Chicago Reader: Groups fight huge expansion of police drone monitoring of protests by Freddy Martinez:
Civil liberties groups are pushing back against proposed legislation in Illinois that would allow police to dramatically expand the use of drones to monitor large gatherings of people and equip those drones with cameras with controversial facial recognition technology.
Reason.com: Volokh Conspiracy: Collins v. Virginia and “the Conception Defining the Curtilage” by Orin Kerr:
A familiar idea “easily understood from our daily experience” — or is it?
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Lawfare: Summary: Circuit Split on Device Searches at the Border in US v. Touset by Grayson Clary:
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Following the three factor test of Winston v. Lee, the search warrant for defendant’s rectum performed at a hospital by a doctor by anoscopy was reasonable. It was an affront to dignity, but it was a reasonable and safe procedure. United States v. Gray, 669 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2012), judgment vacated on other grounds by Gray v. United States, 568 U.S. 802, 133 S. Ct. 151 (2012) is distinguished because there less intrusive measures were available and not used. State v. Brown, 2018 Minn. App. LEXIS 266 (May 29, 2018):
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The power of curtilage: Collins v. Virginia, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3210 (May 29, 2018) (8-1, Alito dissenting):
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Defendants’ vehicle looked like one wanted in a recent bank robbery, and officers sped up to get closer, and the vehicle was speeding through a residential area. Aside from speeding, officers had reasonable suspicion they were involved in the bank robbery. The alert for the vehicle didn’t include an LPN, but that was required based on what they knew. “Although it is true that the ‘wanted’ in Smith contained a license plate number, nothing in that case indicates that a license plate number must invariably be included in an alert or bulletin before officers can justifiably rely on such an alert. In fact, the Eighth Circuit has found that officers had reasonable suspicion in cases where the bulletin or alert at issue contained a level of specificity similar to that contained in the Alert in this case.” United States v. Garmon, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87768 (D. Minn. May 25, 2018), adopting 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88623 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2018).
Driving 69 in a 70 mph zone in the middle lane of the Ohio Turnpike is not an offense, and the officer acted unreasonably in stopping defendants for that. A sign said slower vehicles use right two lanes, and defendants actually passed cars going 69. When the officer pulled behind them they slowed to 66. (The court also questions the officers seeing cannabis flakes on the floorboard since it’s not mentioned on the video.) The stop and the search of the car are suppressed. State v. Clark, 2018-Ohio-2029, 2018 Ohio App. LEXIS 2202 (6th Dist. May 25, 2018).
NYTimes: F.B.I.’s Urgent Request: Reboot Your Router to Stop Russia-Linked Malware By Louis Lucero II:
Hoping to thwart a sophisticated malware system linked to Russia that has infected hundreds of thousands of internet routers, the F.B.I. has made an urgent request to anybody with one of the devices: Turn it off, and then turn it back on.
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Merely saying that defendant “will offer evidence” to support his allegations at a Franks hearing isn’t an offer of proof. “Stating an intent to offer evidence in the future does not satisfy McMillan’s immediate burden to justify the need for a Franks hearing, however. See Gonzalez, 781 F.3d at 430. ‘A mere allegation standing alone, without an offer of proof … is insufficient to make the difficult preliminary showing’ for a Franks hearing. United States v. El-Alamin, 574 F.3d 915, 925 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).” As to where a Snapchat video was made, the officer said he believed it was made in defendant’s apartment, not that it was. It isn’t false. United States v. McMillan, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87765 (D. Minn. May 25, 2018).
Wiretaps provided reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was armed and driving around with it to “get someone.” United States v. Edwards, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84999 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2018).* As I’ve explained to clients before: “A wiretap is already based on probable cause. Then they get a lot more listening to you and your co-conspirators.”
Defendant was indicted for providing material support to a terrorist organization and planned to travel to Afghanistan, and there were nine search warrants. She communicated with Afghanistan on digital devices and by a gmail account. The search warrants for all of them all showed probable cause on a “four corners” review. She lacks standing to challenge a search warrant for YouTube to provide her search history and the videos she looked at for inspiration. United States v. Hassan, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87337 (D. Minn. May 8, 2018), adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86591 (D. Minn. May 23, 2018).
Another Playpen warrant sustained. United States v. Welch, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87735 (D. Neb. May 25, 2018).*
NYTimes: Can 30,000 Cameras Help Solve Chicago’s Crime Problem? By Timothy Williams
Armed with advanced gadgets and mapping, officers can get to crime scenes “in time to see the guy still shooting.” But what does it mean for residents’ privacy?
NPR: Newark Police Camera System Relies On Residents, Stirring Privacy Concerns by Karen Rouse:
Newark, New Jersey’s largest city, is taking the concept of a neighborhood watch to a whole new level. The city is installing hundreds of surveillance cameras to create a virtual block watch. Some residents are concerned about the technology’s implications for people’s privacy.
State law does not limit a law enforcement officer from applying for a search warrant outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction. [Neither does the Fourth Amendment, but it isn’t even cited.] State v. Stouffer, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 7274 (Fla. 4th DCA May 24, 2018). Other jurisdictions are in accord:
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The search here was in a remote area on the Crow Nation. First, officers had exigency because it was cold, raining, and getting dark, and evidence might be lost. Also, defendant was abandoned there by his assault victim, and he was subject to the elements. Second, the Fourth Amendment doesn’t even apply because this was all on open fields. Defendant claims a search warrant is required for any officer to enter a reservation, but no case law says that. United States v. Door, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87502 (D. Mont. May 24, 2018).*
Officers had plenty of probable cause for the place to be searched by detailed and corroborated information that drugs were kept there and a deal was going down there. Defendant objects to the use of the word “occupant” to describe him, but the general use of the word included him. His Franks challenge on that fails, too. United States v. Thompson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87462 (N.D. Ohio May 24, 2018).*
Officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective weapons search of the car defendant came out of a motel and got into. While watching the car, before defendant was there, officers saw a juvenile hiding a gun under the floor mat. When defendant got into the car and claimed it, the officers had reasonable suspicion for a search despite his being a new arrival at the scene. United States v. Cloud, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87531 (W.D. N.C. May 25, 2018). So: Does reasonable suspicion also apply to places, not just people, like probable cause does? This case essentially says so, but it seems a little uncertain attempting to tie the defendant to the car when he wasn’t there when the gun was hidden:
Additionally, it is true that, at the time Officer Jenkins first noticed someone in the car attempting to conceal a firearm, defendant was not present. However, as the stop and investigation progressed, defendant became involved by entering the car, and it quickly became apparent to the officers that defendant was the only adult involved at the scene. The reasonable and articulable suspicion was not simply because he happened to be associated with the juvenile; the reasonable and articulable suspicion was based on claiming ownership of the car where someone was attempting to hide a gun, by virtue of being the only adult who could possibly be old enough to legally possess the gun, and other factors like the time of day and location of the incident. This combination of factors suggests that, even if a seizure protected under the Fourth Amendment had occurred, the police had a sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to investigate potential criminal activity on the part of defendant. As such, the court sees no reason to suppress evidence found in this matter, and will deny defendant’s motion.
Failure to describe the CI as a “paid informant” doesn’t undermine his credibility. Every issuing magistrate should know that a CI has some motive for providing information, be it money or leniency. United States v. Mobley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86735 (S.D. Ga. May 23, 2018):
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There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop, and that included a protective weapons search for a firearm under Michigan v. Long, which produced one. United States v. Caraang, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81814 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2018).*
In the former Pennsylvania AG’s prosecution, a second search warrant produced additional facts which led to an amended charge against her. There objectively was more, and that meant she couldn’t prove selective prosecution. Essentially, she presented no facts at all supporting that claim (which the state courts already well recognize). Commonwealth v. Kane, 2018 PA Super 137, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 542 (May 25, 2018).*
In a border search case, defendant’s consent to produce his passwords doesn’t matter because the government has the authority to conduct a search of incoming electronic equipment. United States v. Vallerius, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85620 (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2018):
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Defense counsel deliberatedly didn’t make a claim officers violated curtilage in their initial entry to defendant’s property. The first search warrant application was rejected by one judge. The affidavit was redrafted with additional facts and presented to a second judge who granted it. The question of Strickland prejudice of whether it mattered to the outcome wasn’t resolved below, and the case is remanded for a finding on that. State v. Smith, 2018 Ariz. App. LEXIS 87 (May 24, 2018).*
“[W]e have repeatedly held that the smell of marijuana establishes probable cause to search a vehicle.” United States v. McKinley, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 13676 (6th Cir. May 24, 2018).*
This case started with a cell phone stolen from a customer in a grocery store. The police pinged the phone and it came back as being located at defendant’s house. Police went there to talk to defendant, and he had a story about kids having brought the phone there, and he told them to return it, which he said happened. The police went to the grocery store to find a few turned in phones, but the victim couldn’t ID one as his. Police went back to defendant who had a slightly different version. “Suspicious of Defendant’s answers, Officer electronically applied for, and received, a warrant to search Defendant’s residence for the phone and its SIM card. Officer served the warrant on Defendant and began the search” finding prescription drugs in bottles not prescribed for him. The officer applied for a second electronic warrant for that offense, and it was granted, and the officer searched this time for drugs, for which defendant was charged. The motion to suppress the second search warrant is denied. The fact the magistrate was quick in ruling on it is attributed to the fact he or she was familiar with the facts already. Also, the fact defendant had prescriptions not in the bottle is a question for trial and doesn’t undermine probable cause just because they could be his. State v. Roberts, 2018 Utah App. LEXIS 102 (May 25, 2018). Note 4:
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