WaPo: Editorial: Putting cameras on police officers is an idea whose time has come:
Having successfully deployed cameras in patrol cars, a number of police departments, including the District’s, are now studying whether body-mounted minicams–attached to an officer’s lapel, for instance–could reduce officer (or civilian) misconduct, among a range of benefits. With sound safeguards, it’s a smart idea.
“We first analyze each of the factors: (1) Officer Devos’s previous encounter with Mr. Garcia [where he ran and aggressively confronted the officer two weeks earlier], (2) Mr. Garcia’s criminal history [which included a prior armed robbery], (3) Officer Devos’s working conditions [where he stopped defendant working alone and had to turn his back on defendant during an inventory [N.B.: which itself suggests the inventory was pretext because of timing]], and (4) other, less significant factors. We then present a totality of the circumstances analysis.” On the totality, the frisk was reasonable. United States v. Garcia, 751 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2014).*
Defendant’s stop was lawfully extended because of reasonable suspicion. He had a prison-type shank on him, and he was continually the subject of drug investigations, which other officers knew about and told the stopping officer. United States v. Brown, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8856 (5th Cir. May 12, 2014).*
Plaintiff was subject to an erroneous felony stop because of a hit by an Automatic License Plate Reader. Summary judgment of her § 1983 claim on qualified immunity for false arrest and excessive force was reversed, and the case sent back for further development and likely trial. Green v. City & County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2014). Summary by the court:
Plaintiff’s lawsuit arose out of a vehicular stop by San Francisco Police officers after the police department’s Automatic License Plate Reader mistakenly identified plaintiff’s Lexus as a stolen vehicle. Without visually confirming the license plate, a police officer made a “high-risk” stop during which plaintiff was held at gunpoint by multiple officers, handcuffed, forced to her knees, and detained for up to twenty minutes before the mistake was discovered and she was released.
The panel held that there were triable questions as to whether: (1) law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion to justify plaintiff’s initial detention, (2) plaintiff’s detention amounted to an arrest without probable cause, and (3) police officers used excessive force in effecting the detention. The panel further held that viewing the facts in plaintiff’s favor, it could not make a determination as a matter of law that the officer who made the initial stop was entitled to qualified immunity. Because questions of fact remained regarding defendants’ conduct, the panel also reversed the district court’s summary judgment as to the municipal liability and state law claims and affirmed the district court’s denial of partial summary judgment as to plaintiff.
Star Tribune: Marine Corps appoints independent attorney to review seized evidence from raid on law offices by Julie Watson:
Military criminal investigators raided Marine Corps defense counsel offices at Camp Pendleton, opening files during a 2½-hour search and potentially compromising scores of cases, the attorney who oversees Marine defense lawyers in the region said Friday.
WaPo: Meet Howard Bowe and Detective Charles Dinwiddie, your latest casualties in the war on drugs by Radley Balko:
“The way these people were treated has to be judged in the context of a war.”
— Former Hallandale Beach, Florida, attorney Richard Kane, after police officers raided the home of Edwin and Catherine Bernhardt. Police broke into the couple’s home and immediately threw Catherine Bernhardt to the floor at gunpoint. Edwin Bernhardt, who had come down from his bedroom in the nude, was also thrown to the floor and cuffed at gunpoint. Police forced him to wear a pair of his wife’s underwear then took him to the police station, where he spent several hours in jail. Police later discovered they had raided the wrong address.
In Woolen v. State, 2014 Ala. LEXIS 70 (May 9, 2014), Chief Justice Roy Moore dissented from denial of certiorari on a roadblock case (opinion below) that basic standards weren’t complied with:
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Policing Facts, Seth W. Stoughton, 88 Tul. L. Rev. 847 (2014). Abstract:
The Supreme Court’s understanding of police practices plays a significant role in the development of the constitutional rules that regulate officer conduct. As it approaches the questions of whether to engage in constitutional regulation and what form of regulation to adopt, the Court discusses the environment in which officers act, describes specific police practices, and explains on what motivates officers. Yet the majority of the Court’s factual assertions are made entirely without support or citation, raising concerns about whether the Court is acting based on a complete and accurate perception. When it comes to policing facts, the Court too often gets it wrong.
This Article explores the influence that the Court’s conception of policing has on the creation and modification of constitutional norms. It demonstrates that misunderstandings about law enforcement have led to constitutional rules that fail to align with the world that they were designed to regulate. Confusion about the facts upon which a rule is built creates a gap between the conceptual justification of the rule and its practical consequences, between the effect that the rule was intended to have and the effect it actually has. Thus, misalignment results in the under- or over-regulation of officer behavior and, correspondingly, the under- and over-protection of liberty and privacy interests. This observation offers one explanation for why the Court’s constitutional pronouncements often fail to have the anticipated result. Having identified the effects that follow from a faulty factual premise, I explore ways to narrow the gap. When constitutional rules are predicated on empirical information, a more accurate understanding of police practices will better align those rules with reality, leading to both more precise constitutional rule-making and more efficacious liberty protections.
[Law review articles are reviewed by Prof. Andrew G. Ferguson, UDC School of Law.]
Police received a call about a cash register till tapping theft or robbery, and defendant was identified as a suspect. He fled into an apartment building, and he was pursued. Police believed he broke into an apartment in flight. The entry was justified by [classic] hot pursuit under Warden v. Hayden. People v. Henry, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 826 (May 8, 2014).
Defendant argued the search of the car wasn’t justified under plain view. Instead, the court finds it justified under the automobile exception. State v. Chaffins, 2014-Ohio-1969, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1906 (4th Dist. May 7, 2014).*
Defendant was lawfully arrested, so his consent to taking DNA was otherwise valid. State v. Newton, 2014-Ohio-1958, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1902 (10th Dist. May 8, 2014).*
NYT: The Polarized Court by Adam Liptak:
WASHINGTON — WHEN the Supreme Court issued its latest campaign finance decision last month, the justices lined up in a familiar way. The five appointed by Republican presidents voted for the Republican National Committee, which was a plaintiff. The four appointed by Democrats dissented.
That 5-to-4 split along partisan lines was by contemporary standards unremarkable. But by historical standards it was extraordinary. For the first time, the Supreme Court is closely divided along party lines.
A police entry to seize a person and her guns 9 hours after a doctor’s call she was a danger to herself or others was kind of “exigent,” but nevertheless treated as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Still, qualified immunity and good faith protects the officers. The doctrines are explained in this case. Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014) (concur):
Krysta Sutterfield sued the City of Milwaukee and several of its police officers after the officers forcibly entered her home to effectuate an emergency detention for purposes of a mental health evaluation, opened a locked container, and seized for safekeeping the gun and concealed-carry licenses they found inside. She contends that officers violated her rights under the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments in doing so. We conclude that the warrantless entry into Sutterfield’s home was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as the defendant officers had a reasonable basis to believe that Sutterfield posed an imminent danger of harm to herself. We shall assume, as the district court did, that the search of a closed container for a gun, and the ensuing seizure of that gun, violated Sutterfield’s Fourth Amendment rights. But we agree with the district court that even if the officers did exceed constitutional boundaries, they are protected by qualified immunity. See Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 870 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Wis. 2012). We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Continue reading
On the totality of circumstances, the officer had probable cause to believe defendant was under the influence, and that can overcome the driver passing an FST. State v. Hunter, 2014 Ida. App. LEXIS 51 (May 6, 2014).
An officer doesn’t need cause to order a person to get out of a car, so reasonable suspicion of DUI wasn’t required first. Observations of defendant getting out can be used to determine reasonable suspicion. State v. Koczwara, 2014-Ohio-1946, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1885 (7th Dist. May 1, 2014).*
There was probable cause shown in the affidavit for search warrant for armed robbery. State v. Watson, 2014 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 437 (May 8, 2014).*
Officers created their own exigency by sticking a foot in a motel room door, but the court finds the independent source doctrine saves the search because they already had enough information in the submission for the search warrant independent of that. State v. Kuruc, 2014 ND 95, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 97 (May 8, 2014):
[¶14] Here, the exigency of destruction of evidence was created by the officer’s actions in entering the constitutionally protected space. Although Larson and Kuruc had a 1:00 p.m. checkout time, there is nothing in the record to indicate law enforcement could not have secured a warrant prior to that time. Officers were aware of the specific room Larson and Kuruc were staying in and could have had the room under surveillance to assure the suspects did not leave. The record also suggests Larson and Kuruc did not know of the officers’ presence. The facts [*9] simply do not reflect a situation involving the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of the evidence until after police entered the room.
[¶15] Thus, as a preliminary matter, we conclude the officer did enter a constitutionally protected space when she stepped into the hotel room without a search warrant and without exigent circumstances. The district court did not err in finding that, because there were no exigent circumstances, the entry into the room was unreasonable. We next turn our analysis to determine whether the court erred when it applied the independent-source doctrine.
Taking and retaining defendant’s DL without reasonable suspicion then running his name for warrants was suppressed. State v. Westover, 2014-Ohio-1959, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1898 (10th Dist. May 8, 2014):
[*P28] We find the running of a warrants check to be the critical distinction between Jones and McDowell. As noted above, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when an officer approaches an individual, asks them general questions, and asks to see their identification. An officer in receipt of an individual’s identification may accordingly jot down the information presented on the identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment. However, when an officer takes the further action of retaining an individual’s identification to run a warrants check, the officer has implicitly commanded the individual to remain on the scene, as no reasonable person would abandon their identification, and has demonstrated that they suspect that criminal activity is afoot. An officer must have some reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before they may detain someone in this manner to run a warrants check. Compare State v. Owens, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-423, 2004-Ohio-5159, ¶ 23 (noting that, because the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer “was without legal authority to demand appellant’s driver’s license in order to run the LEADS check”).
The time of the warrant of 10:31 pm was clearly a scrivener’s error because it was issued at 9:31 pm. Therefore, the search warrant did not issue after the search began, and the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Leflore, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63805 (M.D. Ala. April 21, 2014).
The facts were in dispute, but the court concludes that the search here did not take place until after the search warrant issued. There was also probable cause. United States v. Embry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63292 (D. Mont. May 7, 2014).*
Officers had reasonable suspicion for stopping defendant at 4:30 in the morning for casing parking lots for cars to break into because of his cruising and acting guilty when seeing them. When questioning began, defendant had no answers to questions created by his own statements, and then he fled. An abandoned gun was linked to him. United States v. Stacks, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8666 (4th Cir. May 8, 2014).*
WaPo: Morning Links: DEA launches nationwide synthetic drug sweep by Radley Balko:
● I’ve often seen my reporting co-opted by other publications without credit.* So I try to acknowledge the reporters who originally broke stories that later make national news. So kudos to Denis C. Theriault at the Portland Mercury, who broke the story about the arrest of a 9-year-old that I posted about yesterday.
● The Drug Enforcement Administration makes a nationwide sweep of busts for synthetic drugs.
● In a lawsuit, the family of an Alabama teen alleges that Huntsville police set him up for a drug buy, then held him down and shoved a sharp object into his throat, allegedly to find a package of drugs they thought he had swallowed. He died. According to the lawsuit, the coroner has refused to give the family a copy of the autopsy report.
. . .
In a business records search, the question is probable cause to believe evidence will be found, and it isn’t necessary for the search warrant affidavit to implicate a possible target of the search to be valid. United States v. Suarez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63684 (N.D. Idaho May 8, 2014).
The search warrant issue is summarily affirmed, apparently attacked on the ground it lacked probable cause. State v. Manning, 2014 S.C. App. LEXIS 95 (May 7, 2014).*
Here, there was a lot of evidence besides a dog sniff on half a million in cash to support a money laundering conviction. Acosta v. State, 2014 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 687 (May 7, 2014).*
PC World: Department of Justice wants expanded permission to hack and search remote computers by Grant Gross:
The U.S. Department of Justice wants new authority to hack and search remote computers during investigations, saying the new rules are needed because of complex criminal schemes sometimes using millions of machines spread across the country.
Digital rights groups say the request from the DOJ for authority to search computers outside the district where an investigation is based raises concerns about Internet security and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
SFGate: Magistrate waxes poetic while rejecting Gmail search request by Henry K. Lee
SAN JOSE — A federal magistrate on Friday rejected a bid by prosecutors to search an unidentified target’s Google e-mail account, criticizing the “seize first, search second” request as overbroad and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
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BLT: Court: Privacy Outweighs Public Interest in Dispute Over Cell Tracking Records by Zoe Tillman:
The public doesn’t have a right to information on criminal cases involving warrantless cell phone tracking if the defendant was acquitted or had their case dismissed, a federal appeals court in Washington ruled Friday.
A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the defendants’ privacy rights outweighed the public’s interest in understanding the scope of warrantless cell phone tracking by the government.
ACLU v. DOJ, 13-5064 (D.C.Cir. May 9, 2014):
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This was a stop by Texas Tech PD, and defendant’s DL was suspended. Other things indicated drugs or drug usage. Nevertheless, the inventory of the vehicle was conducted in compliance with the department’s inventory policy and it wasn’t shown to be pretextual. Uballe v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 4874 (Tex.App.–Amarillo May 6, 2014).*
Where the inventory policy was shown to be overbroad [apparently a unique Oregon issue], an inventory under it is suppressed. The state’s alternative arguments were not developed below, so they can’t be addressed on appeal for the “right ruling, wrong reason” rule. State v. Cherry, 262 Or. App. ___, 2014 Ore. App. LEXIS 627 (May 7, 2014).*
