitch?]

Defendant lived with his father and sister, and he was on probation for methamphetamine offenses. His father and sister were concerned he’d relapsed because he was locked in his room for two days and acting “out of his mind.” They called the police, and the father consented to an entry into the bedroom to check on him. Defendant argued he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room, but he wasn’t proved to be a tenant. He alleged he was; if he wasn’t his father could consent to the entry into the room. Assuming, arguendo, he was did, in fact, have a reasonable expectation of privacy against consent from his father, the entry was valid as a probation search under the state constitution. State v. Brooks, 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 117 (Dec. 23, 2016).*

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M.D.Fla.: “We can do this the ‘easy way or hard way’” doesn’t make otherwise voluntary consent invalid

“We can do this the ‘easy way or hard way’” doesn’t make otherwise voluntary consent invalid. United States v. Jackson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175964 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 16, 2016), adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175505 (M.D. Fla., Dec. 20, 2016):
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D.Me.: Detaining def, taking his hotel room key, and moving him from outside the hotel to just outside his hotel room was an arrest; but here with PC

Detaining defendant, taking his hotel room key, and moving him from outside the hotel to just outside his hotel room was a clear indication to defendant he was under arrest. On the totality of circumstances, however, there was probable cause for the arrest. United States v. Flores, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175548 (D.Me. Dec. 20, 2016):
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WaPo: The Watch Blog: DOJ report: Arrests without PC, held for days without a lawyer; here it’s a “CID hold”

WaPo: The Watch Blog by Radley Balko:

Incredible Justice Department report finds brazen and systemic police abuse in Louisiana. Officers in two departments made hundreds of “secret” arrests without probable cause. The arrests typically included strip-searches, and arrestees could be held for days without access to a lawyer. Most were based on little more than an officer’s hunch, after which the arrestee would be pressured to confess.

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The Legal Intelligencer, Will Technology Change the Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?

The Legal Intelligencer, Will Technology Change the Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment? by Leonard Deutchman:
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D.N.M.: Both protective sweep and emergency aid justifications fail for lack of objective facts somebody else was there

Where there are no articulable facts somebody else might be present in the house, the protective sweep doctrine can’t be relied on. Likewise with the emergency aid doctrine. Here there was a 911 hang up call, but the critical fact is that somebody was in need isn’t present. United States v. Benavidez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175373 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2016):
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D.Md.: Govt first raising standing in a supplement brief after hearing was waiver

The government’s first raising standing in a supplemental brief after the hearing is too late. United States v. Larson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175547 *3 n.2 (D.Md. Dec. 19, 2016):
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New Law Review: “The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,” for evaluating new technological problems and the third-party doctrine

New Law Review: “The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,” 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1821 (2016) by William Baude & James Y. Stern:

For fifty years, courts have used a “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard to define “searches” under the Fourth Amendment. As others have recognized, that doctrine is subjective, unpredictable, and conceptually confused, but viable alternatives have been slow to emerge. This Article supplies one.
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N.D.Ill.: While merely being close to another for whom there is reason to frisk or arrest is not PC, here there actually was PC

The FBI had more than reasonable suspicion based on mere propinquity to others. There were specific facts involving defendant that rose to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Amaya, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174615 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 16, 2016).*

Defendant’s cell site location information was obtained by search warrant, so his lawyer couldn’t be ineffective for not challenging it unless the challenge went to probable cause, something not raised. This circuit treats CSLI as a business record. United States v. Moffitt, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173194 (W.D.Pa. Dec. 15, 2016).*

Another Playpen warrant upheld. United States v. Vortman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175235 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 16, 2016).*

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N.D.Cal.: Going home after a drug sale from one’s van is nexus for SW for house

Defendant sold drugs from his van, but nexus was shown to his home. “[T]he fact that Johnson left his van and entered his home soon after completing a sale (the controlled sale observed here) provides a reasonable nexus between his home and his drug sales, particularly when informed by Detective Sample’s statement that drug dealers often kept some inventory in their homes.” United States v. Johnson, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176161 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016).

Petitioner’s 2255 search and other claims were all raised in his direct appeal and are denied. Anderson v. United States, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178956 (N.D.Tex. Nov. 7, 2016).*

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PA holds state constitution requires exclusionary rule applies to parole and probation revocation proceedings

PA holds state constitution requires exclusionary rule applies to parole and probation revocation proceedings. The court engages in a lengthy and sensitive analysis. Commonwealth v. Arter, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 2916 (Dec. 28, 2016):
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Ars Technica: Here’s what a “digital Miranda warning” might look like

Ars Technica: Here’s what a “digital Miranda warning” might look like by Cyrus Farivar:

Smartphone owners need to know if—and when—they need to reveal their passcodes.

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New law review: Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory

New law review: Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, by Lior Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler (not online yet, if ever).

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E.D.N.Y.: 791 days of GPS tracking of a parolee to catch others in a DTO was [somehow] not unreasonable

In a really strange case, a GPS monitor to track curfew violations of a parolee was left on for 791 days. The parole officers and then other officers watched where he was going to attempt to crack a drug trafficking organization, apparently letting him think they weren’t paying attention. The original parole order was for defendant to wear it for only six months, but it went on for two years and two months and they just watched to see where he was going. The opinion strongly states that this was highly invasive of defendant’s rights, tracking him for so long, but still, the court somehow denies the motion to suppress the tracking information. United States v. Lambus, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177585 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016) (Weinstein, U.S.D.J.):
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D.N.M.: When neither party requests a hearing and only disputed fact isn’t material, one won’t be held

Neither party requested a hearing on the motion to suppress and one isn’t required. Here, there is one disputed fact and it isn’t material to the outcome. United States v. Benavidez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175373 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2016).

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CA8: As long as drug dog gets there before the traffic ticket is done, it’s all good

From the circuit that brought us Rodriguez, a drug dog on the scene within two minutes of a traffic stop and writing a ticket for no DL was reasonable. “Thus, there is no evidence that the dog sniff unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop beyond what was necessary to complete the stop.” Being clocked by radar at 66 in a 65 is reason for a stop. United States v. Fuehrer, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23326 (8th Cir. Dec. 28, 2016):
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LA rule permitting electronic warrant applications and issuance doesn’t violate 4A or Rule 41

The police got a search warrant from a Louisiana state judge by electronic means, but the case ended up in federal court. Louisiana’s criminal rule permitting electronic warrant applications does not violate the “oath or affirmation” requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Electronic signatures are permitted on Rule 41 warrants, too. United States v. Demouchet, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173976 (M.D.La. Dec. 16, 2016):
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N.D.Cal.: Conversations outside courthouse were entitled to REP [on reconsideration]

Surreptitious recordings outside the San Mateo courthouse of persons talking amongst themselves were entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy because they talked such that others could not overhear them except with planted recording devices. The court will conduct a hearing on remedy, and the Title III remedy is broader than the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Giraudo, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176813 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 21, 2016), prior opinion, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100486 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2016) (prior opinion posted here):
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CA9: Def turned over cell phone by consent, but, even if not, it was searched with a warrant

Defendant handed over his telephone when it was requested [or demanded] by the police. The Fourth Amendment wasn’t violated because turning over the phone was by consent. Even if turning over the phone was nonconsensual, the cell phone was searched with a warrant. United States v. Thomas, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22625 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2016).

Defendant consented to the search of her house. Her testimony is specifically found to be “an exaggeration” that they would tear the house apart if she didn’t disclose the location of the drugs because of the way the search was conducted. United States v. Lopez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172291 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 13, 2016).*

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