N.D.Ill.: Chicago Sun-Times gets access to SW affidavit briefly accidently unsealed on PACER under common law right of access to judicial records

The Chicago Sun-Times got access on PACER to a search warrant affidavit that was filed and briefly not sealed. They opened and copied it before it was sealed. Now they seek access to the file. The court finds that the government’s interest in sealing the affidavit, which is not infinite anyway, is outweighed by the common law right of access to materials that would ultimately have to be unsealed anyway. United States v. Suppressed, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36565 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2019):
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FL2: State raises standing for first time on appeal; remanded so issue can be developed

The trial court suppressed on a violation of the curtilage, and the state raises standing for the first time on appeal. The court lets it do so, but remands for another suppression hearing to develop the facts. State v. Pettis, 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 3455 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 6, 2019). [Note: I was the victim of this in my own state* even though Steagald doesn’t allow it in federal cases where the government acquiesced in standing (calling it defendant’s property).** Thus, in some states, the state gets to sandbag the defense, hide behind the log on standing, and then raise it on appeal without there being a record developed on standing, and then lack of record is used against the defense. This is a manifest due process issue. While Florida recognizes the ability of the state to raise standing for the first time on appeal, it sends the case back for another suppression hearing. That at least is due process.]
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* Regular readers have heard that complaint before. And I practice in a state where procedural default in criminal cases only seems to be applied to defendants. If it were a civil case, they would hold the state defaulted the issue by not getting a ruling below.
** Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981) (“We conclude, however, that the Government, through its assertions, concessions, and acquiescence, has lost its right to challenge petitioner’s assertion that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched home. We therefore turn to the merits of petitioner’s claim.”).

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FL1: Entry into def’s backyard for “strong chemical smell” was without showing exigency and suppressed

Police entered defendant’s backyard based on a call about a strong chemical smell. He was grinding glass with a heavy tool. They saw two women and another man visible inside the shed. They ordered him out and then got defendant to sign a consent form. The consent was invalid because the police unlawfully entered the curtilage without exigency. Bryant v. State, 2019 Fla. App. LEXIS 3570 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 7, 2019).

The totality of the information showed probable cause for issuance of the search warrant without regard to the challenged show up of defendant. United States v. Hicks, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34432 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 5, 2019).*

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MA applies “foregone conclusion” test to determine def could be compelled to provide password for cell phone

Massachusetts applies the “foregone conclusion” test to whether forcing defendant to enter the password on his cell phone to search it violates the Fifth Amendment. The court concludes that defendant’s possession of the phone and admission it was his and it was used in offense satisfies the standard. Commonwealth v. Jones, 481 Mass. 540 (Mar. 6, 2019)
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IL: State did not satisfy foregone conclusion test to get cell phone password

The state did not satisfy the foregone conclusion test to get access to defendant’s password on his cell phone. People v. Spicer, 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 129, 2019 Ill. App. LEXIS 129 (Mar. 7, 2019):
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E.D.Mich.: Not IAC to not have challenged CSLI in 2014

It wasn’t ineffective assistance for defense counsel to not have filed a motion to suppress 2014 CSLI. United States v. Littles, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34359 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2019).*

In this 2255, defense counsel was not shown to be ineffective in not filing a motion to suppress when there was no showing at all that it would have been successful, and the court can’t see that it would be either. United States v. Cruz, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35969 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2019).*

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OH8: Stop for flashing high beams was mistake of law and objectively reasonable under Heien

The state concedes that one flashing his high beams for one second twice 14 seconds apart at a vehicle in front of him for not moving is not a violation of the statute for unnecessarily driving on high beams. Nevertheless, it was an objectively reasonable mistake under Heien, and the stop would not be suppressed. State v. Spellacy, 2019-Ohio-785, 2019 Ohio App. LEXIS 837 (8th Dist. Mar. 7, 2019).*

There was “considerable detail” in the application for the search warrant here that shows a substantial basis for probable cause. So much so, in fact, that the court puts a .pdf image of a good part of it in the opinion. United States v. Lough, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34654 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019).*

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D.V.I.: “Premises” includes the curtilage

The premises for a search warrant includes the curtilage, and drugs found hidden outside the house on the curtilage just a few feet from the house were properly seized. United States v. Dowling, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34956 (D. V.I. Mar. 5, 2019).

Financial records seized by a grand jury subpoena are not subject to suppression under Carpenter.
United States v. Moiseev, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34949 (D. Mass. Mar. 5, 2019).*

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D.Ore.: Seizing house title records from house officers already had copies of wasn’t overbroad; it shows control

The search warrant was not overbroad because officers seized title records on the property that they already apparently had copies of. It shows control. United States v. Cramer, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34959 (D. Ore. Mar. 5, 2019).

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in outgoing calls from a prison; United States v. Cox, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 6760 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2019);* or in pretrial detention. People v. Utley, 2019 NY Slip Op 01624, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1565 (2d Dept. Mar. 6, 2019).*

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D.Mont.: Federal telephonic SW not subject to suppression without bad faith

The stop, as told to defendant, was for a traffic violation, but there was reasonable suspicion for drug trafficking considering all that the officers knew. Therefore, using a drug dog was reasonable because a drug investigation was legally supported. Use of a telephonic warrant was not subject to suppression. United States v. Diskin, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34973 (D. Mont. Mar. 5, 2019):
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N.D.N.Y.: Even if def accused drug dealer’s alleged cover business was omitted from affidavit, there still was PC

The officers lack of complete detail to fully explain defendant’s version that he might have had a lawful explanation for what he was doing doesn’t rise to the high bar of a Franks violation. In addition, it’s not uncommon for drug suspects to have a legitimate cover business at the same time. One doesn’t easily get a Franks hearing. Here, even if what defendant claims was omitted was included, there still would be probable cause. United States v. Peralta, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33381 (N.D. N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019).* With considering:
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CA9: CSLI warrant was issued without PC, but it wasn’t so lacking that GFE should not apply

The government’s pre-Carpenter search warrant for CSLI was issued without probable cause, but it wasn’t so deficient that the good faith exception should not apply. United States v. Elmore, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 6507 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2019):
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W.D.Mo.: Def had standing in a truck he was loaned

Defendant has standing in his daughter’s truck because he showed that she let him use it. The officer’s mistake of law concerning the expiration date of the vehicle’s license was reasonable.
“Month of expiration” under Missouri law isn’t obvious. United States v. Forjan, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33737 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2019).

Defendant listed numerous alleged Franks issues which are rejected as immaterial, conclusory, or merely negligent. United States v. McKnight, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33614 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2019).*

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S.D.N.Y.: Def had standing in his own work computer but not the company server

Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his own work computer, but not on what was on the company server. Because the crimes under investigation were listed in the search warrant, the warrant wasn’t general. United States v. Mendlowitz, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33664 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019):
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TX9: Def abandoned trailer he was living in along with all its contents

Defendant and his family were living in a trailer they abandoned. After a broken water line inside, the trailer and contents were damaged, and they moved out, apparently never to return. When the owner found the trailer, there was mold inside. He called defendant who said he was “working on” coming to get his stuff but never did. The owner cleaned it out, found defendant’s laptop and took it. He turned it on and found child pornography and turned it over to the police. The trial court did not err in finding it abandoned. Defendant demonstrated no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trailer or the computer. Akins v. State, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1704 (Tex. App. – Beaumont Mar. 6, 2019).

CI’s two controlled buys close in time to issuance of the search warrant was probable cause. People v. Syphrett, 2019 NY Slip Op 01536, 2019 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1500 (1st Dept. Mar. 5, 2019).*

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Washington Examiner: The NSA stopped collecting bulk phone data, and nothing bad happened

Washington Examiner: The NSA stopped collecting bulk phone data, and nothing bad happened by Dan King:
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Law.com: What’s Next: Thinking About Privacy Post-Carpenter + Getting Ahead of Drone Law

Law.com: What’s Next: Thinking About Privacy Post-Carpenter + Getting Ahead of Drone Law by ALM Staff:

We caught up with USC law professor Orin Kerr to talk about the pressures that digital technology places on the Fourth Amendment and where things go next.

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S.D.N.Y.: Use of military weaponry (flash bang) in a residential neighborhood is LEO discretion under FTCA

The choice of law enforcement officers to use flash bang devices in a residential neighborhood at 4 a.m. is discretionary with the police and not unreasonable as a matter of law: “weighing of such risks against the necessity of using such weaponry is a choice that is firmly within the province of governmental decision-makers. It is the precise type of choice that is protected by the discretionary function exception (the “DFE”) to the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Oliveras v. United States, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33806 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 4, 2019).

Defendant’s individual actions may not show probable cause, but his collective actions showed probable cause he was stalking a child. State v. Conklin, 2019 La. App. LEXIS 377 (La. App. 1 Cir. Feb. 28, 2019).*

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GA: Lifetime GPS monitoring of SVPs after parole and the SO registry unreasonable under 4A

Lifetime GPS monitoring of a sexually violent predator was a Fourth Amendment violation that does not satisfy the special needs doctrine and is unreasonable. Despite the diminished expectation of privacy of a person on post-conviction supervision, this is just too intrusive. Moreover, GPS monitoring isn’t even part of probation or parole of a sex offender. Park v. State, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 138 (Mar. 4, 2019):
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MO: “All data” SW for cell phone was particular where crimes under investigation also listed in SW

No Missouri case deals with the question of particularity in a cell phone search. One group finds “all data” warrants not particular. Others hold such warrants valid if the crime under investigation is also mentioned. Here it was mentioned to be drug delivery and rape, so the court follows those cases and holds the warrant particular enough. Because the cell phone was in the possession of the police for the eight months before the search warrant was sought, it was not stale. [But what about unreasonableness in general? That’s a significant issue, too.] Defendant’s voluntarily entering his password into the phone to open it for his expert in the presence of law enforcement makes the “foregone conclusion” doctrine apply, and he can’t plead the Fifth Amendment to compulsion of the password. State v. Johnson, 2019 Mo. App. LEXIS 297 (Mar. 5, 2019):
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