N.D.Ga.: Warrant for whole single family dwelling was not overbroad in a CP case

Search warrants are directed at places, and it doesn’t matter that several people live there. This was a single family dwelling, so the warrant wasn’t overbroad for identifying the whole home as a place to search in a child pornography case. United States v. Graham, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88796 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 2014).

Even if the defense lawyer had provided the impound policy, the search result wouldn’t be different. United States v. Foskey, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12232 (11th Cir. June 30, 2014).*

The officers collectively had sufficient knowledge of probable cause to search defendant’s car. United States v. Jenkins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88728 (S.D. Ill. June 30, 2014).*

Trial court’s finding of no consent from being confronted at night and having a flashlight shined in defendant’s eyes was not shown to be clearly erroneous, so it’s affirmed. State v. Purvis, 2014-Ohio-2865, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 2811 (9th Dist. June 30, 2014).*

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E.D.Mich.: That police were rude during the search isn’t a ground to exclude

Alleged police misconduct in how the search was conducted because they were rude and cavalier in handling the evidence isn’t a ground to suppress. United States v. Samonek, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88269 (E.D. Mich. June 30, 2014):
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D.Kan.: Standard govt cell phone search protocol violates particularity requirement and results in a general search

And it begins: What is the scope of Riley? When I was interviewed by the NYT last week about Riley, I mentioned that particularity was going to be the next real issue in cell phone searches, but that didn’t end up in the article. The District of Kansas held the day after Riley in a fascinating opinion that the standard search protocol of the government for cell phones provided in the search warrant application violated the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and would result in a general search. In re Premises Known As: a Nextel Cellular Tel. with Redacted Unknown Assigned Tel. No. Belonging to & Seized from [Redacted], 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88215 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014):

In addition to the places to be searched, the warrant must also describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity. This is to avoid a “general exploratory rummaging of a person’s belongings,” and was included in the Fourth Amendment as a response to the evils of general warrants.10 First, the description of the things to be seized must be “confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause.”11 Second, a warrant must describe the things to be seized with sufficiently precise language so that it informs the officers how to separate the items that are properly subject to seizure from those that are irrelevant.12 Stated another way: “As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”13 Taken together, a warrant is overly broad if it does not contain sufficiently particularized language that creates a nexus between the suspected crime and the things to be seized.14

The Court remains concerned that, in its current form, the government’s Application violates both of these provisions.
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CA5: Border Patrol agent could be sued in federal court for shooting a kid across the border in Mexico

A Border Patrol agent in El Paso shot and killed a young man in Mexico who was playing with his friend, running down and touching the border fence and running back. The friend was lucky and captured; Hernandez was shot in the face without ever setting foot in the U.S. His estate sued the government and the shooter. The Fifth Circuit concludes that there is no extraterritorial Fourth Amendment Bivens claim, but there is a Fifth Amendment due process claim for the shooting. The FTCA and other claims are denied as well. Hernandez v. United States, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12307 (5th Cir. June 30, 2014):

Finally, we address the practical obstacles and other functional considerations extraterritorial application would present. We recognized some of the practical concerns already: the national interest in self-protection; the constant need for surveillance, often with advanced technologies; and concerns over varying degrees of reasonableness depending on an agent’s location at any given time. While these practical concerns counsel against the Fourth Amendment’s application, they do not carry the same weight in the Fifth Amendment context because different standards govern the respective claims.
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ACLU: STINGRAYS: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About (Download)

ACLU of No. Cal.: STINGRAYS: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About
Download: Stingrays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About:

Federal and state law enforcement entities across the country are using a powerful cell phone surveillance tool commonly referred to as a “StingRay.” These devices are capable of locating a cell phone with extraordinary precision, but to do so they operate in dragnet fashion, scooping up information from a target device, as well as otherwireless devices in the vicinity. In addition, these devices can be configured to capture the content of voice and data communications. Although the federal government has been using these devices since at least 1995, and use by state and local governments is quite widespread, there are only a handful of published opinions addressing their use.

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WaPo: Officials release data on ‘backdoor’ searches

WaPo: Officials release data on ‘backdoor’ searches by Ellen Nakashima:

The FBI conducts a “substantial” number of warrantless queries for Americans’ e-mails and phone calls in a special database of intercepted communications, but it does not track exactly how often, an intelligence official said in a letter released Monday.

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D.N.H.: Bail conditions can permit otherwise illegal searches of the person; same as parole search

Officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a patdown of the defendant. Even if they didn’t, a bail condition of his would have permitted it. United States v. Drane, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88729 (D. N.H. June 30, 2014):
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NM adopts Greenwood dissents and finds a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash out for collection

New Mexico adopts the Greenwood dissent and holds that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left out for collection in an opaque bag, even in a communal dumpster. City ordinances on trash collection help create the expectation of privacy by regulating it. State v. Crane, 2014 N.M. LEXIS 245 (June 30, 2014):
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NYT: Border Patrol Scrutiny Stirs Anger in Arizona Town

NYT: Border Patrol Scrutiny Stirs Anger in Arizona Town by Fernanda Santos

ARIVACA, Ariz. — Every time Jack Driscoll drives the 32 miles from this remote outpost in southeastern Arizona to the closest supermarket, or to doctor’s appointments, or to a pharmacy to fill his prescriptions, he must stop at a Border Patrol checkpoint and answer the same question: “Are you a U.S. citizen?”

Sometimes, Border Patrol agents ask where he is going or coming from, the type of car he is driving, what is in that bag on the back seat or what brings him to these parts, even though he has lived here for more than a year. Lately Mr. Driscoll, a 75-year-old retired highway construction engineer, has taken to opening his window just a crack and yelling, “I’m American,” as he stops at the checkpoint, one of the ways he has found to protest.

He is not the only one in this community of 800 whose anger is boiling over. …

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D.Ariz.: Police merely entering a hospital room to talk is not a “search”

There was no Fourth Amendment violation from an officer coming into defendant’s hospital room to talk to him because it wasn’t a search. Even so, defendant consented to the officer’s presence. United States v. John, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86369 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2014).*

There was probable cause for defendant’s stop and search incident to his arrest based on the detailed and corroborated information from the CI. His admissions led to a search warrant for his home. The trial court’s finding of no probable cause is reversed. People v. Nguyen, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 1213 (June 24, 2014).*

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N.D.Cal.: 4 a.m. knock-and-talk violated the implied license of curtilage

A 4 a.m. knock-and-talk violated the implied license of curtilage, even though the officers did not identify themselves as officers at first. [Excellent discussion of Jardines curtilage and implied license to a 4 a.m. visit by anybody.] United States v. Lundin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88058 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2014):

3. Conclusion

Although the purpose and timing of the officers’ visit were both inconsistent with a “knock and talk,” there is some evidence that pushes the other way. For example, officers did not identify themselves as police, and did not “demand that the occupants open the door.” United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1573, n. 3 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1109 (holding a “knock and talk” reasonable because, inter alia, the officer “never announced that she was a police officer while knocking nor did she ever compel Cormier to open the door under the badge of authority,” and “[b]ecause there was no police demand to open the door”). The officers also only knocked twice, and were not “unreasonably persistent in … [their] attempt to obtain access to” the resident of the dwelling. Cormier, 220 F.3d at 1109 (citing U.S. v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1997)).

But while these facts might tip the balance in a closer case, here they are insufficient to render the officers’ 4:00 a.m. visit constitutional. By entering onto Lundin’s curtilage at four in the morning for the purpose of locating him to arrest him, the officers engaged not in a lawful “knock and talk” but rather in a presumptively unreasonable search. Since the government has not demonstrated that any exception to the warrant requirement applies, the search was unconstitutional.
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IN: The resisting law enforcement statute has to be construed to require the order to stop be lawful and be based on RS or PC

The Indiana resisting law enforcement statute has to be construed to require the order to stop be lawful and be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. On its face, it requires a person to stop even for unlawful orders, and that condones Fourth Amendment violations to be litigated after the fact. Construing it this way preserves its constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. Gaddie v. State, 2014 Ind. LEXIS 516 (June 27, 2014):

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable search and seizure shall not be violated. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. At minimum, the government’s seizure of a citizen must rest on specific, articulable facts that lead an officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968). The Supreme Court in Terry stressed that it had “always recognized” that:

No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.

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N.D.Cal.: TOS agreement didn’t create an objective reasonable expectation of privacy

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s IP address from discovery by the government. Here, it was by the use of a packet sniffer. Also, the software’s terms of service might create a subjective expectation of privacy, but they wouldn’t create one that society would find was reasonable. United States v. Hagood, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88076 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2014):
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RT.com: Facebook fighting against ‘largest ever’ govt data request in court

RT.com: Facebook fighting against ‘largest ever’ govt data request in court:

Facebook is locked in a legal battle over a court ruling that forced the site to hand over data from almost 400 profiles to authorities. The social media site argues the decision is unconstitutional and violates the Fourth Amendment.

Last summer, a New York court ordered Facebook to release data from the accounts of 381 people, who were suspected of being involved in a disability fraud case. The information included photos, private messages and other data.

The social media platform had previously been unable to go public about their legal struggle against the “largest data request” by a government body because of a court gagging order. However, Chris Sonderby, Facebook Deputy General Counsel published a blog post on Thursday speaking out about the case after a New York judge granted permission to go public.

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DE: Out of possession landlord had no expectation of privacy in his rental property

“As an out of possession landlord and–subsequently–a former landlord, Mr. Walker would not have any expectation of privacy in any rental property he owned. That expectation of privacy would belong to the tenants at 637 Clymer Street. Further, Mr. Walker did not even own the property during the time in question.” Walker v. City of New Castle, 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 307 (June 23, 2014).

Defendant consented to a search of his cell phone apparently as an act of cooperation. The district court did not clearly err in finding consent. United States v. Garrett, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12184 (7th Cir. June 26, 2014).*

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OH2: Dive to floor on opening door was exigency

When the door to defendant’s hotel room was opened, his dive toward the floor was exigent circumstances where they already suspected he was armed. State v. Peck, 2014-Ohio-2820, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 2760 (2d Dist. June 27, 2014).

Officers came to a house looking for a man and had a description. They knocked and were leaving when the door opened and a man matching the description opened the door with what officers thought was a gun in hand. He saw the officers and shut and locked the door. Then there was a commotion inside. Officers entered without a warrant, and the trial court credited the one officer, the only witness, who testified that there was exigency. “He then heard commotion from which he concluded that that someone inside the house had been harmed or was at risk of harm.” [The defense called this “dubious,” but there wasn’t anything to contradict it.] State v. Berg, 2014-Ohio-2745, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 2697 (9th Dist. June 25, 2014).*

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D.C.Cir.: False evidence for an arrest states a claim for relief

Plaintiff was a jail guard, and he was prosecuted for assaulting an inmate. Two years after the prosecution started he won. It was determined that the basis for the arrest was on knowing use of false evidence that he did not act in self-defense, so plaintiff stated a claim for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The statute of limitations started with the dismissal of the underlying case. Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12117 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014):
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S.D.Fla.: GFE applies to overbreadth questions, too

A child pornography warrant was not overbroad as to the computers and a Dropbox account. Even it if was, the offending portion would be severed. Here, nothing was seized under the allegedly overbroad phrase. And, even if it was, the good faith exception would apply. United States v. Darbouze, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87059 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2014):
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WaPo: How accurate are historical cell-site records?

WaPo: How accurate are historical cell-site records? by Orin Kerr:
Not very accurate, says Douglas Starr over at The New Yorker. An excerpt: If I make a cell call from Kenmore Square, in my home town of Boston, you might think that I’m connecting to a cell site a few hundred feet away. But, if I’m standing near Fenway Park during a Red Sox game, […]

The link: The New Yorker: What Your Cell Phone Can’t Tell the Police by Douglas Starr:

If I make a cell call from Kenmore Square, in my home town of Boston, you might think that I’m connecting to a cell site a few hundred feet away. But, if I’m standing near Fenway Park during a Red Sox game, with thousands of fans making calls and sending texts, that tower may have reached its capacity. Hypothetically, the system might send me to the next site, which might also be at capacity or down for maintenance, or to the next site, or the next. The switching center may look for all sorts of factors, most of which are proprietary to the company’s software. The only thing that you can say with confidence is that I have connected to a cell site somewhere within a radius of roughly twenty miles.

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NYTimes: Facebook Bid to Shield Data From the Law Fails, So Far

NYTimes: Facebook Bid to Shield Data From the Law Fails, So Far by Vindu Goel and James C. McKinley Jr.:

In confidential legal documents unsealed on Wednesday, Facebook argues that Manhattan prosecutors last summer violated the constitutional right of its users to be free of unreasonable searches by demanding nearly complete account data on 381 people, ranging from pages they had liked to photos and private messages.

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