CA3: State law required RS for a parole search

Defendant was a parolee, and the parties argued over whether no suspicion was required for a parole search or reasonable suspicion. The government argued no suspicion required. The parole conditions didn’t specify, but state statute did, and reasonable suspicion is the standard. And the officers had it. United States v. Henley, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 32482 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 2019). [Note: State law is irrelevant to federal cases arising from a state search (Virginia v. Moore) except only under the law of probation and parole searches because it informs reasonableness under Samson:

Henley claims Douglass’s suspicion that he was dealing drugs rested on “nothing more than stale speculation premised upon irrelevant innuendo.” Henley Br. at 5. In support of his appeal, Henley relies on various Pennsylvania court decisions concerned with state constitutional violations. Because this case involves a federal prosecution, however, we must determine what the Fourth Amendment demands of the challenged search. United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1984). At the same time, we recognize that state law may inform the contours of the government intrusion, both in terms of the legitimate state interests and the parolee’s diminished expectation of privacy. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 851-52, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006).]