GFE is not an exception to warrant requirement, only the exclusionary rule (dissent)

Per the dissent, the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in holding in an unpublished opinion that the good faith exception is an exception to the warrant requirement, not the exclusionary rule. People v. Mead, 2020 Mich. App. LEXIS 6223 (Sept. 17, 2020) (unpublished). People v. Mead, 2021 Mich. LEXIS 617 (Apr. 16, 2021) (5-2) (dissent from denial of review).

Reasonable suspicion can come from an “emerging tableau” of information. “And when in the course of these inquiries the officer formulates new suspicions based on the “emerging tableau” of information, the officer is permitted to “increase the scope of his investigation by degrees.” Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (discussing law enforcement’s need for ‘an escalating set of flexible responses’)).” United States v. Carr, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73809 (D. Me. Apr. 16, 2021).

The state court considered petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim on direct appeal, so further review is barred by Stone. Benavidez v. Espinoza, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74023 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2021).*

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