PA holds state constitution requires exclusionary rule applies to parole and probation revocation proceedings

PA holds state constitution requires exclusionary rule applies to parole and probation revocation proceedings. The court engages in a lengthy and sensitive analysis. Commonwealth v. Arter, 2016 Pa. LEXIS 2916 (Dec. 28, 2016):

As we further explained in Edmunds, when a litigant seeks relief based exclusively on the Pennsylvania Constitution, as does Appellant in this case, it is important that the litigant brief and analyze the following four factors: (1) the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2) the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; (3) relevant case law from other jurisdictions; and (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895; Commonwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1205 (Pa. 2007). Appellant has addressed in his brief each of the four Edmunds factors. Thus, to determine whether illegally-seized evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule under Article I, Section 8, we proceed to consider these factors seriatim.

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Although this Court based its holding in Wilson on the statutory language at issue, as opposed to the parties’ constitutional arguments, our reasoning in Wilson answers the Commonwealth’s present argument that its ability to enforce the terms of an individual’s probation or parole effectively outweighs the recognized privacy rights of a probationer or parolee. As we stated in Williams, in deciding whether a warrantless search by a parole officer conducted pursuant to a parolee’s signed parole agreement authorizing warrantless searches could survive constitutional scrutiny, we “must balance the governmental interests involved in granting parole and supervising parolees with that interest of the private individual, i.e., the parolee, which has been affected by the governmental action.” Williams, 692 A.2d at 1035. Thus, although we have suggested that a parolee has “a more narrowly protected privacy interest than that afforded a free individual,” id. at 1036, we have recognized that the government’s interest in enforcing the terms of parole and probation cannot entirely displace a parolee’s protected privacy rights.

Finally, we conclude that application of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings is in accord with this Court’s consistent and repeated emphasis that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule under Article I, Section 8, is protecting the individual privacy rights of our citizens, as opposed to deterring police misconduct. This purpose is equally applicable to criminal proceedings and revocation proceedings. Accord Rogers, 836 P.2d at 130 (liberty interest of individual who is on probation analogous to liberty interest of defendant in traditional criminal proceeding).

Based on our assessment of the Edmunds factors — the text of Article I, Section 8; the unique history surrounding its origins; its subsequent interpretation by our Court; decisions from those states which share our Commonwealth’s commitment to protecting the privacy rights of individuals; and important policy considerations — we conclude they command the application of the exclusionary rule to parole and probation revocation proceedings.

III. Conclusion

As it is undisputed that there was no reasonable suspicion for the parole officer’s warrantless search of Appellant, we hold that, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the evidence seized as a result of the search was inadmissible at Appellant’s parole revocation proceedings, and, thus, Appellant’s motion to suppress filed with respect to those proceedings should have been granted. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court, vacate the order revoking Appellant’s parole, and remand this matter to the Superior Court for remand to the trial court for further proceedings.