Editorial: Police Videos Should Be Public Under OPRA

NJLJ: Editorial: Police Videos Should Be Public Under OPRA:

In Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, our Supreme Court has held in a 4-3 decision that police video recordings are exempt from disclosure under the Open Public Records Act. We believe that the dissent has the better of the argument, and we believe that the issue is of sufficient public importance that the Legislature should address it.

Posted in Body cameras | Comments Off on Editorial: Police Videos Should Be Public Under OPRA

NYLJ: Crime Fighting Cyber Surveillance Tools After ‘Carpenter’s’ Adjustment

NYLJ: Crime Fighting Cyber Surveillance Tools After ‘Carpenter’s’ Adjustment by Peter Crusco:

In his Cyber Crime column, Peter Crusco discusses ‘Carpenter v. United States,’ describing the case as ‘probably the most important Fourth Amendment case involving new crime fighting cyber surveillance technology to reach the high court in many years.’

Posted in Surveillance technology | Comments Off on NYLJ: Crime Fighting Cyber Surveillance Tools After ‘Carpenter’s’ Adjustment

CA7: Pre-Carpenter CSLI was valid in good faith reliance on SCA (Davis not cited)

Defendant’s pre-Carpenter CSLI gathering was challenged under the theory that the SCA statute was unconstitutional. It was done in good faith reliance on the statute under Krull v. Illinois, and there would be no exclusion. (Davis good faith is not mentioned.) United States v. Curtis, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24028 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2018).

The only evidence shows that the trash was out for collection at the curb, so the police did not invade the curtilage. United States v. Holmes, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144468 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 2, 2018).*

Posted in Cell site location information, Curtilage, Good faith exception | Comments Off on CA7: Pre-Carpenter CSLI was valid in good faith reliance on SCA (Davis not cited)

E.D.Va.: When the stop is based on RS of speeding, the unmarked car’s speedometer doesn’t have to be “calibrated”; when there are two bases for stop, attacking one isn’t good enough

Defendant argues that his stop wasn’t justified because the police officer paced him with the uncalibrated speedometer on his unmarked car. The question, though, is reasonable suspicion, and aside from speeding there was a window tinting violation. So, the stop was justified by either. United States v. Myers, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144214 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2018).

The search warrant for defendant’s airplane was on probable cause on the totality. “Here, the CHS’ statements were abundantly corroborated, and cross-corroborated, through the personal contacts between an FBI agent and Holland, Holland and Weverka, the Sheriff and Weverka, an FBI agent and Weverka, and the calls, many of which were recorded, between the CHS and Weverka and between the CHS and Holland. In addition, those statements explained the flight itinerary found when Parsons was arrested and Parsons’ motivation to apply for FAA certification to pilot an airplane.” Even if there was no probable cause there was certainly enough that the good faith exception applies. United States v. Parsons, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144591 (D. Neb. July 2, 2018).*

Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Off on E.D.Va.: When the stop is based on RS of speeding, the unmarked car’s speedometer doesn’t have to be “calibrated”; when there are two bases for stop, attacking one isn’t good enough

N.D.Cal.: The question for a stop is potential danger, not “significant danger”

The government didn’t have to show that defendant posed a potential significant danger to officers; just a possible danger based on objective observations and knowledge. It satisfied that here even though the offense (flashing a weapon) happened earlier in the day. The offense justifying the stop need not have been in the officer’s view. United States v. Vandergroen, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144664 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on N.D.Cal.: The question for a stop is potential danger, not “significant danger”

Just Security: Americans’ Privacy at Stake as Second Circuit Hears Hasbajrami FISA Case

Just Security: Americans’ Privacy at Stake as Second Circuit Hears Hasbajrami FISA Case by Elizabeth Goitein:
Continue reading →

Posted in FISA | Comments Off on Just Security: Americans’ Privacy at Stake as Second Circuit Hears Hasbajrami FISA Case

Gizmodo: Woman Sues Border Agents to Make Them Return Data They Seized From Her Phone

Gizmodo: Woman Sues Border Agents to Make Them Return Data They Seized From Her Phone by Melanie Ehrenkranz:
Continue reading →

Posted in Border search, Cell phones | Comments Off on Gizmodo: Woman Sues Border Agents to Make Them Return Data They Seized From Her Phone

WaPo: FBI surveillance devices may interfere with 911 calls, U.S. senator says

WaPo: FBI surveillance devices may interfere with 911 calls, U.S. senator says by Aaron Gregg:

In a letter to the Justice Department, Sen. Ron Wyden raised the concern that Stingray phone surveillance devices could “completely disrupt” cell services, citing conversations with the manufacturer.

Posted in Cell site simulators | Comments Off on WaPo: FBI surveillance devices may interfere with 911 calls, U.S. senator says

SF Chronicle: On the road to Burning Man, traffic stops and drug searches fuel backlash

SF Chronicle: On the road to Burning Man, traffic stops and drug searches fuel backlash by Peter Fimrite:
Continue reading →

Posted in Roadblocks | Comments Off on SF Chronicle: On the road to Burning Man, traffic stops and drug searches fuel backlash

NC: CI merely located defendant; officers already had PC, so no disclosure of CI’s identity

Officers merely used the CI to locate the defendant, not for the probable cause to search, so no reason to disclose the CI is shown. State v. Heard, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 828 (Aug. 24, 2018).

The dash cam video does not support the officer’s testimony that defendant’s car drove on the double yellow line, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Woods, 2018-Ohio-3352 (9th Dist. Aug. 22, 2018).*

Defendant argued he merely borrowed the car because the owner loaned it to many people, and the USMJ found he lacked standing. The USDJ agrees, but also there was probable cause for the search. United States v. Black, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143704 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2018).*

Posted in Informant hearsay, Reasonable suspicion, Standing | Comments Off on NC: CI merely located defendant; officers already had PC, so no disclosure of CI’s identity

E.D.Cal.: Inventory procedures not followed, and testimony suggested investigative motive, so suppressed

The inventory did not comply with CHP procedures, and it appears from the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing that it really had an investigatory purpose. United States v. Verduzo-Verduzco, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144696 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Inventory | Comments Off on E.D.Cal.: Inventory procedures not followed, and testimony suggested investigative motive, so suppressed

LA4: Actual apartment number not needed in SW when it is clearly described

The actual apartment number on the search warrant isn’t required when defendant’s apartment is clearly described. (“2819 Carondelet Street, New Orleans, La., described as the middle first floor apartment of a raised two story wood frame structure with grey stucco and white trim. The apartment has a shared stairway on the south side that leads to the first floor. The numbers 2819 in white are affixed to a window above the front door facing Carondelet Street.”) Before searching, officers knocked on the door, and defendant answered. State v. Klein, 2018 La. App. LEXIS 1636 (La. Cir. 4 Cir. Aug. 23, 2018). [How much more clearly could it have been described? Sometimes the apartment numbers given are wrong. See post four days ago.]

Defendant pled guilty to DWI and then challenged his conviction under Birchfield claiming it was retroactive. He’s allowed to do so under state law. Johnson v. State, 2018 Minn. LEXIS 492 (Aug. 22, 2018).*

Posted in Particularity | Comments Off on LA4: Actual apartment number not needed in SW when it is clearly described

S.D.Ga.: Payton‘s standard is “reason to believe” under a common sense approach and not PC

The Payton standard for determining whether a person is home for execution of an arrest warrant is “reason to believe” under a common sense approach and not a more demanding probable cause requirement. In addition, defendant’s actions showed he abandoned his electronic devices when he fled from the police. United States v. Dennino, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142001 (S.D. Ga. July 31, 2018), adopted, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141900 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Abandonment, Arrest or entry on arrest | Comments Off on S.D.Ga.: Payton‘s standard is “reason to believe” under a common sense approach and not PC

LA2: No IAC for not challenging search of house two months after murder

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to suppress a search of defendant’s home two months after a murder because it wasn’t meritorious [and the court never says why it wasn’t].
State v. Critton, 2018 La. App. LEXIS 1618 (La. App. 2 Cir. Aug. 22, 2018):
Continue reading →

Posted in Ineffective assistance, Staleness | Comments Off on LA2: No IAC for not challenging search of house two months after murder

CA11: Apparent consent for 5:30 am entry defeats “egregious” 4A violation for exclusion in immigration removal

Petitioner’s declaration did not make a prima facie case of an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment to preclude evidence in his removal proceeding. The entry was at 5:30 am, but there was also evidence of consent to the entry. That alone defeats the claim. Batres-Garay v. U.S. Attorney General, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 23754 (11th Cir. Aug. 23, 2018).

Civil forfeiture default was set aside. “The trial court erred as a matter of law because it focused only on what the money was to be used for and not whether there was probable cause to trace the money to any drug offense, and because it failed to give the requisite deference to Philogene’s proffered defense that, in effect, the cash had a legitimate source.” State v. Philogene, 2018 ME 126, 2018 Me. LEXIS 129 (Aug. 23, 2018).*

Posted in Exclusionary rule, Forfeiture, Immigration arrests | Comments Off on CA11: Apparent consent for 5:30 am entry defeats “egregious” 4A violation for exclusion in immigration removal

CA7: Considering that SWs are entitled to deference, the strong inference here doesn’t have to be proved

In a child pornography starting as a fake child enticement case: “Scott assumes that on appeal we will make an independent (de novo) assessment of probable cause, ignoring the state judge’s finding. We will not. The decision of the judge who issued the warrant receives ‘great deference’. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); United States v. McIntire, 516 F.3d 576, 577-79 (7th Cir. 2008). With the benefit of ‘great deference,’ this warrant is valid.” Is there a positive link between pedophila and possession of child pornography? Not positive, but it’s a reasonable inference. United States v. Scott, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 24027 (7th Cir. Aug. 24, 2018).
Continue reading →

Posted in Probable cause, Standards of review | Comments Off on CA7: Considering that SWs are entitled to deference, the strong inference here doesn’t have to be proved

WaPo: New facial recognition system nabs imposter at Dulles International Airport

WaPo: New facial recognition system nabs imposter at Dulles International Airport by Lori Aratani:

Officials said a 26-year-old man arriving at Dulles International Airport on Wednesday presented a French passport to a U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer. Using the new facial comparison biometric system, the officer determined the man did not match the image on the passport. The man was then referred to secondary screening where CBP officials said he became “visibly nervous.” The man was searched, and officers found his identification card from the Republic of Congo hidden in his shoe.

Posted in Surveillance technology | Comments Off on WaPo: New facial recognition system nabs imposter at Dulles International Airport

Law360: Airbnb Suit Challenges New NYC Rental Data Collection Law

Law360: Airbnb Suit Challenges New NYC Rental Data Collection Law by Pete Brush

Airbnb Inc. sued New York City on Friday claiming a new law requiring online rental companies to share data about their clientele violates the U.S. Constitution, but the city said it would work to get the Manhattan federal court complaint tossed to protect its effort to maintain affordable housing and secure neighborhoods.

Posted in Surveillance technology, Third Party Doctrine | Comments Off on Law360: Airbnb Suit Challenges New NYC Rental Data Collection Law

MA: Stop with guns drawn without RS unreasonable

A stop with guns drawn without reasonable suspicion was unreasonable. Summary by the court: “A Superior Court judge erred in denying the criminal defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress a firearm seized by police after a lawful stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger, where, in the circumstances, the conduct of the police (i.e., the use of multiple vehicles and officers to box in the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, and the approach of at least two officers with guns drawn) was disproportionate to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion and constituted an arrest without probable cause, given that the police had no particular information that the defendant, who had a prior nonspecific “involvement” in firearms, possessed a firearm at the time of the stop; the police had no information about any history of violent conduct on the part of the defendant; and, at the time of the show of force, the police had not observed any furtive conduct by the defendant or his companions.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 792, 2018 Mass. App. LEXIS 114 (Aug. 22, 2018).

Posted in Reasonable suspicion | Comments Off on MA: Stop with guns drawn without RS unreasonable

D.Colo.: There is no requirement the SW particularly describe the inside of the place to be searched

The CI was corroborated by controlled buys and surveillance cameras showing drug deals outside defendant’s home. The house was sufficiently described that the wrong house wouldn’t be searched. “Ms. Pereda nonetheless argues the search warrant lacked particularity because it did not specify the layout of her home’s interior or mention specific locations within the home where illegal substances could be found. The Court finds this argument to be wholly without merit.” United States v. Pereda, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142683 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2018). [How can the interior be described? Unless the CI provided it, and that’s corroboration the CI was only inside.]

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress. There clearly was probable cause for the search warrant. Crisp v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142141 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2018).*

Posted in Ineffective assistance, Particularity | Comments Off on D.Colo.: There is no requirement the SW particularly describe the inside of the place to be searched