D.Conn.: In a stop, hesitation then flight is still no submission to authority

When the police tried to stop defendant, he hesitated and then ran, leaving a duffle bag with a gun inside. He argued he was unconstitutionally stopped. No. “In order ‘to comply with an order to stop—and thus to become seized—a suspect must do more than halt temporarily; he must submit to police authority, for “there is no seizure without actual submission.”’ United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007)); see also United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 359 (3d Cir. 2000) (‘Even if Valentine paused for a few moments and gave his name, he did not submit in any realistic sense to the officers’ show of authority, and therefore there was no seizure until Officer Woodard grabbed him.’); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (‘[The defendant] initially stopped, but he drove off quickly before Officer Hemphill even reached the car. Because [the defendant] did not submit to Hemphill’s order, he was not seized.’); United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘Hernandez requests we find he submitted to authority and was seized, despite his subsequent flight, merely because he hesitated for a moment and made direct eye contact with Sadar. We decline to hold these actions sufficient to constitute submission to authority.’).” United States v. Huertas, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43406 (D.Conn. April 1, 2015).

Defendant raised enough to get a hearing on his motion to suppress because the consent form is confusing and it’s undisputed that his mother was highly distraught when she signed the consent form. The hearing is postponed pending defendant’s mental exam. United States v. Bishop, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44096 (S.D.Ala. April 3, 2015).*

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E.D.Wash.: SW for taking blood presumes that it will be tested, too, and the warrant doesn’t need to specify

A warrant for taking blood presumes that it will be tested, too, and the warrant doesn’t need to specify. A Washington state case saying otherwise is not followed. In any event, it would be in good faith to have tested it. United States v. Williams, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42342 (E.D.Wash. March 31, 2015).

Plaintiff’s 1983 false arrest case defense summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. There was probable cause for the stop and arrest as to some things but not others. The state malicious prosecution claim can proceed. Benavidez v. Cibola County, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 40 (March 31, 2015).*

Defendant’s motion to suppress the search for child pornography was unparticularized and denied by the USMJ and that’s adopted. United States v. Peterson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44253 (D.Minn. April 2, 2015),* R&R 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44366 (D.Minn. January 14, 2015).*

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TX1: Heien ‘reasonable mistake of law’ rejected because Texas doesn’t follow GFE

Defendant was followed to a stop with a flat tire. The officer noticed signs of intoxication, and defendant ended up arrested for DWI. The warrantless blood draw couldn’t be based on two prior DWIs as exigency. Moreover, “Accordingly, we decline to apply the ‘reasonable mistake of law’ reasoning from Heien to create a new exception inconsistent with the text of article 38.23. Because the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw here violated Tercero’s Fourth Amendment rights, we conclude that the trial court did not err in suppressing the blood evidence.” State v. Tercero, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3284 (Tex.App. – Houston (1st Dist.) April 2, 2015).

In a swerving stop, defendant consented to the search of his car producing cocaine. United States v. Davis, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5376 (8th Cir. April 3, 2015).*

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WaPo: Holder announces new limits on civil asset forfeitures

WaPo: Holder announces new limits on civil asset forfeitures by Robert O’Harrow Jr.:

Attorney General Eric H. Holder announced new curbs Tuesday on the government’s use of civil asset forfeiture laws, saying that federal authorities will only seize bank accounts when serious illegal transactions have been documented.

The new policy amplifies an announcement in October by the Internal Revenue Service, which said its agents would use seizure authorities primarily in cases when accounts owners are clearly using the banking system for crimes.

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Police Technical: Snapchat: Investigating the ‘Self-Destructing’ App [free white paper]

Police Technical: Snapchat: Investigating the ‘Self-Destructing’ App [free white paper] by Aaron Edens:

Snapchat users think their photos are gone, but they’re not.

Snapchat, a popular mobile application, allows users to exchange “self-destructing” messages, pictures, or videos, making investigations involving the program difficult. This whitepaper provides an overview on the application along with search warrant language and techniques to use during investigations.

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The Hill: Advancing cyber bills spark fresh NSA worries

The Hill: Advancing cyber bills spark fresh NSA worries by Cory Bennett:

A bipartisan plan to merge elements of competing legislation has privacy advocates worried.

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WaPo: DHS revives quest for license-plate access

WaPo: DHS revives quest for license-plate access by Ellen Nakashima:

The Department of Homeland Security is seeking bids from companies able to provide law enforcement officials with access to a national license-plate tracking system – a year after canceling a similar solicitation over privacy issues.

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TX1: Comment on refusal to consent here wasn’t prejudicial

The prosecutor commented on defendant’s refusal to consent and defense counsel didn’t object. On this record, there was plenty of evidence of defendant’s knowledge of the drugs such that the error, if it was, was prejudicial to him. Jones v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3139 (Tex.App. – Houston (1st Dist.) March 31, 2015).

The court credits that defendant consented to the police entry but they retreated when his pit bull appeared after the dog was put away, then they reentered. Any constitutional violation was minimally flagrant. United States v. Wortham, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42929 (E.D. Wis. February 6, 2015), prior op. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183249 (E.D. Wis. December 5, 2014).*

Defendant’s car was parked partly on the street with somebody behind the wheel at 2:45 am, so the officer decided to conduct a welfare check and the use of emergency lights didn’t make it an arrest. State v. McCormick, 2015 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 238 (April 2, 2015).*

Posted in Community caretaking function, Consent, Ineffective assistance | Comments Off on TX1: Comment on refusal to consent here wasn’t prejudicial

CA10: For pre-Jones GPS good faith to apply, Knotts and Karo are enough

In a pre-Jones GPS case, even though there was no authority from this circuit, two SCOTUS cases seemingly authorized warrantless GPS: Knotts (1983) and Karo (1984). Thus, the Davis good faith exception would be applied. “We also note that several of our sister circuits have held the good-faith exception applicable under similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Taylor, 776 F.3d 513, 517-19 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Katzin, 769 F.3d at 173-77 (en banc); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 336-39 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Fisher, 745 F.3d 200, 203-06 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 676 (2014); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 261-62 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 400 (2014); United States v. Sparks, 711 F.3d 58, 62-68 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 204 (2013); United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 834-35 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2012).” United States v. Hohn, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5226 (10th Cir. April 1, 2015).

Posted in Good faith exception, GPS / Tracking Data | Comments Off on CA10: For pre-Jones GPS good faith to apply, Knotts and Karo are enough

The Atlantic: When Will the NSA Stop Spying on Innocent Americans?

The Atlantic: When Will the NSA Stop Spying on Innocent Americans? by Conor Friedersdorf:

The law cited as the justification for the phone dragnet will expire on June 1 unless Congress acts to extend it.

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Just Security: How a Case of Stolen Corn Seeds Shows the Problem with the FISA Court

Just Security: How a Case of Stolen Corn Seeds Shows the Problem with the FISA Court
by Faiza Patel:

As collateral challenges to the mass surveillance programs disclosed by Edward Snowden like US v. Moalin, US v. Muhtorov, and US v. Mohamud are winding their way through the courts, a lower-profile case – U.S. v. Hailong – is raising the issue of whether a Chinese company’s plot to steal corn seed warrants the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This case highlights the near impossibility of effectively challenging the use of these authorities, even in cases of targeted surveillance.

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D.Nev.: Apt was small enough that protective sweep was valid, even to balcony

While the record isn’t clear, the apartment here appears to be small enough that a protective sweep validly covered all the space inside, including the balcony near where defendant was arrested. United States v. Washington, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43617 (D.Nev. February 3, 2015). [It’s a heavy burden for the defense to show that any protective sweep that is just a look isn’t valid based on size of the dwelling. A ten room house is small enough. What about a 40 room house?]

Defendant’s argument isolated the parts of the officer’s testimony in an effort to show no reasonable suspicion, but the argument essentially ignores the totality of circumstances. “It is apparent from defense counsel’s cross-examination, as well as the briefs filed by defense counsel, that Mr. Johnson is arguing, in part, that Trooper Knott had already concluded that he had a drug trafficker when he first saw a black man driving a vehicle with a New Jersey license plate. Thus, Mr. Johnson argues that thereafter Trooper Knott’s conduct was entirely aimed at confirming the conclusion he had arrived at without any supporting information. As a result, Mr. Johnson argues that Trooper Knott had a distorted interpretation of Mr. Johnson’s otherwise innocent and explainable behavior. Seen in this light, Mr. Johnson’s argument is reasonable but still unconvincing.” The officer acted reasonably and professionally throughout. United States v. Johnson, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40558 (W.D.Pa. March 30, 2015).*

Six month old information wasn’t stale in a child pornography investigation. Defense counsel informed the defendant that it was a frivolous motion, and defendant concurred not to file a motion to suppress that wouldn’t win anyway. Defendant’s computers were searched and he continued obtaining child porn and he was also convicted of interstate transportation of a minor for sex and was sentenced to life. United States v. Simons, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42836 (N.D.Ala. January 6, 2015).*

Posted in Protective sweep, Reasonable suspicion, Staleness | Comments Off on D.Nev.: Apt was small enough that protective sweep was valid, even to balcony

S.D.Ohio: Alleged overseizure was not shown to be unreasonable here

“Sember has been indicted for stealing certain United States Air Force sensitive and proprietary technical, engineering and computer data and codes having a value in excess of $1,000 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.” The seizure of some matter allegedly beyond the warrant was not per se unreasonable. Also, the court finds the search started at 6 am and not earlier. United States v. Sember, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43035 (S.D. Ohio April 1, 2015):
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D.Mass.: Power company was not a state actor in providing electrical usage information

“The aphorism that ‘one man’s trash is another man’s treasure’ would certainly apply to the law enforcement officials who investigated this case.” Here, the city sanitation workers were seeing large amounts of marijuana debris coming in, and they called the police. The power company was not a government actor in revealing the defendant’s power usage to the police. “The very nature of marijuana cultivation conspiracies suggests, under some circumstances, that several year old information may not be stale. What’s more, the facts of the warrant affidavit give every reason to believe that such an extensive and long term conspiracy was present.” The warrant showed probable cause. United States v. Ly, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40854 (D.Mass. March 30, 2015).

The patdown was with reasonable suspicion and the drug packets were found by plain feel. Defendant failed to assign error to the trial court’s findings on inevitable discovery, so he can’t appeal that ground. Pork v. Commonwealth, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 105 (March 31, 2015).*

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CA6: Court can’t dictate how officers conduct their reasonable suspicion inquiry, but there are some limits

The stop was for speeding, 72/55. Nervousness alone is not enough for reasonable suspicion. An “oddity” in the rental contract, a third party renter not present, was enough to extend the stop. The dog sniff here occurred during the process of issuing the ticket. “Whether a seizure is reasonable is a question of law, which we review de novo.” “This is a close case,” but the court comes down on the side of reasonable suspicion on the totality. The court can’t dictate how the officers should conduct the inquiries, just whether they were wrong to do as they did. United States v. Winters, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5143, 2015 FED App. 0057P (6th Cir. March 31, 2015):
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Wisconsin Radio Network: Law enforcement to start collecting DNA samples during arrests

Wisconsin Radio Network: Law enforcement to start collecting DNA samples during arrests:

Wisconsin’s expanded DNA collection regime, which includes a cheek swab of people arrested for certain crimes, goes into effect Wednesday.

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WaPo: The proper way to make mistakes in drug policing

WaPo: The proper way to make mistakes in drug policing by Radley Balko:
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WSJ: Privacy Group Sues FAA Over Drone Rules

WSJ: Privacy Group Sues FAA Over Drone Rules:

Privacy advocates sued the Federal Aviation Administration for not addressing privacy issues in recent proposed rules for commercial drones, the latest dust-up over how to regulate unmanned aircraft as the devices become more prevalent in U.S. skies.

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IL: Pre-Jardines dog sniff at an apartment door not saved by Davis good faith exception where no case law authorized it at the time

Pre-Jardines dog sniff at an apartment door not saved by Davis good faith exception where no case law authorized it at the time. [Appellee didn’t even file a brief.] People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 140093, 2015 Ill. App. LEXIS 226 (March 31, 2015).

Plaintiff was ratted out by his half-brother for threatening to kill him and having and making counterfeit bills in his apartment. Since plaintiff was on probation from New Jersey, officers had sufficient information to conduct a probation search based on the phone call. Forney v. Forney, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40536 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2015).

The 14 page affidavit for search warrant shows probable cause and the warrant sufficient particularity. In any event, the good faith exception would save it. United States v. Byrd, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41083 (E.D.Mich. March 31, 2015).*

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ID erroneously puts burden of proof on driver in DL suspension cases to prove stop was not valid

In DL suspensions in Idaho, the burden is on the driver to show a lack of justification for the stop, not on the state to prove that it was valid. “The hearing officer properly concluded that Wernecke failed to prove the arresting officer lacked legal cause to stop Wernicke.” Wernecke v. State, 2015 Ida. App. LEXIS 20 (March 30, 2015). Since this is a civil case, should it matter? I say yes it does. The burden doesn’t change because warrantless anything is presumptively invalid, and the burden is on the state to justify. And, SCOTUS reminded everybody yesterday that the Fourth Amendment applies in civil cases. Civil tort cases helped create the Fourth Amendment, remember? Leach v. Money (1763) and Entick v. Carrington (1765).

Telephone calls to defendants from the undercover officers, passing $150,000 in cash for drugs, preparations for a second transfer of drugs, showing up at the appointed place, etc., was all probable cause for a search of the car they arrived in under the automobile exception. United States v. Deasis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39919 (E.D.N.Y. March 27, 2015).*

One has no standing to contest GPS on another’s vehicle. Green v. State, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 228 (March 30, 2015).

Posted in Burden of proof, GPS / Tracking Data, Reasonable suspicion, Standing | Comments Off on ID erroneously puts burden of proof on driver in DL suspension cases to prove stop was not valid