D.Kan.: AOL’s TOS deny an objective REP in CP transmitted by email (on remand from CA10)

In the district court’s original opinion, reversed for reconsideration in United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016), the district court assumed defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails. On remand, the court determines that he did not. He was an AOL customer, and AOL’s TOS warn against use of AOL to transmit illegal material. And, “To prevent violations and enforce this TOS and remediate any violations, we can take any technical, legal, and other actions that we deem, in our sole discretion, necessary and appropriate without notice to you.” This amounted to defendant having no reasonable expectation of privacy in child pornography that AOL’s system scanned, separated, and tipped off NCMEC. AOL is, as an email provider, a mandated child pornography reporter. That made AOL’s report and NCMEC’s receipt in good faith reliance on a statutory scheme. United States v. Ackerman, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178925 (D. Kan. Oct. 30, 2017):
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CA11: Franks challenge fails; officer’s frank admission of mistake [apparently] helped show mere negligence in including it

The mistake in the affidavit was just negligent and it didn’t undermine the probable cause at all. Besides that, there was an independent source for all the information in the warrant that was probable cause. United States v. Reddick, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21478 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2017). On the Franks challenge, the officer’s admission of the mistake was apparently important, but it was hardly reckless in any event:
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GA: Def not compelled to perform breath tests, so no self-incrimination issue

Defendant was not compelled to perform breath tests, so the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause did not apply. State v. Council, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 531 (Oct. 30, 2017).*

In a Franks challenge, “The Court is tasked with reassessing the probable cause in the affidavit, substituting the facts as disclosed in Luna’s testimony for the misleading statements in the affidavit, and supplementing the affidavit with facts that were omitted. See Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d at 146 (citations omitted). In doing so, the Court finds that, had all of the relevant facts been included accurately in the affidavit, the affidavit would have supported a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Marley, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180360 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017).*

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OH11: Admin SW for hoarding was issued with PC and wasn’t stale

Defendant here was referred to as “having a hoarding issue” because of a growing collection of junk in his yard and up against his house that was flammable and attractive to rodents. He was prosecuted for the exterior junk and given several months to clean it up. But he didn’t. The city came back and alleged in an administrative search warrant that they reasonably suspected the inside was as bad as the exterior, and the administrative warrant issued. The later warrant was not stale because the conditions continued to exist. The city had no duty to search the interior months earlier in the initial prosecution. State v. Griesbaum, 2017-Ohio-8363, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 4737 (11th Dist. Oct. 30, 2017):
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 30 years old today

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines went into effect November 1, 1987, though they were at least three years in production.

The U.S. Sentencing Commission has numerous publications on dealing with Guideline issues. All changes go into effect November 1st each year. The 2017 manual, however, hasn’t been posted on the GPO bookstore yet. Maybe in a few days.

U.S. Probation here says “they just show up, and I don’t think we order them.”

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GA: Protective sweep of a house after a street fight and stabbing outside and a brief standoff with a cut def was reasonable

A protective sweep of defendant’s house right after his arrest was reasonable. Officers responded to a 911 call about a street fight and a possible stabbing. A dying victim was found in the street, and another victim was in hysterics. Defendant locked himself in his house leading to a brief standoff. When he came out, he had cuts on his body, too. Officers did not know if there were other assailants or victims inside, so a sweep was reasonable. Williams v. State, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 922 (Oct. 30, 2017) (corrected link: two Williams opinions that day).

Defendant’s motion to suppress had been denied before trial. His IAC argument is that it should have been renewed during the trial because of trial developments, but he makes no argument of how he was prejudiced, and the court can’t make it for him. Pate v. State, 2017 Mo. App. LEXIS 1101 (Oct. 27, 2017).*

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WaPo: Oversight board finds many D.C. officers fail to properly use body cameras

WaPo: Oversight board finds many D.C. officers fail to properly use body cameras by Peter Hermann:

More than a third of cases investigated by a D.C. police oversight board after complaints were made about officers’ conduct this past year involved officers who did not properly use their body-worn cameras during those incidents, according to a report made public Tuesday.

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KS suppression statute permits pretext arguments; remanded

Kansas’s suppression statute permits the defense to make a challenge based on a race-based stop, if he can prove it. The trial court didn’t apply this test, and neither did the court of appeals, so remanded for reconsideration. State v. Gray, 2017 Kan. LEXIS 727 (Oct. 27, 2017):
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NPR: WNYC: Predicting Crime and Enforcing Law Through Big Data

NPR: WNYC: Predicting Crime and Enforcing Law Through Big Data:

Cutting-edge technology that uses big data is changing the face of law enforcement, and in ways many Americans don’t know about.

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D.S.D.: If bad driving alone wasn’t RS, his leaving a drug house and being known have prior drug arrests made it RS

Here, defendant allegedly drove left of center and he challenges that as the basis of the stop. The court doesn’t agree and goes one further, prior drug arrests and just leaving a drug house added to the driving was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Spaid, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178391 (D.S.D. Oct. 27, 2017):
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KS: That def’s relative owned a black Explorer and it had been parked at def’s house wasn’t RS to stop it

Stopping a car because a relative of the wanted defendant owned it and it had been seen at defendant’s house wasn’t reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Carr, 2017 Kan. App. LEXIS 78 (Oct. 27, 2017):
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OR: No REP in a camera and SD card left recording in a Starbucks bathroom

Defendant left a camera disguised as a cell phone charger in a Starbucks bathroom. It was found by a customer and turned over to the store manager. The manager believed it to be a camera, opened the back, and found an SD card, and called the police. A man came to claim it, and they said it had been turned over to the police. They found him in the security video, and he was also on the SD card placing the camera. Video of patrons going to the toilet were on the card. Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the camera left in the bathroom. It was effectively abandoned. State v. Ipsen, 288 Ore. App. 395, 2017 Ore. App. LEXIS 1285 (Oct. 25, 2017).

Defendant waived any Fourth Amendment claim by his guilty plea, and he significantly benefitted from the plea. Hoskin v. United States, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177752 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2017).*

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CA6: Facebook messenger SW was not overbroad because limited in time

Defendant’s guilty plea waived any suppression motion because there was no ruling to appeal. On the merits, the search warrant here was not overbroad. The Facebook search warrant sought only five months of information related to sex with minors. It was not constitutionally overbroad. United States v. Lowry, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21346 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2017) (no link yet):
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S.D.N.Y.: 21 month pole camera surveillance of def’s front door was reasonable

Pole camera surveillance of defendant’s house for 21 months didn’t violate Fourth Amendment. He had a subjective reasonable expectation privacy, but it’s not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The court traces Katz to Jardines, and concludes that this pole camera surveillance was reasonable. Even after this detailed explanation of the law of reasonable expectation of privacy, the court concludes that Davis and the good faith exception would foreclose relief anyway. United States v. Mazzara, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178575 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 27, 2017). This analysis is helpful to all as to how reasonableness should play out:
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NYLJ: Battle Over Emails Stored Overseas Reaches Supreme Court

NYLJ: Battle Over Emails Stored Overseas Reaches Supreme Court by Philip C. Patterson & Vera M. Kachnowski:

In their International Criminal Law and Enforcement column, Philip C. Patterson and Vera M. Kachnowski discuss a case which highlights a recurring tension between public safety and privacy concerns, and underscores the increasing complexity behind the technology we all rely on each day.

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CA6: Plf’s stipulation there was PC in his criminal case that led to dismissal was judicial estoppel to bringing a civil case on the same facts

Plaintiff’s stipulation there was probable cause in his criminal case that led to dismissal was judicial estoppel to bringing a civil case on the same facts. Grise v. Allen, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21358 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2017).

The affidavit for the search warrant here sufficiently alleged a violation of the mail fraud statute to support a search. Besides, the good faith exception would save it. United States v. Guthman, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176894 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 2017).*

Defendant’s weaving in his lane, nearly colliding with another, and failing to signal a turn all justified his stop. State v. Baffone, 2017 Del. Super. LEXIS 530 (Oct. 23, 2017).*

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CA5: Search of wrong house leads to liability: “An officer who makes no reasonable effort to correctly identify the place to be searched does not get immunity merely because someone else was leading the search.”

Sloppy police work leading to a search of the wrong house on a warrant leads to loss of qualified immunity: “An officer who makes no reasonable effort to correctly identify the place to be searched does not get immunity merely because someone else was leading the search.” They claimed qualified immunity that there was no constitutional requirement that only the right house be searched. If the facts were more hazy, maybe, but they’re not. He searched the wrong house without even asking which was the right one. The claim of exigency for searching the wrong house also fails on the facts. Gerhart v. McLendon, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21152 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2017):
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D.N.M.: Def doesn’t make a sufficient showing of some discriminatory effect to get further discovery of selective enforcement

Defendant doesn’t make a sufficient showing of some discriminatory effect to get further discovery of selective enforcement against African-Americans. United States v. Laneham, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176486 (D. N.M. Oct. 25, 2017):
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CA7 en banc: Conviction affirmed for gun seen while allegedly “parking while black”

Stopping a car 7′-8′ from crosswalk for illegal stopping was reasonable under the all the facts. It necessitated a brief stop to issue a ticket, and officers saw a gun. Whren doesn’t apply just to moving offenses and not fine-only offenses. The dissent calls this “parking while black,” while the majority says that the defense never raised a racial issue for the stop. United States v. Johnson, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21340 (7th Cir. Oct. 27, 2017) (en banc, 5-3):
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Just Security: Top Experts: Can Facebook Legally Disclose Russian Ads–What does the Stored Communications Act say?

Just Security: Top Experts: Can Facebook Legally Disclose Russian Ads–What does the Stored Communications Act say? by Ryan Goodman:
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