Defendant stated a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest by a false affidavit for arrest, and the statute of limitations started to run on defendant’s acquittal. A Franks violation generally defeats qualified immunity. Winfrey v. Rogers, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 23139 (5th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018), prior appeal, 882 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2018):
Furthermore, we agree that a Fourth Amendment claim is cognizable under the facts here. This Court has held that although there is no “freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution,” “[t]he initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection—the Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested, for example.” Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945, 953 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1998), a plurality of the Supreme Court said that malicious-prosecution claims must be based on the Fourth Amendment, rather than on “the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,'” because the Fourth Amendment is the explicit textual source against this type of government behavior. Id. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)). And recently, in Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911, 197 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2017), the Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff had stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance based upon false reports written by a police officer and an evidence technician. Id. at 915. There, the Court said the plaintiff’s “claim fits the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment fits [the plaintiff’s] claim, as hand in glove.” Id. at 917. And it held “that the Fourth Amendment governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention even beyond the start of legal process.” Id. at 920.
These cases fully support a finding that the Fourth Amendment is the appropriate constitutional basis for Junior’s claim that he was wrongfully arrested due to the knowing or reckless misstatements and omissions in Johnson’s affidavits. We, therefore, hold that a Fourth Amendment claim is presented, and we will decide the remainder of the issues based upon this legal conclusion.
. . .
Here, we conclude that Junior alleges a clearly established constitutional violation. Under the first prong of Franks, Junior must present evidence that Johnson, through material omissions or otherwise, made “a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.” 438 U.S. at 155. Junior provides evidence that Johnson made false statements in his affidavit by (1) omitting Campbell’s statements that were contradicted by the physical evidence; (2) misstating that Pikett’s drop-trail from Burr’s house to the Winfrey house used Junior’s scent, when the drop-trail actually used Hammond’s scent; and (3) omitting Campbell’s inconsistencies between his statements, that is, between Campbell’s first statement—which was related in the affidavit—that said that Megan and Junior helped Senior to murder Burr and Campbell’s inconsistent later statement that Senior’s cousin was the accomplice. We find that this showing is also sufficient to demonstrate that there is an issue of material fact as to whether Johnson acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, because Junior alleges that Johnson either knew or should have known that these material omissions and false statements could lead to an arrest of Junior without probable cause. In short, the evidence presented is sufficient to support a finding that his conduct was unreasonable in the light of the well-established principle requiring probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant.
Yet, we must proceed further to the second prong of Franks in order to resolve whether “the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause,” as required by the Franks analysis. 438 U.S. at 156. To determine whether the false statement was necessary for this finding, Franks requires us to consider the faulty affidavit as if those errors and omissions were removed. We then must examine the “corrected affidavit” and determine whether probable cause for the issuance of the warrant survives the deleted false statements and material omissions. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 (saying that courts must excise false statements); United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d 296, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Franks to omissions and using a corrected affidavit that “contain[ed] the allegedly exculpatory conversation” to determine whether that affidavit would establish probable cause to authorize electronic surveillance), overruled on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S. Ct. 365, 148 L. Ed. 2d 221 (2000). The warrant will be valid only if the corrected affidavit establishes probable cause for Junior’s arrest.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)