TX7: SW sworn to before wrong official still in good faith

While the search warrant affidavit was not sworn to before the correct official as required by statute, the good faith exception is enough to sustain this search. There was probable cause, and it was particular. All constitutional requirements were met. State v. Rios, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 9404 (Tex. App. – Amarillo Dec. 9, 2025) (substituted opinion on rehearing):

The Court of Criminal Appeals has applied the good faith exception where officers rely on warrants with technical defects that do not undermine the warrant’s constitutional foundation. In State v. Arellano, the court held that a defect on a warrant that failed to meet Article 18.04(5)’s requirements (requiring a legible signature) did not preclude the good faith exception. 600 S.W.3d 53, 60-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The court emphasized that “evidence obtained pursuant to such a defective warrant should not be rendered inadmissible, so long as the statutory requirements of Article 38.23(b) are satisfied . . . .” Id.

Similarly, in Dunn v. State, a magistrate’s missing signature on an arrest warrant was held to be a defect covered by the good faith exception. 951 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The Court held that despite the statutory violation, the record reflected “the magistrate found probable cause to issue the warrant, signed the accompanying warrants, and intended but inadvertently failed to sign appellant’s arrest warrant.” Id.

Contrary to what Rios suggests, the statutory good faith exception is not limited to defects on the face of the warrant itself. It can encompass defects in the oath supporting the warrant provided that the constitutional foundation lies intact and the officer’s reliance is objectively reasonable. Consistent with that focus, at least one court has applied the exception where the defect lay in how the underlying complaint or affidavit was sworn rather than in the warrant form itself. See Flores v. State, 367 S.W.3d 697, 702-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d), (recognizing good faith exception when police officer swore complaint for an arrest warrant before an assistant district attorney rather than “before the magistrate” as required under Article 15.03(a)(2) when the officer “followed standard procedure in attesting to his complaint and obtaining the warrant” and the warrant indicated complaint was made under oath.).

Our holding is narrow. We do not hold that Article 18.0215(c)’s judge-specific oath requirement is optional or that its violation is trivial. Rather, we hold that this judge-specific requirement, important as it is, does not transform a constitutionally-sworn affidavit into the equivalent of no oath at all, and it does not categorically preclude application of Article 38.23(b) where the statute’s four elements-warrant, neutral magistrate, probable cause, and objective good faith reliance-are otherwise satisfied.