S.D.Ind. erroneously states there is a “presumption of good faith reliance” on a SW

Assuming there is no probable cause, the court instead decides the question of application of the good faith exception, erroneously putting the burden on the defendant to overcome the good faith exception, not putting on the government to prove the good faith exception where it belongs. “In sum, Vivas has not cited to any case involving a materially similar affidavit and cannot establish that the affidavit is so plainly deficient that a reasonable officer could not be expected to know that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. See United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 819 (7th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, Vivas has failed to rebut the presumption of good faith reliance, and the evidence seized as a result of the search warrant will not be suppressed. As such, the Court need not determine whether Vivas’ consent to search the email was tainted by an illegal search. See United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1990).” [Valencia is not cited for the good faith exception, anyway.] United States v. Vivas, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140579 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2018).